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Reviewing the challenges to organized civil life 
of threatening forces from within and without, 
Mr. Morris seeks to define the ways in which the 
i n h e r i t e d i n fo rma t ion n e c e s s a r y to ensu re 
society's continued existence and development 
is transmitted from generation to generation. 
The impor t ance of the role that Mr. Morris 
assigns to "institutions of intelligence" derives 
from the characteristics that enable these insti­
tutions to fulfil our complex society's need for 
both stability and innovation: (a) reliance upon 
inferential beliefs, (b) consolidation of social 
activities, and (c) perpetuation of a fruitful life 
through the promise of a sufficiently flexible 
community. 
Moving from a discussion of the primitive arts 
to those sophisticated arts so characteristic of 
the present, Mr. Morris dwells upon science and 
technology as the primary formative factors of 
contemporary society. Science, as an institution 
of intelligence, not only makes ever insistent 
demands upon us but also holds out ever greater 
promise of contributions to the formation of a 
more authentic cultural life. Through the insti­
tution of technology, the discoveries of science 
affect the practical activities of the common man. 
Primarily concerned with redefining the educa­
tional needs of our technological age, Mr. Morris 
insists that our educational institutions can take 
advantage of these potentials only by radically 
reorienting themselves to them. Accordingly, he 
maps out stages from the early beginnings of 
learning through the stages of higher education 
and after when opportunities should be eagerly 
seized to advance the practical arts and to free 
the human spirit in the more completely libera­
tive arts: aesthetic, religious, and philosophical. 
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Foreword 
The publication of this analysis by an established scholar in 
American philosophy represents the completion of an intellec­
tual trilogy comprised of Numbers 4, 5, and 6 in this series 
sponsored by the John Dewey Society. Each of the three stud­
ies selected has focused upon one of the approaches to educa­
tional theory that have become increasingly significant since 
mid-century: linguistic analysis, existentialism, and philosophi­
cal anthropology. 
The first of these volumes to appear, The Place of Reason 
in Education by Bertram Bandman (Number 4 in the series), 
was intended to show the relevance of analytic philosophy to 
educational theory. In the same year, Kenneth Winetrout's 
F. C. S. Schiller and the Dimensions of Pragmatism repre­
sented a re-evaluation of pragmatism and its relevance to ex­
istential philosophies. The author of the present volume, Ber­
tram Morris is now concerned with applying philosophical 
anthropology to educational theory. 
 x Foreword
Intelligence can be considered a social phenomenon and an 
instrument of culture, as well as a possession of individuals. 
Among the institutions of man created out of the matrix 
of human cultural experience are those concerned primarily 
with safeguarding and nurturing intelligence; such institutions 
of intelligence are intended to preserve and order that aspect of 
civilization concerned with developing the minds of men. To 
such an important but relatively ignored perspective on educa­
tional theory Professor Morris here addresses himself. 
The book was written expressly for the John Dewey Society 
in response to an invitation extended by the Commission on 
Studies in Educational Theory. Although all members of the 
Commission have reacted to earlier drafts of the work in prog­
ress, Professor Frederick Ellis worked most intensively with Dr. 
Morris and represented the Commission in the earliest stages 
of planning. 
ROBERT MASON 
University of Pittsburgh 
July 10, 1968 
Preface 
In one sense the grave issues of society are the same today as 
they have ever been: to transform the spurious and disfunc­
tional elements of social life into authentic and functional ele­
ments. In another sense our times have advanced human in­
telligence in ways such as to create problems for which there 
is no parallel in former times. With the advent of modern 
science and its application to virtually every kind of human 
endeavor, we have come to see institutions develop that have the 
promotion of man's intelligence as their chief end. A peculiar­
ity of this innovation is that man has altered both the world 
and himself. He has changed his environment and he has 
changed himself too—his needs, his outlook, his mode of life. 
There is reason, therefore, to turn attention to his new predica­
ments and to his prospects for a genuine society. 
To understand what has happened and what men can do 
to reorient themselves to what has happened, I have here con­
cerned myself with institutions of intelligence, primarily in 
terms of the impact of science and technology on modern so­
Preface xii 
ciety and secondarily in terms of the role schools and universi­
ties can play so that men can accommodate themselves to 
science and technology and the practical arts derivative from 
them. 
Were it not for the prodding and stimulus of my friend 
Professor George E. Axtelle, I should not have engaged in this 
venture. Because of what he initiated, I have further enjoyed 
a most gratifying relationship with the members of the Com­
mission on Studies in Educational Theory of the John Dewey 
Society: Professors Robert E. Mason, Chairman; Frederick 
Ellis,- Ward Madden; and Israel Scheffler. They have gener­
ously made helpful suggestions for revision of my manuscript. 
I can never properly acknowledge my debt to the western 
philosophical tradition. I have taken much from Greek science 
and Greek humanism as well as from Hobbes' conception of 
man as a member of civil society. As for my debt to contem­
porary philosophy, I owe most to the pragmatic tradition and 
especially to Dewey's philosophy when it is read, as it should 
be, as disclosing intimate interrelations between ideas and in­
stitutions. My other debts are not easily specified, but I owe 
much to my free-thinking students with their not idle protests 
against authority, ideology, and war. 
BERTRAM MORRIS 
Boulder, Colorado 
June 20, 1968 
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Institutions of Intelligence 
But so long as power alone is on one side, 
and knowledge and understanding alone on the other, 
the learned will seldom make great objects their study, 
princes will still more rarely do great actions, 
and the peoples will continue to be, as they are, 
mean, corrupt, and miserable. 
JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU 
Disquisition on the Arts and Sciences 
Introduction 
Preliminary Definition 
Men act, feel, and think, and by doing so they manifest their 
various human capacities. These capacities, however, may be 
made known not just by individuals but also by established 
institutions. The latter necessarily develop regularized forms 
which, through appropriate means, advance collective ends of 
social life. We may denote the kinds of institutions that corre­
spond to the capacities for acting, feeling, and thinking as 
institutions of power, institutions of expression, and institu­
tions of intelligence, respectively. 
Just as, psychologically, action, feeling, and thinking are 
almost certainly never found in complete isolation from one 
another, so, socially, neither are the institutions such as to 
manifest one of these human qualities without an admixture of 
the others. Yet the predominance of one quality over the others 
is justification enough for naming the institutions as I have 
above suggested. Thus, government and economics may appro­
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priately be regarded as institutions of power; the fine arts as 
institutions of expression; and science and philosophy as insti­
tutions of intelligence. Moreover, each may have supporting 
institutions, such as courts of law or magazines of the arts and 
art criticism or, for institutions of intelligence, schools and 
universities. Even though the supporting institutions invaria­
bly employ intellectual analyses, yet by extension they are 
properly classified with the superordinate institution that they 
serve. In what follows, however, I shall, of course, concentrate 
upon institutions of intelligence, but at crucial points I shall 
want both to indicate ways in which the institutions of other 
kinds may very well complement one another and to note the 
desirability of their becoming so interfused as to efface the 
distinctions I have proposed for analytic purposes. 
By institutions of intelligence I denote then such organized 
forms of intelligence as science and philosophy, as well as those 
institutions, such as the school or university, that, relying upon 
the intellect, directly serve to perpetuate them. And for reasons 
that will become apparent in the course of the discussion, I also 
denote the practical arts as institutions of intelligence. The 
intellectual content of the practical arts is certainly implicit, if 
not explicit, but in an emphatic sense they embody a collective 
intelligence by virtue of which a society sustains itself. Al­
though they do have a component of power, and usually one of 
expression too, nevertheless the expertise that at least the 
primary practical arts demand is dependent on an intimate 
knowledge of nature, as, for example, in the arts of hunting, 
fishing, domesticating animals, agriculture, together with the 
fabrication of all sorts of things. Without intelligence, which 
includes the ability to make, perfect and employ tools, social 
life could arise at best in such forms as the animals of the 
jungle may enjoy, but not in human forms. The tools of social 
life mark the presence of intelligence at work, and the more 
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sophisticated the tools, naturally the more sophisticated are the 
techniques of the arts that employ them. 
Science is peculiarly an institution of intelligence because it 
represents an extension of the knowledge that is contained in 
the arts, and in turn it allows the arts to become transformed 
by becoming informed with the new knowledge men gain 
through the practice of science. In one of its phases, science 
becomes pure by becoming dissociated from the arts; in an­
other, it becomes effective by being employed for practical 
ends. In the latter phase, we discern the impact of science on 
other forms of institutional life; for we see how a people's life 
becomes drastically changed, involving new means and there­
fore new ends and therefore new relations among men. Much 
of my discussion will be an attempt to understand the signifi­
cance of this change, including the need for educational insti­
tutions to keep abreast of change and to help redefine ends 
appropriate to newly developing knowledge. 
As science arises out of the arts and converts them into new 
forms, so philosophy arises out of science and has as its distinc­
tive task a reconciliation of it with the established beliefs of a 
culture. Science is liberative; but as with all liberation, it is 
destructive too. By its dogged insistence upon the development 
of natural knowledge, science inevitably comes into conflict 
with settled ways of looking at nature and man and his gods. 
Through a variety of techniques, philosophy aims to help men 
reorient themselves to a world torn by conflicting beliefs and 
attitudes. Plato, St. Thomas, Descartes, Kant, and, more re­
cently, Russell, Whitehead, James, Dewey, Sartre, and Witt­
genstein, among others, have attempted just this, however 
different their methods and insights. 
Philosophy, then, is not just an escape from the world or a 
purely formal exercise of the mind. Rather, it is an escape so 
that one can return to the world of actions and things and see 
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them ordered in a new way, more in keeping with what one 
may know and has a right to believe in. So far from being an 
idle exercise in intellectual prestidigitation, philosophy is a 
serious business of seeking through the intellect those struc­
tures upon which men can rely and can rightly establish new 
beliefs. The history of Western philosophy is a formidable 
story of how, in the light of cultural advances, philosophers 
have set about this endless task of reinterpreting man and his 
place in the world. 
Through their agents, institutions of intelligence thus share 
in the task of extending and consolidating knowledge, accom­
modating institutional purposes to changing intellectual hori­
zons, and of warding off its enemies, especially those of vested 
interests, ignorance, and such irrelevancies and distractions as 
prevent men from liberating the human spirit and of further­
ing their common causes. Clearly, the task requires that strate­
gies and tactics be devised for attaining these ends. The strate­
gies need to be decisive and the tactics will necessarily be 
complex. The strategies constitute the institutional phase; the 
tactics, the internal complexities that define intelligence in 
operation. 
Intelligence does not require institutions, but sustained in­
telligence does. Men are surely capable of thinking and invent­
ing by themselves, but not on a large scale. Institutions can 
support these activities by bringing the accumulated past to 
bear upon the present, by introducing more varied suggestions 
than can come from a single person, and by creating a commu­
nity of interests that necessarily relies upon critical understand­
ing of ideas. Institutions thus can come to have an established 
purposiveness, a comprehensiveness, and at the same time a 
coherence that is difficult, if not impossible, for a person by 
himself to achieve. And even if there are geniuses that excel in 
a number of qualities, the one they cannot excel in is that of a 
Introduction 
firmly established capacity for sustained activity. At least this is 
the lesson that contemporary man has learned, and it is as true 
of institutions of intelligence as of other kinds of institutions. 
Nevertheless, an institution of intelligence does not prosper 
without its tacticians, who are thinking individuals. Intelli­
gence feeds on thoughts, even though they always extend be­
yond the individual. The process of thinking is mediated by 
inference, and the whole achieves a form in which thoughts 
are interconnected in a way that produces a satisfactory result. 
In the play of intelligence, inferences create a system of 
thoughts, which are related, moreover, to the ends to which 
they are pertinent. The dramatic successes of intelligence have 
resulted in finding forms or laws in the changing events of 
nature or society, such as are expressed in the law of gravity or 
in the law of diminishing returns. Without such forms man 
would be at the mercy of experience; with them he is able to 
master experience and to employ it for his own ends. But to do 
this effectively, his successes need to be consolidated and func­
tionally perpetuated. When men do this well, they do it in 
concert, and thus become institutional agents of intelligence. 
Those institutions of intelligence that best serve man are those 
in which the agents accommodate themselves to change by 
sloughing off old, inadequate ways in favor of new, functional 
ones. 
I define now an institution of intelligence as an organized 
social activity which depends on a series of inferences and 
which is capable of correction and of perpetuating itself. The 
distinctive mark of the institution is its dependence upon a 
kind of knowledge that is subject to correction. Knowledge 
that is mediated by inference can be corrected in part by being 
criticized at each step, in much the same way as the mathemati­
cian demands to see strict implication in each step in the proof 
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of a theorem. But in greater part, knowledge (that is, apparent 
knowledge) is corrected by our seeking evidence to support the 
truth of our statements about what the world is. For example, 
by a series of inferences, together with a growing knowledge of 
the way things behave, we first conclude that adding nitroge­
nous substances to the soil produces better and more nourishing 
crops. But then through a complicated process we later discover 
that nitrogen in the form of nitrates becomes nitrites and that 
we are indirectly poisoning ourselves. Such may be the ironies 
of which we come to learn. 
The complexity of the role of knowledge in institutions of 
intelligence requires that we make a distinction between 
knowledge for its own sake and knowledge for civic life. 
Ordinarily the two are intertwined, but for analytic purposes 
the distinction should be made. Science, we note again, is often 
said to be pure. Although later on I shall adduce considerations 
that cast doubt on its purity, for the present we may accept the 
notion. Science is, of course, pure in the sense that it has its 
own rigorous techniques and methods, such that, for example, 
if nitrites are really poisonous to the upper intestines, this is so 
regardless of a scientist's political ideology or theological belief 
or philosophical persuasion. Because science is a critical and 
co-operative enterprise, there is sense in talking about the 
community of scientists who pursue their objectives, criticize 
one another, arrive at agreements, and train others to do so. 
Such a community is surely to be regarded as an institution of 
intelligence, even the prime institution of intelligence. 
There is, however, the wider community to which the 
practical arts are indispensable. In so-called primitive societies 
these arts too may be primitive. (It seems, however, that the 
more we know of such societies the more skilled and informed 
their arts appear.) The difference between the practical arts in 
primitive societies and in our complex industrial societies re­
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sides in the degree to which sophisticated knowledge enters 
into and alters the character of these arts. By virtue of this 
feature many of the distinctive quandaries of our times are 
created—automated industry, big business, intolerable govern­
ments, strife-ridden cities, pollution—the list is endless. Some 
reasonable utilitarian ends appear to be the only proper meas­
ure of the arts if these quandaries are to be understood. The 
definition of such ends, incorporating as they do institutions of 
intelligence, is the theme of my discussion. But before pursu­
ing it, I wish to locate some of these quandaries, first, by 
focusing upon the popular indictment of contemporary society 
and, secondly, by observing two of the current philosophical 
modes that bear upon them. Then I wish to reconsider these 
quandaries from the point of view of institutions of intelli­
gence. 
The Popular Indictment 
To begin with, there is the popular indictment of modern 
society, somewhat inchoate, yet somewhat formidable. First, it 
is a resentment against the bigness of society, and, second, an 
abhorrence of the confusion of material and spiritual values. 
Neither of these protests is unfounded. Modern society is big, 
impersonal, urban, crowded, mechanized, inhuman—in short, 
it is mass society. It is also one profusely endowed with mate­
rial goods, often convenient, yet frequently trifling, distractive, 
and unworthy of human employment. Mass society is a condi­
tion of great perplexity, coarse and busy, and rude to individ­
ual concern. However much it opens opportunities for a diver­
sity of talents, it nevertheless imposes appalling standardization 
and monotony upon men's lives. Even though men accept it, 
they cannot but doubt its acceptability. Mass society surely 
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does produce its own kind of strains, often intolerable. At times 
its psychological and social burdens encourage men to seek 
compensations in sensational or remote ends, disparate from 
those involvements dictated by social necessities. Compensatory 
satisfactions are not in themselves objectionable; but they do 
inhibit more complete and, consequently, more satisfying activ­
ities. The popular indictment assumes many forms, sometimes 
worded as the curse of bigness, sometimes as the lost individ­
ual, sometimes as the lonely crowd, and, more currently, as 
man's alienation. In all these wordings there is a fundamental 
disjointedness between the individual's hopes and his realiza­
tions. And in the modern mode—reflected in literature, the 
theater, TV, criticisms of urban and domestic relations, and 
even in politics—there is a prevailing pessimism, spurred on by 
the facts of social life. 
Surely we must admit there is truth in the indictment— 
even if it is the truth of the affluent society. I am not suggest­
ing that men have not always suffered dilemmas, both on the 
social and the psychological plane. But I do wish to suggest 
that the contemporary dilemmas have a singular character, 
only partly shared with those of the past. I urge, moreover, that 
unless we appreciate this singularity, we can neither diagnose 
nor prescribe for the malady of contemporary man. The virtue 
of the popular indictment lies in its sheer and impressive 
negativity. It is contained in the immediate and fresh responses 
of those who are undeniably hurt—their humiliations, their 
degradations, and their frustrations. The injuries of the com­
mon people, being freshly and naively encountered, are ex­
pressed on the level of common sense and are not projected in 
Schopenhauerian terms onto the level of metaphysical arche­
types. Those most understanding of the immediate quality of 
human sufferings are the poets or playwrights or novelists or 
artists, rather than the metaphysicians. Those devoted to the 
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fine arts, being less given to dogmatics and moralizing than the 
metaphysicians, are for the most part more competent to give 
shape to the quarrels men have with their world. The Becketts, 
the Bellows, the Albees, the Baskins—these articulate the ago­
nies of life in ways that those who suffer them know only as 
darkly felt, uninstructive emotions. In their articulations we 
may find not answers but representations of suffering that we 
ignore at the risk of losing any capacity to cope with the issues 
of contemporary culture. 
Contemporary Philosophical Approaches 
Philosophy also comes into play as a sophisticated reflection 
upon culture—though possibly concerned more with answers 
than with documented representations of the human predica­
ment. The current philosophical schools are predominantly 
two: analytic philosophy coming from England and existential­
ist philosophy coming from the Continent. Beginning in differ­
ent quarters, speaking different languages, and employing dif­
ferent philosophical techniques, they nevertheless end up with 
some startling similarities in their final philosophical pro­
nouncements. It is beyond my province to provide details of the 
origins and developments of these philosophies. I wish, how­
ever, to note some dominant features that indicate how mem­
bers of these schools attempt to cope with the human predica­
ment and how they employ their skills for arriving at their 
conclusions.* 
* For two brief and popular, yet skillfully done, versions of these 
competing philosophies, I refer the reader to Stanley Cavell, "Existential­
ism and Analytic Philosophy," Daedalus, XCIII, No. 3 (Summer, 
1964), 946-75, and George Geiger, "Notes on Philosophy: 1940-65, 
1965?" Antioch Review, XXV, No. 4 (Winter, 1965-66), 564-75. 
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Existentialism 
Of the two schools, existentialism is closer to the popular 
idiom. It begins powerfully with Kierkegaard's explosive indict­
ment of European culture and Christians who have forsaken 
Christianity. Under Sartre, it develops climactically into a 
humanism that is forced to acknowledge the human predica­
ment as being meaningless, absurd, and nihilistic. The themes 
are close to human life and the language closer to the vulgar 
than it is to the traditional philosophical mode of speaking. 
Kierkegaard consciously disavows the abstractions of philoso­
phy, especially the rationalism of Hegel; and Sartre repeatedly 
insists that he can better communicate by means of literary and 
dramatic devices than by means of philosophical conceptuali­
zation. Certainly, we must admit that religious language and 
literary expression enjoy an affective quality that is missing in 
philosophical analysis. 
Besides the linguistic affinity, there is also deeply embedded 
in these two forms of existentialism a common insight. Both 
are led to despair, even if for very different reasons: the 
religious because God is unapproachable and the humanistic 
because there is no God to approach. The common element, 
however, lies in a yearning for an inwardness and a rejection of 
outwardness. (A more profound insight is at times suggested in 
both versions—namely, that the outward can be accommodated 
to, and domesticated by, the inward.) There is no doubt, 
however, that priority belongs to inwardness, without which 
men concern themselves only with trivia. To understand the 
details of these themes is to understand existentialism itself. I 
content myself with merely a few of the most obvious consider­
ations and then only for the purpose of preparing for the 
conclusions to which existentialists are committed. 
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Kierkegaard explicitly regards the cultivation of inwardness 
as the only proper vocation of man. His is a search for, or 
better, an orientation toward, subjectivity. Man gains nothing 
by gaining the world—and losing his soul. Throwing all else to 
the winds, man's awesome search is for subjectivity, and it is a 
search totally passionate and selfless. "Decision inheres in sub­
jectivity alone, essentially in its passion, and maximally in the 
personal passion which is infinitely interested in an eternal 
happiness." * In this search, the scientific mode must be aban­
doned, whether it pertains to an inquiry into the Scriptures 
themselves or to the disinterested study of nature. Faith is a 
demanding mistress, who allows no other love. 
The humanistic version may seem poles apart from the 
religious. And to be sure, in many ways it is. Yet it has its own 
version of inwardness, which is related to its predecessor. No 
doubt, the most basic distinction that Sartre insists upon is 
between things and conscious beings—that which exists "in 
itself" and that which exists "for itself." The search is for the 
latter, and an agonizing one it is. Man seeks "good faith," but 
at every step he falls into "bad faith." Whatever he does, 
however, he and he alone is responsible; for he is freedom. His 
responsibility is undertaken by his own acts. The act of asser­
tion, which is the expression of his freedom, is a dreadful one, 
"a pure wrenching away from himself. . . . This implies for 
consciousness the permanent possibility of effecting a rupture 
with its own past, of wrenching itself away from its past so as 
to be able to consider it in the light of a non-being and so as to 
be able to confer on it the meaning which it has in terms of the 
project of a meaning which it does not have!'\ The chasm 
* Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 35. 
t Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and. Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes 
(New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1956), p. 436. 
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between present and past is the condition of fearful choice— 
the nausea that is the inescapable condition of man. 
The violence of the human estate upon which Sartre insists 
clearly derives from the rupture of past and present. He will 
have no continuity between them, and for this reason man is 
helplessly turned back upon himself, only to find that the task 
to be undertaken is for a giant, whereas the agent is a pigmy. 
The result, if not sheer comedy, induces a sense of the absurd, 
the meaningless, the nihilistic, both for man and for his inter­
pretation of the world. This attitude, however, is not always 
consistently assumed. Simone de Beauvoir deprecates science 
in so far as it yields to "the infatuation of the serious" and 
technics in so far as it "sets up as absolute goals the saving of 
time and work which it enables us to realize and the comfort 
and luxury which it enables us to have access to." She adds 
that "airplanes, machines, the telephone and the radio do not 
make men happier than those of former times." Significantly, 
she continues: 
But actually it is not a question of giving men time and 
happiness, it is not a question of stopping the movement 
of life: it is a question of fulfilling it. If technics is at­
tempting to make up for this lack, which is at the very 
heart of existence, it fails radically; but it escapes all criti­
cism if one admits that, through it, existence, far from 
wishing to repose in the security of being, thrusts itself 
ahead of itself in order to thrust still farther ahead, that it 
aims at an indefinite disclosure of being by the trans­
formation of the thing into an instrument and at the 
opening of ever new possibilities for man.* 
* The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Freehtman (New York: 
Philosophical Library, Inc., 1948), pp. 79, 80. 
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Although we may approve of this notion, it is difficult to see 
how existentialists can regard it as approvable. As "opening 
ever new possibilities for man" and as "fulfilling the movement 
of life," it would seem to be predicated upon the assumption of 
the continuity of life, rather than upon that of constant "rup­
tures" and of the need for "a pure wrenching away [of man] 
from himself." Surely it is the latter assumption that constitutes 
the fresh challenge of existentialism. By seriously questioning 
the import of science and technology, existentialists dramati­
cally portray the kind of inwardness that disjoints man from 
the world, that is, from the in-itself. Thus, being freed from 
the tyranny of outward circumstance or what they call "sheer 
facticity," man is guaranteed his freedom. In this sense, hu­
manistic existentialism displays a philosophical similarity to the 
religious variety. And both kinds converge on a representation 
of human life as a surd, and consequently as "absurd," whether 
its dramatic expression is seen in the form of comedy or of 
tragedy. 
Analytic Philosophy 
At the outset, no philosophy would seem to be farther 
removed from existentialism than analytic philosophy—espe­
cially if its representative is taken as the early Wittgenstein of 
the Tractatus. The notion that truthful propositions are pic­
tures of the world by virtue of their possessing a logical 
structure that mirrors the facts of the world—this notion surely 
lacks anything even faintly dramatic. To construct models of 
something already known appears to be a most unrewarding 
undertaking. Yet the enterprise looks quite different when it is 
understood against the background of the older philosophy— 
especially German idealism. There are facts in the world to be 
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known, and they can be stated, if not in the language of the 
plain man, at least in a logical form which pictures these facts. 
The world is not all of one piece. There are "atomic facts," and 
they possess internal properties, whether or not we know how 
those properties are related to other things beyond that thing to 
which they belong. Knowledge of objects is thus feasible, and 
we need not be hoodwinked into a repudiation of the plain 
facts of the world that are actually knowable. I do not propose 
to venture into a detailing of the steps by which this philoso­
phy developed. Suffice it to say that it is a sophisticated one, 
and that its ancestry is to be found in the philosophy of revolt, 
grandfathered in different ways by G. E. Moore and Bertrand 
Russell. 
Analytic philosophers are generally agreed that we can and 
do say things that are true of the world, and therefore we need 
to pay strict attention to the language in which these truths are 
couched. Linguistic forms are the guides to truth and in them 
resides our salvation from metaphysical absurdities. Even if we 
repudiate the "picture theory" of language, we need neverthe­
less to respect usage if we are not to wander off into senseless 
oddities. For example, Wittgenstein writes in the Investiga­
tions about "length" and "determining the length" of some­
thing as follows: 
One judges the length of a rod and can look for and find 
some method of judging it more exactly or more reliably. 
So—you say—what is judged here is independent of the 
method of judging it. What length is cannot be defined 
by the method of determining length.—To think like this 
is to make a mistake. What mistake:'—To say "The height 
of Mont Blanc depends on how one climbs it" would be 
queer. . . . What "determining the length" means is 
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not learned by learning what length and determining are, 
but the meaning of the word "length" is learnt among 
other things, by learning what it is to determine length.* 
When we say something is "queer" or "odd," then we have 
made a "mistake." It becomes clear then that the trouble with 
philosophy is that it is full of mistakes because it is full of 
queer or odd sayings—such, we may suppose, as saying that we 
must know the "essence" of redness before we are entitled to 
say that "The apple is red" or the "essence" of piety before we 
can reliably say that "Alcibiades is pious." 
To employ language consists then in "playing a game." If 
only we abide by the rules, ordinarily we can all, interestingly 
enough, win the game. Whether we are talking about mathe­
matical certainties or intentions to do something or how flowers 
grow, we can get along perfectly well as long as we do not mix 
our idioms. Numbers don't grow in the same way flowers do, 
and intentions don't have the kind of existence as when we 
say, for example, "There exists an integer between 17 and 19." 
If, we play the game fairly, we can talk sensibly and can 
probably be understood. But if we insist upon applying the 
rules of one game to another, we end up with a mess or 
metaphysics, or with just plain puzzlement. There are many 
ways of saying this, such as that of tidying up our language, or 
of dispelling our intellectual cramps, or of showing the fly the 
way out of the bottle. At bottom, these expressions all signify 
that questions are answerable; otherwise they are not questions. 
("If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered." 
—Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.5.) It turns out then that the 
* Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New 
York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 225°. 
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deepest problems are really no problems (Proposition 4.003). 
The aim is to seek clarity—clarity in thought and clarity in 
expression. The rest is senselessness, or silence. Philosophy 
seems to teeter between the two, or to be begrudgingly allowed 
the role of clarifier of concepts. In any event, it is not a science 
and its own language is suspect. 
There is an important sense, however, in which silence is 
supreme. Wittgenstein's often quoted last sentence of the Trac­
tatus reads, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be 
silent/' Senseless noises surely do not count as speech; things 
that can be said clearly are not problematic and count as 
answers; philosophy comes to have a narrowly circumscribed 
function, and the more successful it is, the more it vanishes.* Is 
the end then to be regarded as sheer contemplation of that 
which neither can nor need be made effable? There are sugges­
tions to this effect. It would be interesting to know whether, if 
this is the end, its expression turns out to be "thick" or 
"thin"—thick as in the richness of James Joyce's Ulysses, or 
thin as in Samuel Beckett's End Game, or even thinner when 
Beckett dismisses words entirely in his Act Without Words.~\ 
There is at least a superficial, if not a fundamental, similar­
ity between analytic and existential philosophy in what can 
and cannot be meaningfully said. Communication is at the 
level of mundane, and for the most part unimportant, things. 
The question is whether communication fails at other levels 
* We should, of course be mindful of developments in analytic 
philosophy that begin to reinstate, even if in a new form, traditional 
problems of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. Cf. Geiger, loc. cit., 
p.	 569 f. 
t My young friend Jimmy Milstein has suggested to me that the 
ne plus ultra may be regarded as Beckett's radio plays, which are really 
"Words without Act." Accordingly, contemporary drama and philosophy 
may be converging to the same end. 
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because there is nothing to say or because it can't be said. 
Absurdity may result in either case, but not the same kind of 
absurdity. Certainly, nihilism results in both cases, but the one 
may contain a placidity not shared by the other. Nihilism may 
be manifested in resignation or it may be manifested in an­
guish. In either case, man is rendered incapable of coping with 
the world. The focus on the inwardness of man in both 
philosophies places the outwardness of things out of focus. By 
obscuring the connection between inner and outer, both philos­
ophies arrive at conclusions which leave man contemplating 
himself, depreciating nature, and hindered from engaging in 
effective action. Accordingly, the alienation of man from na­
ture becomes complete. Science and technology are all right in 
their place, but of no use to guide man in the solution of issues 
really important to him.* Does this indictment, along with the 
popular indictment of modern man, stand? Is it true that 
modern man can avoid science and technology in the sense 
that they have nothing to do with the human issues? Have the 
current philosophies made insoluble problems by insisting on 
"wrenching man away" from nature or by dissociating his 
destiny from it? No cavalier answer is appropriate. But to 
suggest an alternative is certainly appropriate, and I think this 
may best be done, first, by raising a question as to what 
"justification" may mean in terms of these questions about 
issues of life (and death), and second, by developing an 
alternative in terms of what the arts of man are and how they 
can be employed to promote his well-being. 
* Wittgenstein says, "We feel that even if all possible scientific 
questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at 
all." And he adds, "Tbe solution of the problem of life is seen in the 
vanishing of this problem." Tractatus Logico-Politicus, trans. C. K. 
Ogden (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1922), 
pars. 6.52, 6.521. 
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lustification 
Human life surely would not require justification were it 
not for the quandaries in which man finds himself. In their 
absence he would still be living in the Garden, neither at­
tempting nor needing justification for his existence. Living off 
the fruits of the land, he would not labor or anguish. Under 
idyllic circumstances, to demand for life a justification would 
be only an impertinent intrusion. In the classical version, the 
intrusion that makes justification, an accounting, necessary is 
the forbidden fruit of which man partakes. Thus, knowledge 
of good and evil, once awakened, transforms life. Pain, labor, 
sorrow, self-consciousness—even knowledge itself—can no 
longer be avoided. Forced to acknowledge the conditions of 
life, a man can no longer ignore them, nor can he quite 
content himself without seeking to fit them into some pattern 
of wisdom. 
One of the contemporary modes of expressing the human 
condition is phrased as "the problems of men." The language 
may have been overworked in its countless usages—the prob­
lem child, the problematic situation, the Polish problem, the 
problem of race, problems in chess, intelligence as problem-
solving, etc. Vague and various as the term is, it nevertheless 
may not be inept to regard the need for "final" justification as 
"the problem of problems." In so regarding our topic, we are in 
a position to suggest an alternative to the prevailing philosophi­
cal winds, and consequently to bring out more clearly the 
direction they are travelling. Accordingly, we can better evalu­
ate contemporary philosophical techniques as well as the kind 
of results they foretell. 
I see four basic attitudes that may be taken toward the 
problems of men. First, one may evade them; second, one may 
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solve them; third, one may agonize over them; and fourth, one 
may convert them. Of these only the second and the fourth 
seem viable, and for a number of reasons I think the fourth is 
the more viable. 
Evasions 
Men perpetually search out ways of evading their problems 
—mostly because of the unpleasantness or fearfulness of ac­
knowledging them and of coping with them realistically. Since 
Freud, we can no longer question the prevalence of our wish­
ing to avoid many of the realities of life. The mechanisms by 
which we do it turn out to be devious, often deeply concealed, 
even from ourselves. Although evasions are of endless varieties, 
yet they all contain a wish or impulse that runs contrary to the 
requirements imposed upon a person who would fairly face his 
problems.* Evasions always have a psychological dimension, 
but they have other dimensions as well, social and cultural. 
Social pressures and restraints are among the powerful forces 
in hindering one from acting on one's best insights. And 
culturally speaking, a whole range of superstitions and reli­
gious beliefs constitute effective reasons for refusing to follow 
the dictates of natural knowledge. 
Little evasions, like white lies, are necessary if a person is to 
respect the least rudiments of conforming behavior, as well as 
to keep trivialities in their place and not to get bogged down in 
them. Big evasions pertain to gross affairs beyond one's control 
such as matters of national honor or of cultural insufficiency. 
* I am not suggesting that by referring to an underlying wish or im­
pulse I have thereby explained the mechanism. Until an adequate 
account of the mechanism can be supplied, there is not even the 
beginning of an explanation of our evasions. 
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Unable to accept his predicament and incapable of transform­
ing it, a man attempts to wish it out of existence. Yet, evasions 
even in this area do have the effect of making a man smaller 
than he need be and of reducing his energies below what they 
can fruitfully express. For this reason, he cannot afford to 
ignore the existence of big problems, even if his acknowledg­
ment of them is limited merely to a recognition of their nature. 
Since big problems are often tragic problems, a person can 
therefore hope only to gain in respect to them the tragic insight 
that they provoke. By this insight he avoids self-deception so 
that if he cannot alter the world to conform to his heart's 
delight, at least he can alter his heart to acknowledge the 
sublimity of the tragic vision. Middle-sized evasions such as 
result in forced role-playing or divided personal allegiances, are 
probably worst of all, because a man is wracked by them. Not 
trivial, he cannot set them aside; and not incapable of solution, 
he cannot take recourse to resigning himself to the contempla­
tion of an alleged tragic wisdom that they might contain. 
Divided and vacillating, he needs to seek wholeness, yet suffers 
the torments of a homeless spirit. These evasions take their toll, 
as any psychiatrist can fully document. 
The objections to evasions can be briefly summarized on 
different levels. On the psychological level, evasions produce 
sickness—especially in the case of middle-sized ones. A person 
is out of tune with his world, not just with that of social 
regulations, but also with that of his own psyche, which makes 
legitimate demands upon him that he cannot meet. Although 
social unconformity may be desirable, failure to conform to the 
demands of one's psyche as part of the real world cannot be 
desirable, for then one loses touch with the human condition. 
The result is psychological impotence, which merges with 
social impotence. Evasions that are distinctively social cater to 
patterns of custom or to power-structures that have become 
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antiquated by social factors needing radical changes of policy. 
Mostly these can be traced back to changes in technology, 
population, and resources, especially when they are coupled 
with social injustices. Refusal to acknowledge altered circum­
stances of life causes serious impairment of society, if not its 
dissolution. Serious psychological consequences also result, but 
they are not to be confused with the evasions that pertain 
primarily to an individual's problems rather than to those of 
social policy and of social organization. 
Solving Problems 
At the outset, the second alternative appears to be eminently 
reasonable: problems are to be faced and solved. A problem 
that has no solution is unreal; it is no problem at all. In many 
of its phases, analytic philosophers insist on just this; for along 
with logical positivists, they are intent upon identifying and 
dismissing "pseudo-problems." In general, metaphysical ques­
tions have no solutions. This fact is often taken to signify that 
they are not real questions. Instead, they are either "idols of the 
theater," merely inherited questions from earlier, ill-conceived 
philosophical systems, or "idols of the market place," linguistic 
confusions that sound like questions or problems but actually 
are not. There is only one thing to do about such pseudo-prob­
lems: ignore them; for since they have no power of their own, 
they are not capable of returning to haunt us.* 
If "philosophical problems arise when language goes on a 
holiday," then the holiday being over, the spirit vanishes. The 
earlier version that language can be used to picture states of 
* Of course, the more sophisticated form is to trace them back to 
their sources, namely, the actual linguistic errors which are responsible 
for them. 
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affairs may give way to the notion that its meaning is to be 
discerned from the use of words. In either case the burden is to 
make language the bearer of meaning, quite independent of 
the occasions that give rise to its employment. Possibly, this is 
as it should be, even though we acknowledge that things—es­
pecially tools—have employments somewhat like language. If 
then we remember that employments are always in context, 
then we can understand that meanings, too, are always in con­
text—a context, moreover, that always includes the occasion of 
employment, whether that is for the uttering of a sentence or 
for using a tool. 
We are now on our way to be able to distinguish real from 
pseudo-problems. Real problems can be dealt with and resolved, 
without any nonsense. One doesn't talk about using saws for 
hammers. Similarly, one doesn't have a private language and, 
for example, use the word red where standard usage is sharf. 
This is nonsense, a misemployment of words. Red does not 
mean sharf, and my fiat does not make it so. If I will conform 
to usage, I can get along very well in the world; otherwise, I tie 
myself up and confuse others, to no good purpose. Should we 
not adopt the same view with respect to the language of 
philosophy? We have noted Wittgenstein's comment about 
"the deepest problems" as not really being problems. If only 
we will relax, we can approach things sensibly and let the fly 
out of the bottle. 
Suppose we do let the fly out, what then? After that, so 
Wittgenstein tells us, language becomes useless, and we are 
reduced to silence. The deepest problems have vanished as 
pseudo-problems; the trivial ones are easily ignored; and the rest 
are straight-forwardly solved. Life then becomes mysteriously 
silent—presumably contemplative, possibly devoid of action. 
The fly, having gone, we are thrown back on our own, neither 
having nor needing a guide to carry on. There is no guide; 
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philosophy does not provide it, nor does anything else. The 
end of life, if this phrase is allowable, is silence. Surely some­
thing like this must be allowable, since the cares of life being 
attended to, and our questions having been answered, there is 
nothing left but silence. 
Agonising 
In contrast to this quiet acceptance of things, the existential­
ist demands the resolute affirmation of man's being—even if the 
affirmation may never be consummated. His condition, how­
ever, is one that he constantly needs to voice. Finding no 
grounds for complacency, he cries out his complaints. His cries, 
moreover, are not the verbiage of lengthy linguistic analysis, 
but rather emotion-packed expressions, cast in the idiom of 
literature, or of religious protest, not communicable by the 
language of analysis. He invents his own vocabulary, which is 
rhetorical, and above all, a means of catching the human 
predicament and of retaining it as inescapably human.* So the 
existentialist turns to non-philosophical media of expression: 
the short story, the novel, the theater. In these forms he 
portrays the trivialities, the absurdities, the involutions of life, 
which have neither issue nor surcease. Contrary to the Stoic 
admonition, his expressions are not just groaning aloud, but 
groaning in the center of his being. 
From man's predicament there is no escape—no exit. His 
life is hell on earth, anguishing, and truly inconsequential. 
Couched in terms of the language of problem-solving, existen­
* In Sartre's Republic of Silence, the silence consists not in man's 
being mute, but in his choice not to communicate for fear that an 
apparent comrade may turn out to be an enemy spy. Distrust intensi­
fies the need to communicate, while making it all the more impossible. 
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tialist philosophy denies that problems are solvable. It dotes on 
them or, as we have said, agonizes over them. Not to face 
problems is to act in bad faith; yet to face them is to involute 
them, but not to solve them. The fly can never escape from the 
bottle. When, as in The Flies, Sartre attempts to depict free­
dom, it comes off as a buzzing or a wandering away, but not as 
authentic fulfilment. Nor can it really come off as excellence, 
since although he allows for "projects," he does not allow for 
improvement, because he allows for no genuine connections 
among projects. Change is thus essentially undirected, and 
mostly absurd. 
In the existentialist's reading of human history, chaos is a 
permanent state of affairs. To be sure, much of history, espe­
cially recent history, lends itself to this interpretation. But 
whether or not from the reading of history we are entitled to be 
optimistic, we are surely misreading it if we fail to recognize its 
cumulative aspect, the carry over from the past to the present, 
which makes the present different from anything man had to 
cope with previously. This alternative reading is not suggested 
by the vacuous wandering off of Orestes and the buzzing of 
flies—unless perhaps we can symbolically regard the flies as 
returning agents of pollination that create new opportunities 
for human fulfilment. Despite the profusion of energy and 
noise, flies may, in this alternative, be conceived of as agents 
for creating novelties. Accordingly, the fly does not just escape 
from the bottle, nor get stuck in the ointment, but rather, 
besides being annoying, remains to produce changes that per­
mit men to engage in activities of which they would otherwise 
be incapable. If only "projects" were to be regarded as cumula­
tive, we would then be close to the fourth way of envisioning 
problems—namely, converting them from one form to another. 
Despite the fact that both Wittgenstein and Sartre employ 
the analogy of the fly, it nevertheless appears forced. A more 
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useful analogy is that which Francis Bacon employs when he 
contemplates the conversion of the human estate as the work of 
the bee in contrast to that of the ant and the spider. Whereas 
the ant only collects (information), and the spider only spins 
(theories), the bee collects, ingests, and converts (and thus 
transforms the human estate from one of ignorance to one of 
knowledge and power). 
The Arts as Agents of Power 
The arts of man of two sorts: those that perpetuate and 
those that liberate. There is of course in addition those that 
destroy; but unless they are only limited and temporary, they 
are self-defeating. The arts that perpetuate, such as those 
connected with the grain mill, the adobe brick, or the cistern, 
may serve a useful purpose. They can make for an ease and 
comfort in life in the production of goods that aid men in their 
tasks and that possess some quality. But they are characteristic 
of a people with a settled life, and they do not progress much 
beyond their immediate advantages. The liberative arts, how­
ever, convert useful arts into new forms even more useful and 
at the same time beget other new arts. They radically alter the 
circumstances of life, and therefore demand constantly new 
accommodations to the altered conditions. The steam engine 
may be taken as an example of a liberative art that made pro­
found demands for social change. It challenged the mores of 
western society, and it created unbelievable strains and tensions 
requiring that totally new attitudes be assumed and new rela­
tions established. In short, the problems to be faced required 
profound transformations from those of the preindustrial era. 
Not only are the liberative arts less directed to a specific set 
of activities and purposes, they also are reinforced by intellec­
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tual activities far more developed than those pertaining to the 
arts that perpetuate. The new complex which provides this 
intellectual superiority is, of course, that of science and tech­
nology. The prophet of this point of view was Francis Bacon. 
On the one hand, he proclaimed that knowledge is power and, 
on the other, that power indefinitely increases when men 
invent techniques for invention. The advancement of science 
then consists in the "invention of invention." Hence, Bacon 
proposed a totally new outlook upon knowledge. Contrary to 
Aristotle's logic of discourse, he advocated the logic of discov­
ery—a new organon or method which substitutes the language 
of nature for that of the syllogism. By correctly posing our 
questions to nature, we force it to divulge its secrets. The 
experimental method is thus made to take precedence over 
reliance upon philosophical dogma or upon the legislation of 
what nature must be by imposing on it our prejudices or by 
reading into it the alleged demands of reason itself. 
However much science has advanced since Bacon's time, he 
nevertheless discerned significant characteristics of science that 
are still valid. Aware of the conditions under which science 
flourishes, his emphases differ, however, from what philoso­
phers of science would today insist upon. He underplayed the 
role of mathematics, but he did not ignore it. Other matters of 
emphasis may be suggested—not just posing questions to na­
ture, but rather commanding, and even remaking nature so 
that it answers our questions. The use of cyclotrons as opposed 
to swinging pendulums in an arc or rolling balls down an 
inclined plane indicates something of the magnitude of differ­
ence between science before the Industrial Revolution and 
science today. This is not the place for detailed discussion of 
the difference, nor for that of the precise nature of science. I 
will only suggest a simple definition as a point of departure. 
Then I wish to observe two aspects of science in order to 
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facilitate a discussion of what the newer arts of man are and of 
what kind of justification one may seek for their employment 
in furthering the ends of life. 
The Challenge of Science 
As for characterizing science, let us simply note that science 
is an effective way of saying with some generality true things, 
or near true things, about the world and that it contains a 
means for correcting errors. Of course science involves concep­
tual elements, and it involves empirical elements too; and there 
certainly is a close interplay between them. In his Terry 
Lectures, Dr. Conant states this with remarkable clarity. He 
observes, "As a first approximation we may say that science 
emerges from the other progressive activities of man to the 
extent that new concepts arise from experiments and observa­
tions, and the new concepts in turn lead to further experiments 
and observations." * This statement suggests not only the need 
for employing conceptual and empirical techniques in science, 
but, even more illuminating, the need for realizing a connec­
tion between science and life. Dr. Conant thus revivifies the 
spirit of Baconian inquiry in relating it to and underscoring 
"the other progressive activities of man." Oriented as science is 
to the outer world, it nevertheless engages more than the 
faculties of perception and thought. In addition, it engages the 
faculties of manipulation and imagination, man's sense of 
order, form, and balance, and we need also add, a sense of 
communication from the past to the future through the pres­
ent. Science is a challenge because it is an opportunity for 
human fulfilment; and although the scientist cannot himself 
* James B. Conant, On Understanding Science (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1947), p. 24. 
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produce a culture, there can be none without him today. He 
introduces forms of knowledge that excite men's minds, as well 
as being useful for human ends. Scientists may be dull and are 
often incapable of keeping up with the challenge of their 
subject; but science is not dull, for it gives expression to new 
ideas and it provides immense powers for remoulding nature. It 
is therefore not inappropriately regarded as a force focal to 
modern life. 
There is little doubt that science is abundantly fertile: it 
multiplies knowledge, which further multiplies knowledge. 
The really basic question, however, is whether the fertility of 
knowledge is also intrinsic to the fertility of social affairs and 
whether it enhances the quality of a population that can 
reasonably sustain itself. 
The Principle of Fertility 
Social life is fertile in that at its best it stimulates the 
development of more social life—just as conversation at its best 
stimulates more conversation, and at its worst dies off into 
monosyllabic mutterings. In its most productive phase, social 
life is constantly converting human tasks into new forms. It 
solves old problems, and by the terms of its solutions, it makes 
new problems. The institutional and mechanical inventions 
abounding with such problems are endless, but some picked at 
random are: the factory, the limited liability corporation, the 
automobile, the airplane, the hydoelectric turbine, interconti­
nental missiles, detergents, antibiotics, food-processing, etc., 
together with myriads of concomitants which, while useful, 
prove also to pose new questions that require new answers. To 
speak of these as instances of fertility is only to acknowledge 
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the kind of creativity that characterizes society when it is not 
stagnant. 
The illustrations I have picked are of course peculiar to 
modern industrial society. This form of society is given to more 
rapid and constant change than any other. And the reason is 
not difficult to find: it is a society behind which lies the 
dominance of science and technology. Science and technology 
are themselves fertile forces and the better they are, the more 
they make for even more science and technology. Modern man 
lives to see the ever-increasing tempo of activity in these 
provinces. Scientists solve problems only to create new ones. 
For example, the atomic theory explains many phenomena, but 
then the scientist turns his imagination to the problem of the 
forces that make the atom stable, and from that to other 
recondite problems of the organization of even simpler parti­
cles, and on and on to cognate problems. 
The same is true of technology. The airplane, for instance, 
has its own logistics, which implicates a whole institution of 
aerodynamics, both in its mechanical phases and in its applied 
phases, both of which in turn involve a host of social issues. 
Especially in the applied phases, we come keenly to recognize 
the interplay between science and technology on the one hand, 
and life on the other. In his perceptive statement about 
science, Dr. Conant calls attention to both phases. He notes 
that "new concepts arise from experiments and observations, 
and the new concepts in turn lead to further experiments and 
observations" and he also notes that "science emerges from the 
other progressive activities of man." I would add that the 
fertility of science bears a real burden in that it not only 
emerges from other progressive activities but that in turn it also 
reacts upon other less progressive activities to make them more 
progressive. The underlying principle of fertility appears to be 
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a viable alternative by which life itself is justifiable, for as a 
continuing process, it constitutes an end by which man affirms 
life, without avoiding it, putting it to an end, or debilitating it. 
Affirmation 
As we have observed, philosophy today is uneasy about re­
garding life as an affirmation. The skeptical mode, including 
the subjective mode, is so thoroughly ingrained in it that phi­
losophers retreat from expressions of forthright affirmation. To 
be sure, contemporary history is not calculated to support whole­
hearted optimism. Continued warfare, accompanied by both 
old and new forms of human degradation, rightly induces 
caution in our judgments about human life. Surely we must 
acknowledge doubts and debilities in their places. Yet, a philos­
ophy that erects them into ends of life can only be short­
sighted, for it converts obstacles into ends. Thus instead of 
employing the obstacles as a way of reinterpreting problems to 
be faced, it makes them into a sufficient end and thus loses 
track of life as a series of related affirmations. Doubts and 
debilities thus become overwhelming. Instead of their being 
regarded as paradoxes to be overcome, they become entrenched 
as a form of paralysis. At this point, life is not simply not worth 
having; it is over. Or if it seems to linger on, it does so only as a 
kind of low-level existence, scarcely asserting, scarcely denying. 
It is often said that affirmation entails negation. At least the 
high tradition in philosophy often has it so: good is a repudia­
tion of bad, true of false and beauty of ugliness. So also is life a 
repudiation of death. But at this point, care is needed in what 
we mean by assertions and denials and by life and death. 
There appears to be a sense in which life and death are 
complementaries and another sense, especially in the extreme 
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case, in which they are opposites and irreconcilables. The latter 
case regards death as an end of life, a stoppage. It may come to 
those still living as shock, and possibly it is best dealt with by 
them through ritual, which is a deeply embedded, cultural way 
of connecting the quick with the dead. About this we need not 
further speak. A more interesting and pertinent topic is that of 
regarding life and death as complementaries, possibly better 
connoted by the terms, living and dying. 
Death is one, whereas, dying, like living, is many. In less 
obscure terms, we may say there are styles of dying, just as 
there are styles of living. And if so, we may also reasonably say 
that there are good ways of dying, just as there are good ways 
of living—and of course in each case bad ones too. Clearly, 
style is expression, an affirmation which has its own elegance. 
And the reason dying can have elegance is precisely that it too 
can be an affirmation—necessarily a rather heroic one and with 
finality, even as a great symphony may be heroic and have 
finality. The dying that is least convincing is that which is a 
repudiation of all that has gone before. It lacks style or grace in 
that it is a phrenetic denial, no more worthy than the former 
existence which it disavows; like a new-found toy, it contains 
temporary fascination, soon to be discarded to the junk heap. 
Heroics need not be a matter of wrenching oneself away from 
reality, but can more impressively be a matter of reaffirming in 
a more final and intense form what one earlier affirmed in a 
more tentative and piecemeal way, just because style cannot 
become sure until a person is satisfied he has fully explored the 
breadth and depth of action suited to his human needs. 
It is worth pausing further over the topic of styles of dying 
in order better to understand styles of living. One style of 
dying is an intense affirmation in that it is a summation, a 
mature recapitulation, of life. Rather than welcoming death, it 
is a way of heeding life and the virtues it holds. In the absence 
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of these virtues, death is an inexplicable intrusion, an implicit 
acknowledgment of life as a surd. Humanistically speaking, 
there is an urgency for affirming death as the culmination of 
life. Saul Bellow aims at such a notion when he has Herzog in 
the novel of the same name say, "The real and essential 
question is one of our employment by other human beings and 
their employment by us. Without this true employment you 
never dread death, you cultivate it. And consciousness when it 
doesn't clearly understand what to live for, what to die for, can 
only abuse and ridicule itself." In these words, Bellow suggests 
an impressive ideal of life and death, Hellenic in spirit, yet not 
unworthy of contemporary consideration. 
There is no style in living if it consists either in just solving 
problems as they arise without any sense of their interconnec­
tions or in brooding over problems without any sense of the 
objective techniques by which they can be resolved and turned 
into new challenges for men to meet in terms denned by a 
community of interests. The first lacks a sense of character, a 
consistency in human life without which man is alienated frcfrn 
himself, and is thus a kind of unreal being. The second lacks 
any strategy for coherent action; and while thus brooding over 
authenticity, it divests itself of the means for arriving at solu­
tions both because it is skeptical of the validity of any solutions 
and because it distrusts common action for attainment of ends 
that have been predefined as private. Acknowledging the need 
for a view of life which regards problems as solvable by being 
convertible and which insists upon recognizing the indispensa­
bility of the intensely personal and affirmative aspect of human 
action, I now take my task to be that of defining the terms in 
which humane ends can thus profitably be conceived. Accord­
ingly, the elaboration of this task leads me to discuss the 
problems of men in terms of the arts in which men find their 
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complex involvements. The rest of this essay will consequently 
be devoted to the following topics: (1) the arts of civilized 
man, (2) the institutions of intelligence that arise from these 
arts and that in turn transform them into more sophisticated 
forms, and (3) the liberal arts today: a redefinition. This 
extended discussion I take to be the essence of a justification of 
human life regarded in the objective phases whereby men cope 
with their problems, which are constantly being converted into 
new forms because conditions of life constantly change. 

I. The Arts and Civil Life 
The Promethean Point of View 
From one point of view, the most distinctive aspect of the 
human community is its reliance upon the practical arts. They 
constitute a nexus of so many activities, attitudes, and beliefs 
that they virtually add up to the profile of a people, including 
many of their sensitivities and their cares as well as that with 
which they are unconcerned. Such arts even suggest an under­
standing of a people's religion and of other aspects of their 
more intimate relations to nature and to other human beings. 
The carvings, symbols, or decorations associated with a people's 
tools often reveal their place in a larger scheme of things. But 
apart from their larger significance in a larger scheme, a peo­
ple's tools and technologies unmistakably record the goods in a 
society and possibly even the social connections that need to 
prevail for their continued employment. By focusing attention 
upon the practical arts, then, we are in advantageous position 
 38 Institutions of Intelligence
for posing our primary questions about man and his potential 
on earth. 
The myth of Prometheus is useful for suggesting a kind of 
cosmic ontology of man. It helps to locate him as a being 
between animals and the gods, and one who partakes of both 
natures. Prometheus is just such a mediator who, in stealing 
fire and making a gift of it to man, converts him from a stupid, 
unintelligent creature into a civilized and responsible being, 
even though man also may be condemned in his new estate to 
perpetual agony. The profundity of the theme makes the words 
of the poet Aeschylus worth repeating at some length. 
PROMETHEUS. Let me rather

Relate to you the tragedy of -man:

How from the silly creature that he was

I made him conscious and intelligent.

I speak the human race not to condemn

But to explain my kindnesses in what I gave to them.

Seeing they did not see, nor hearing grasp 
That which they heard. They lived like ghosts in 
dreams. 
In lifelong anarchy and dreariness. 
No houses huilt of brick to catch the sun

Nor carpentry they knew, hike little ants

They lived in holes and sunless cavities.

And now, my triumph intellectual!

Next I invent the count numerical,

And history's instrument, skill of the bard,

That great compositor the written word.
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I was the first to yoke the animals

In service to the strap, and lay on them

Inheritance of man's excessive toil.

Between the shafts I led the obedient horse,

That ornament of luxury and wealth.

The gleaming sail that wafts across the sea

That intrepid mariner was my device.

The inventor I, who many a shape did show

Of science to mankind, now do not know

What science will my own release allow.

One sentence short proclaims the truth unique: 
Prometheus gave, what man received, technique. 




WANDERER. Thou great utility of social man

His brightest light since history began,

Prometheus, steadfast in your works revealed,

What spells this punishment, these fetters sealed? *

Following the lead of Aeschylus, we may ask the questions, 
What is civilized man?, Why should he perpetuate himself?, 
and How can he do it? These questions are all intimately 
interwoven, but in order to bring clarity to our discussion, we 
need to treat them separately. 
* The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man, a translation of Aeschylus' 
Prometheus Bound by Eric A. Havelock (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 
lines 441-52, 457-71, 505-6, and 612-14. Reprinted with the kind 
permission of Eric A. Havelock. 
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Civilised Man 
There is a simple answer to the question of the nature of 
civilized man; and although it has already been given, it is 
worth repeating before proceeding to unravel some of its com­
plexities. That answer is that civilized man is an artisan. He is 
a maker, possibly a second maker, who in making things makes 
himself. I am not suggesting that there is novelty in this 
answer; nothing so basic is likely to be novel. But I would 
suggest that the simple truth has been so perverted by a variety 
of philosophies and dogmas and false attachments that the 
effort to recover its meaning in pure form and to spell out its 
ramifications is worth while. 
Man is above all an artisan. He makes things, shapes them, 
alters them, converts them, and employs them in an endless 
variety of ways. Simple things can be transformed into more 
complex ones, or can be used in startlingly new ways. Some 
transformations can be brought about with a minimum skill; 
others are hard to come by and require considerable training 
before the appropriate skills can be learned and exercised. 
Much of the history of technology is a matter of improving 
upon old tools in order either to realize old ends more easily or 
to do new things that could not formerly have been done with 
the implements at hand. The more dramatic inventions are 
those which create radically new opportunities, which in turn 
revolutionize society. Iron, gunpowder, the steam engine are 
obvious examples of revolutionary innovations. Either by a few 
radical innovations or by the accumulation of many lesser ones 
a society may become so transformed as to display in its history 
a new epoch, defined by new techniques, new sets of values, 
and new institutions that consolidate the changes thus brought 
about. 
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Utilities 
The first and obvious effect of man the artisan is that he 
brings about new utilities which serve him directly as a con­
sumer or indirectly as the maker of things for the perpetuation 
of his society. The latter often hold more importance than the 
former. One picture of primitive society is that of staunch 
individuals who provide for their own consumption rather than 
for that of the tribe. In the case of the Eskimo this may be so, 
but, as the anthropologists have clearly shown, it is by no 
means universally the case. Certain kinds of enterprises lend 
themselves to individualized efforts; others do not. In any 
event, once the factory system is developed and corporate 
enterprise superimposed upon it, the model of Eskimo society is 
about as helpful for understanding industrial society as the 
fishing spear is helpful for understanding the punch press. But 
the point I wish to emphasize here is that regardless of eco­
nomic or social patterns, utilities constitute activities which are 
the impetus of a society and without which there would be, not 
stagnation, but no society at all. This is not to suggest that in 
all societies utilities must be similar; they may or they may not 
be. There are biological needs that are universal, but the ways 
in which they may be served are legion. Although man must 
eat and drink and procreate and rest, the ways in which he 
does them and the means he employs for satisfying them are so 
diverse as to beggar description. 
Utilities are constituted by the technologies man employs 
for providing the necessities, comforts, and elegances of life. 
Whatever are destructive of the goods of life may reasonably 
be regarded as disutilities. The extreme cases are easiest to 
recognize. Provisions for creature needs are unquestionably 
utilities. Food and drink, shelter and the cure of disease—such 
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goods are most certainly to be regarded as prima facie utilities. 
And the absences or contraries of them surely are prima facie 
instances of disutilities: noxious poisons, polluted water, lack 
of protection from the elements, contaminations, epidemics, 
and the like. Moreover, since men are social animals, they must 
have means for getting on with their fellow tribesmen, if not 
with their extra-tribal neighbors. Men's business and discourse 
with one another do of course complicate the idea of* what is a 
utility and what is not. Business and discourse are clearly 
capable of promoting the ends of life. Even more, they are 
often taken to be ends themselves, and especially the second, 
rightly so. Life without discourse is not for men—those ani­
mals who desperately need to communicate with and under­
stand one another—both for the sake of understanding and for 
its results. Yet, ironically, the methods employed for carrying 
on social life—customs and ideas and ideologies—often con­
travene the primary utilities. At least in extreme cases, such 
contravention is understandable inasmuch as order, socially 
defined, may come into conflict with the order of nature, that 
is, with the primary utilities, without which life cannot be 
sustained. Thus, warfare, economic suicide, religious dogma, 
together with endless forms of factionalism, can rent a society 
to its utter destruction. For such reasons, we should take care to 
define utilities in terms of both the practical arts and civil life. 
The practical arts are indispensable in that they advance the 
life of a people by providing necessary goods and services. Civil 
life too is indispensable in that it defines social ends and 
regulates the practical arts in accordance with those ends. 
Together, they enrich and sustain life as authentic utilities, 
caring not just for creature requirements but only as they 
operate within a community of interests. 
A utility cannot correctly be defined as that which satisfies 
an individual's desires or as that which is in accord with the 
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customs of a society. Desires and customs require validation, 
and primarily they are validated by serving the purpose of 
continuing; and enriching life. The virtue of a utility resides in 
men's marriage with realities. In Whitehead's words, they 
make the present more "insistent," and they do so by "zest­
fully" relating the urgencies of life to their intimate involve­
ments. By becoming a utility, a desire forfeits its autonomy; it 
engages the senses in order to prevent its vacuous dissipation 
and the imagination in order to contain its motion within the 
banks of relevancy. Or, considered on the plane of custom, a 
utility achieves its contained movement in the technological 
instrumentalities of action and its immediate elegance in their 
design. On the one hand, there are required railroads, trucks, 
planes, factories, schools, courts, parliaments, etc., and on the 
other, such structural designs as please the senses and symbol­
ize the function. Aside from contemporary, sustained planning, 
validation appears to have been mostly sporadic and stimulated 
by the appearance of manifest disutilities. When a person or a 
people can no longer ignore dangers and crises that confront 
them, they begin to take seriously the task of validation. Under 
relaxed conditions of life and when threats and crises are less 
imminent, utilities are more easily ignored and leisure and 
innocent pleasures can more easily be made to fill the gaps. We 
may regard these fillers as non-utilities. 
Collectively, if not individually, men need to maintain some 
balance between their utilities and their non-utilities. Clearly, 
a people cannot indefinitely consume or waste or destroy goods 
without exhausting themselves. Should they persist in the 
attempt, the processes of nature will determine their fate. 
When the reckoning does not entail such a fateful end, it 
signifies that men have already directed their energies to at 
least minimal utilitarian ways. Utility can of course become so 
highly minimal in outlook as to deny to persons satisfactions 
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both revelatory of themselves and consistent with their deeper 
vocations. 
This narrow conception of utility suggests the desirability of 
entertaining one less restricted. A broader conception is in­
volved in suggesting that non-utilities may be converted into 
utilities. This conversion may take the form of relating as 
complements their leisure activities and their other activities. 
When this relation obtains, the fine arts become amalgamated 
with the practical arts, and utility and beauty are seen to be 
integral to each other. Utilities become suspect when creature 
comforts and work and business clash with psychic fulfilments, 
enjoyable leisure, and exciting intellectual achievement. When 
nature co-operated with him, primitive man may have suc­
ceeded better in enjoying a kind of wholeness of life than has 
his modern counterpart. However life may have been for 
modern man's forbearers, the crying need today may be stated 
as that of satisfactorily relating the practical arts within the 
framework of civil society. A society fails which cannot adjust 
its arts to the requirements of civil life. 
Security 
The existence of civil utilities in a society ensures at least a 
minimum of security. In order to practice his trade, a man 
must have a base of operations which makes his practice 
possible. In a sense, this is a tautology: no continued practice 
without a continued practice. But in another sense, the base of 
operations is broader in extent than that of plying a trade. 
Naturally, man must be sustained if he is to ply his trade, 
but a great deal more must be sustained too. The trade must be 
important and must be sustained, as well as the man, and both 
of them in a variety of contexts, domestic as well as in the 
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larger social scheme of which he is a part. If it loses its 
function, a trade becomes an anachronism. Since function, 
moreover, relates to activities beyond itself, a trade acquires its 
importance in the society of which it is a part—even as the 
dignity of man acquires its significance in his relations to other 
men. The security that institutionalized utilities make possible 
is provided by the total base of operations which respects the 
artisan and which acknowledges the worth of both the creator 
and the creation. 
Security is an indispensable aspect of the utilities of a 
society; indeed, they go hand in hand. But security needs to be 
properly understood. It pertains to the expectations of leading a 
civilized life. Thomas Hobbes perceived this clearly when he 
insisted that the end of social life is "peace and security." In 
this, he clearly meant two things: first, men must be secure in 
their persons, and secondly they must have assurance and 
support that they can carry on the peaceful arts, such as 
agriculture, navigation, building, trade, and also letters and the 
fine arts. Hobbes rejected the snobbish view of an elite society. 
He was, after Bacon, first to see that power and knowledge and 
the peaceful arts need to be part of one process. There were 
limitations in the seventeenth century to the extent to which 
the peaceful arts could be safeguarded in a society hedged by 
militant neighbors, and Hobbes accommodated his ideas to 
these unfortunate realities. At least he made portentious pro­
posals for ending civil warfare, especially that based upon 
religious divisions. 
In the broad sense, then, security needs to be read as the 
conditions which maintain productive enterprise. These condi­
tions vary with the kind of enterprise of which a people are 
capable. In the early modern world it was very largely the 
market society that provided such conditions, a market society 
in which both the practical and the theoretical arts could be 
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pursued. But the conditions of productivity are complex and 
differ from epoch to epoch, as well as from people to people. 
Security then may be read as furthering production and pre­
venting stagnation, but only as it applies collectively to the arts 
of man, and not to a separate art as such. We don't need 
wheelrights any more, and in fact there is no art that is not 
easily antiquated by technological advancement. The underly­
ing principle seems to be that the antiquation of one art 
follows only upon the invention of new arts. 
Freedom 
Man the maker creates utilities and at the same time estab­
lishes a degree of security which makes the continued opera­
tion of utilities possible; but also he makes life freer in that he 
increases his range of options for new modes of conduct. In 
general, there exists a relation between the promoting of utili­
ties and increased freedom: the more utilities, the more free­
dom one may enjoy. And also the reverse, the more a man 
suffers from other than self-enforced privation, the more he 
suffers, not just from lack of material goods, but also from lack 
of psychic fulfilment too. Without being unmindful of the fact 
that life can be surfeited by material goods and cluttered by 
useless employments, we can in general rely upon the principle 
that the arts are constituted as utilities and that hindrances to 
them are disutilities. By their utilities, men are freer to choose 
and to satisfy psychic needs, because they enjoy a range of 
alternatives which allows them greater opportunities for creat­
ing harmonies between themselves and their world. This is not 
to derogate the attainments of men in primitive societies. Ap­
parently, their harmonies were often profound, and their art 
often of great stature. The Altamira Cave paintings, for exam­
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pie, show unquestionable talent and superb sensitivities, but it 
should be remarked that their paintings o£ bison, for example, 
were not an escape from their world of practical pursuits, but 
rather an adulation of them. Yet however significant and 
enviable their successes, there is no doubt that there must have 
been also much frustration and degradation not recorded in 
their art. Except for its aesthetic attainments, which possessed 
an unsurpassable relevance and absoluteness, primitive society-
could not enjoy anything like the range of expressions possible 
in modern society. Although many of the options in modern 
society get lost by default or in some other ways, the problems 
of modern man in regard to freedom are as different from those 
of primitive man as industrial society is from primitive socie­
ties. 
A range of options can of course be confusing, but it also 
opens new opportunities for venturesomeness. Assuming that 
freedom gains in importance to the extent that there are 
options for satisfying the psyche, we may suggest that they can 
do so only as they pertain to utilities rather than to disutilities. 
Unless freedom is founded upon a base important to human 
life, it dies in the agonies of a self from which there is no exit. 
Men may fail in pursuing options—they usually do, for we 
recognize that failure is a fact of life too. But freedom can be 
only farcical if there is no satisfactory range of choices, and it is 
absolute absurdity to say that a person is free if through 
ignorance he fails to choose because of utter confusion, or 
because the alternatives are hopeless, disastrous, or degrading. 
Choice is no more a matter of inner than it is of outer. In truth 
a man cannot even live, let alone be free, if he has no inner 
resources; but it is equally true that he can neither live nor be 
free without outer resources. Freedom is so very complex be­
cause it involves both inner and outer resources, together with
7
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a delicate relation between them. The theory I would advocate 
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is that, except when it is self-defeating, freedom resides in the 
continuing processes by which inner and outer resources are 
moulded into a harmony, and that a society in which these 
processes are aided and approved, is a society of achievement— 
satisfactory as well as satisfying—and may be called a "free 
society." 
A range of choices makes man freer by giving him an 
opportunity to identify himself with the concrete means by 
which he can express himself. No wonder, as John Locke 
advocated, property and freedom go hand in hand. In Locke's 
time there was no better way of freeing the serf from bondage 
and of giving him assurance of his dignity in a society in which 
by his work he could extend his person and also have rights 
that would be respected by others. That Locke could have been 
so carried away as to regard a person's life and liberty as 
property rights is the conversion of a truth understandable 
when we recognize the identity he assumed to hold between a 
man and his works. Freedom may have been overnarrowly 
conceived; but under the conditions, the definition could not 
but clarify a phase of life which related freedom to men's 
makings and doings. We may conclude that, despite Locke's 
vagaries on the subject, freedom is best expressed through the 
workings of a commonwealth. From such a source, we can 
more adequately understand the character of both civil life and 
civil rights. Locke overworked the interrelation of freedom and 
property, not as a practical device for freeing men from a 
worn-out form of society, but as a matter of theoretical concern. 
Freedom is a universal in life, but only in the context of 
civil society. The simple fact is that by itself freedom is 
appalling. Plato made this abundantly clear; it has been ech­
oed by contract theories of the state, and recently it has been 
given frightening expression in Golding's novel Lord of the 
Flies. Security is the other face of freedom, but the practical 
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issues are often confused. Security can, of course, destroy 
freedom. In this event, what underlies security is probably a 
form of paternalism or authoritarianism or the sheer despera­
tion that causes men to sell their birthright. But there is 
another security, which aids men in their ventures; it equips 
them to have a reasonable chance for success in their undertak­
ings, rather than dooming their chances to failure. 
The real challenge is to combine freedom and security such 
that a person may choose and act, not just blindly, but with 
some sense of his having been somewhere and his carrying 
forward to somewhere. In his leap into the future, then, he 
may fall back, but only to the ground where he may nurse his 
wounds in anticipation of other leaps. Some would have us 
believe that the leap is into the abyss. If so, it can be only an 
abysmal affair. Then freedom may be regarded only with 
dread. The opposite freedom is to be sought in conduct in 
which leading from is also a leading with. The advancement of 
the arts is of this sort. It signifies that the old arts are given up 
only for the new—not for the sake of merely giving up. But 
the new is built on the old, and the old provides the foothold 
for the advancement. Without this grounding, there is no 
leverage, and freedom becomes sheer conceit. Except for his 
stubborn denials, man best exercises his freedom in his creative 
acts—in short, in making and doing of things useful, especially 
when they are done with excellence. Freedom to refuse is not 
to be belittled, but a full measure of freedom is found in the 
positive accomplishments by which men achieve apt relations 
with the world and their fellow beings. 
Because he needs to establish security as well as to take 
advantage of freedom, man the maker finds himself in a net­
work of social affairs. His manifest well-being therefore is not 
evident in the production of things apart from the social life in 
which they operate. For this reason, hedonic values pale in 
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relation to the commodious life, which, with all its perquisites, 
transforms production into expressions of civil society. In a 
later chapter, I shall show how the practical arts require the 
liberal arts as complements if the former are to achieve the 
kind of realization which can pass for civil life. Without such 
complements, the arts degrade men to the point where they are 
blind to the rich potential of human existence. Nevertheless, 
since moral values pertain to the establishment of right rela­
tions among men, there is a level at which we can profitably 
concern ourselves with certain social matters that are indispen­
sable for establishing moral values. I wish to pursue these 
considerations, first, by further clarifying some aspects of utili­
ties and, second, by analyzing what is required for the justifica­
tion of utilities in a society of men. 
Utilities Further Considered 
To clarify further how utilities can serve their purposes in 
civil life, I propose to note some distinctions between goods 
and services, to observe the penumbra between utilities and 
disutilities, and then to add some remarks upon ritual as it 
affects utilities. 
Primary and Secondary Utilities 
In the modern scene, social services not only promote utili­
ties but also partake of their qualities. That this is a fact is 
scarcely open to doubt, but that there is a precise line between 
goods and services is highly questionable. Although we may 
wish to say that goods are more tangible than services, this is 
not always the case. For example, is electric power to be 
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regarded as a good or a service or both? There is no doubt that 
it is a utility. But the question may be raised whether the 
servicing required for a utility is also a utility. I think it is 
helpful so to conceive it, but it also may be helpful to distin­
guish, as far as possible, goods and services as a distinction 
between primary and secondary utilities. Although they are 
usually intermingled, the one may be said to refer essentially to 
the productive or industrial processes, the other to the services 
required in order to realize the consumptive purposes for which 
commodities are intended. This distinction is especially rele­
vant to our complex, industrial society. More and more, we 
have witnessed a shift both in the number of men employed 
and in the importance of the functions they perform in com­
pleting the industrial process by providing correlative services. 
A simple barter system requires a minimum of service. Under 
such a system, a single person can be entrepreneur, manager, 
producer, distributer, and consumer. Today, not only is each of 
these functions highly specialized, but also the need for per­
forming public services in contrast to private ones is likely to 
be paramount. If, for example, we regard the production of 
automobiles as private, we do not so regard the planning, 
construction, and maintenance of highways, or the regulation 
of traffic, or the law-enforcement system that pertains to the 
use of highways. Since the automobile is an institution that 
affects so many public interests, it belongs only in part to the 
private realm. Many of the services pertaining to it are clearly 
public. The automobile suggests the extent to which the serv­
ices required in industrial society fall within a social matrix. 
The shift from production to services in the United States is 
now estimated to be about one-fourth of the total employment. 
The kinds of servicing vary greatly, as may be noted by 
observing the works of those who distribute, maintain, and 
repair machines, as well as by those who gather information, 
 52 Institutions of Intelligence
advertise, propagandize, educate, carry on research and devel­
opment, sell, trade, and possibly even swindle people. The line 
between what is legitimate and illegitimate is often difficult to 
draw, in spite of the fact that industrial production does increase 
with the increased proportion of persons who shift to various 
forms of management, research and development, advertising, 
sales, etc. Except in extreme instances, classical capitalism 
evaded the issues of rationalized production and normalized 
consumption by proposing that they be settled by "the market 
forces." Since the days of the Great Depression and World 
War II, however, there has been a growing uneasiness in 
accepting this solution. Industrial societies can no longer afford 
the luxury of having certain kinds of decisions made by private 
bodies. Inevitably, such societies increasingly come to depend 
upon public authorities. There is a number of reasons why this 
should be so. Some of the more obvious are: the performing of 
necessary services which do not fall within the "profit system"; 
the regulation of business practices that conflict with the gen­
eral welfare; a care for those interests that are of too much 
general concern to be left in private hands; and not least, those 
joint services that depend on the negotiation of working ar­
rangements among private or quasi-private groups in order to 
provide the continuance or development of such services. A 
few words about each of these. 
Because of the outlays required, coupled with the unlikeli­
hood that they can return a profit, some general services need 
to be provided by the state. Guarding against floods or epidem­
ics or care for the young and for old people—such instances 
immediately come to mind. Again, industrial and business 
practices that wantonly consume natural resources or those that 
misrepresent commodities or those that are harmful to mind 
and body are clearly practices that call for government interven­
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tion. Other sorts of services belong peculiarly to the province of 
the state because they touch sensitive parts of a culture, espe­
cially in its political and social aspects. The administration of 
justice, provision for defense and for police protection, insuring 
proper education, guaranteeing fair treatment of citizens of 
different races and religions—such services are patently not to 
be bargained for in the market place. Indeed, they are meant to 
fix conditions within which the market may flourish; they are 
not intended to be dictated by it. Finally, I would call attention 
to the development of a whole new kind of law which, in 
supplementing traditional law, is especially directed to the 
continuance and development of services indispensable to our 
industrial society. The regulation and supervision of transpor­
tation, power, trade, labor relations, securities, communications, 
aeronautics, and such like—these, experience shows, are better 
handled by authorities who, at their best, can sensitively and 
imaginatively come to the kinds of incisive but delicate deci­
sions demanded where practices are constantly and swiftly 
changing and where the public interest cannot afford to be lost 
sight of even for brief periods of time. 
The point crucial to this discussion is that there are activi­
ties so affected with the public interest that they cannot be left 
to chance or whim or to the vagaries of irresponsible decisions. 
They require accountability, and therefore they require direc­
tion from a responsible, public authority. By recognizing this 
aspect of contemporary social life, we can more clearly detect a 
general principle which relates government to a solid base of 
values with which it is inescapably concerned, namely the 
primary utilities without which a society, let alone a state, 
cannot continue to exist. Modern government is thus destined 
to be the protective agency of such utilities. However corrupt it 
may be, it maintains itself only as it also safeguards the primary 
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utilities of its subjects. Moreover, because of its indispensable 
functions, government is constituted as a utility, a secondary 
utility, we may say. 
Utilities and Disutilities 
For purposes of clarification, I have distinguished between 
primary and secondary utilities, depending upon whether they 
pertain mostly to productivity or to services, including the 
general services of government. There remains to distinguish 
between authentic and pseudo services, which I now wish to 
point up briefly. There exists, as I have earlier suggested, a 
penumbra between utilities and disutilities, and in the deeper 
shadows we may not be able to say on which side of the line a 
commodity or activity falls. There are two reasons for this, not 
entirely separate. First, we may be in ignorance of the answer 
to a factual question of what the agent intends to do; but 
secondly, and much more difficult, is a matter of principle as to 
whether certain kinds of actions are to be regarded as genu­
inely useful or not. 
As for the factual question, there is the extreme case of 
corrupt acts, which if we knew the intent of the agent and the 
outcome of a chain of acts, we would be in no doubt about its 
disutility. Alleged medicines that the agent believes to be 
harmful and that are harmful could qualify only as disutilities. 
Others may be merely placebos, which in the consumer's igno­
rance could have a mildly beneficial effect, but which could 
have just the opposite effect were he to gain knowledge of their 
having been misrepresented. Or, only slightly shifting the 
perspective, we may raise perplexing questions concerning ad­
vertising. Legitimate claims for legitimate products would seem 
to fall into the class of useful service, at least when they are 
55 The Arts and Civil Life 
limited to appropriate media at appropriate times. Their exten­
sion beyond these limitations, however, can easily transform 
them into disutilities, even though the precise line again may 
not be detected. Other alleged examples of services can readily 
be thought of which in truth are disservices or would definitely 
be so regarded if the intended victims were apprised of the 
relevant facts.* 
Some of these apparently factual questions pertaining to 
utilities and disutilities actually turn in the final analysis upon 
a matter of principle. Things that are prima facie useful may 
be so handled as to constitute exploitation of a people. By 
employing business extravagance, those who stand to gain 
extend their activities beyond proper bounds. Advertising is a 
case in point. Advertising that would be legitimate if restricted 
to appropriate media and appropriate times becomes illegiti­
mate when extended beyond its appropriate restrictions. The 
underlying evil can clearly be seen in American life: the 
distraction of men from their proper vocations. To be con­
stantly bombarded with trivia and irrelevancies hinders them 
from distinguishing between the true and the false and deters 
them from the ideal of searching for "the whole truth." Pul­
chrident may actually make the teeth whiter (and incidentally 
be responsible for a fungus infection), but whiter teeth can be 
at best an insignificant measure of civil life and at worst a 
significant detraction from it. 
Ritual 
In many cases, disutilities can be decided by factual knowl­
edge; in others it is a matter of public policy. The latter is 
* E. Jordan has carried out a detailed examination of this theme in 
his Business Be Damned (New York: H. Schuman, 1952). 
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likely to be especially controversial in that the penumbra that 
obscures utility and disutility falls between debilitating ritual 
and fraternal morality. In the light shed upon the extremes, the 
issues are clear, but in the middle, controversy rages. On the 
one hand, ritual is objectionable in that it stupifies reason and 
silences criticism and is thus contrary to the proper purposes of 
utilities. It is a major source of anti-intellectualism and an 
obstacle to the development of civil live. On the other hand, it 
does promote solidarity and a significant sense of the common 
bonds and communications of people. Yet, in strengthening 
the internal bonds of a people, it increases enmity and provokes 
militancy against other peoples. Especially for modern times, 
the aims of nationalism, legitimate or illegitimate, are aspects 
of ritualism, and therefore, despite their virtues are suspect. 
Again, ritual caters to the emotional life of a people. The 
nice connections between utility and those aesthetic impulses 
that liberate practice are conclusive evidence of the power and 
benevolence of feeling. In such cases, it leads to an extension 
of civil life and makes it less rigid than it would otherwise be. 
The celebration of life is authentic ceremony, a rededication to 
meaning, and not just to empty form. Commitment of this sort 
is justified by its power to advance human life. Whitehead 
eloquently defines it as duty and relevance. In The Aims of 
Education, he writes of them as follows: 
Duty arises from our potential control over the course of 
events. Where attainable knowledge could have changed 
the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice. And the founda­
tion of reverence is this perception, that the present holds 
within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards 
and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is 
eternity.* 
* Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims of Education (New York: 
Mentor Books, 1949), p. 26. 
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Whatever our skepticism about eternity, we can nevertheless 
appreciate that aspect of his statement which attributes to 
knowledge the power of releasing man from the bondage of the 
emotions. At the same time the statement suggests how the 
emotions may be transformed by becoming part of the move­
ment of life through the present from the past to the future. 
When such continuities are affected, the emotions facilitate, 
instead of impeding, life; and ritual embodied in the celebra­
tion of men's vocations achieves a justification by the broad­
ened vision it gains into the meaning of utility. The principle 
of the movement of life is the most reliable guide we have for 
distinguishing utility from disutility. It helps to remove the 
shadow that obscures the distinction between utilities and 
disutilities. 
Why Should Man Perpetuate Himself? 
In taking the point of view that man is a tool-using, tool­
making animal, we are not to assume that he is an animal 
limited to this quality. I shall insist later that his utilitarian 
activities may be liberalized by his capacities to enjoy what he 
is doing, to think about them and improve them, and to pursue 
them in a larger world of meaning. Substantive issues, I think, 
must bear a considerable burden of the justification of civil life. 
Total justification, it appears, needs to be sought in nothing 
short of the totality of the arts, including the primary and 
secondary utilities, together with the liberal arts, which round 
out life by creating for men a perspective on their place in 
their world. Total justification is the achievement of a genuine 
culture, perpetuated in institutions that are suitable to practical 
needs and luxurious in the liberation of the human spirit. 
When the practical and the luxurious re-enforce each other, 
men live in that rare society which is constituted as a genuine 
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culture. Yet, the means by which such a culture is to be 
achieved deserve special consideration, for they also constitute 
one form of an answer to the question of what constitutes 
justification of civil society. Thus, the answer to our question is 
complex. It involves both formal and substantival matters. 
Accordingly, I wish now, first, to sketch briefly an outline of a 
theory of justification, secondly, to project the idea of a moral 
community, and thirdly, to insist that justification requires a 
constant interplay between the moral community and the arts 
of man. 
How Justify the Arts? 
To justify is to give acceptable reasons, and in the field of 
practical philosophy acceptable reasons require their accept­
ance by like-minded persons. I hasten to add that the expres­
sion "like-minded persons," is not in this case a tautology; for it 
refers simply to persons who have or are capable of having an 
understanding of the human estate of their own society. In­
fants are not capable of this understanding, nor are ''barbari­
ans"; "selfish persons" are, but not easily, for they need to be 
unblocked; most people are, but some with greater difficulty 
than others. To be sure, the social issues of an industrial society 
are complex. They are not manageable when people are not 
adequately informed, and therefore they require wide-ranging 
knowledge. For this reason, the institutions of intelligence 
occupy a position central to civil life. Among these institutions, 
the school must bear a heavy burden, for it has as its reasonable 
end to educate a people for the appreciation, practice, and 
extension of its arts. Without such education, a people is 
prepared neither to participate in culture nor to share its 
rewards nor to develop any sense of the excitement of the 
human enterprise. 
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However difficult is the justification of a practice in the 
concrete, in the abstract it has a simple formula. Justification is 
giving acceptable reasons. But the test of acceptability is com­
plex enough; for it is a dyadic, even if sometimes a reflexive, 
relation between justifier and judge. Acceptable reasons re­
quire acceptance inasmuch as the test does not quite satisfy if 
justifier and judge fail to reach agreement. In the event of 
either agreement or disagreement, however, it is possible that 
the judge may have been incompetent. Although certain forms 
of incompetence, such as madness, are sufficient grounds for 
rejecting a judgment, incompetence that results from bias on 
the part of the judge is not so easily dismissed. When no one 
who is substantially affected by a biased action is injured the 
motivating bias may be regarded as legitimate. Or again, if 
someone is injured by a biased action when agreement on the 
desirability of the action prevails, the justification of the action 
shifts from the bias to the motivating reasons that make it 
acceptable. 
So, although agreement is desirable and important, it is not 
satisfactorily reached without a basis in sufficient reasons. In 
this case, the accounting both satisfies the judge and supports 
the judgment. An accounting is satisfactory, then, when there 
is informed agreement on the ends to be achieved, common 
knowledge of how to achieve them, and a concerted willing­
ness to undertake the steps to effect the end. Even so, it is 
necessary to assume in practice that no negative conditions will 
intervene sufficient to warrant rejection of the judgment. Prac­
tical judgments can be and are made on such a basis, subject 
always to the hazards of life. 
For example, a person makes a proposal to establish a 
reservoir for domestic water for a community. The bits of 
evidence for the advantages of such a proposal are amassed. At 
run-off periods the water is available and collectable. It is 
relatively pure, or in any event, capable of being purified at 
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reasonable expense. The location is sufficiently isolated to pre­
vent easy contamination from passers-by, fishermen, small boys, 
and beer drinkers. No other use for the water seems better, 
nor is there any closely competing use for it imaginable. There 
are no important legal obstacles in the way. Under these 
circumstances and assuming there are no detectable overriding 
reasons—such as prohibitive costs or the abundance of other 
existing supplies for the foreseeable future—surely it would be 
folly not to build it. The reasons for it and the absence of 
negative reasons against it constitute reasons why it should be 
done.* Let us further assume that the members of the commu­
nity, have debated the question and having arrived at unani­
mous agreement, actually build the dam. Upon completion, let 
us further assume that an underground source of pollution 
contaminates the water so that it cannot be made fit for human 
consumption. Should the reservoir have been constructed? One 
can, I think, persuasively argue that it should have, and that 
the miscalculation could not reasonably have been avoided. 
One might properly argue this way even though the reservoir 
could not be converted to some other use—say, to that of 
irrigation water. Men often fail and need to go on from their 
failures. But some failures are civil ones, and men may take 
pride in them, whereas they may not take pride in those that 
arise from stupidity, malevolence, brutality, or egotism. More­
over, the chances are likely that joint activities civilly engaged 
in can, upon failure, be converted into new forms capable of 
success. When such successes occur, it scarcely need be added, 
they represent new directions for society, growing out of pre­
ceding failure. I am not suggesting that an optimistic point of 
* See Professor A. I. Melden's convincing case for such a theory 
as this in his presidential address to the American Philosophical 
Association, "Reasons for Actions and Matters of Fact," Proceedings 
and Addresses, 1962. 
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view is always warranted, but it often does lead to rich fulfil­
ments. 
Implicit in this notion of accountability is that of a society 
of the most inclusive sort in which everyone is to count. And 
without meaning to pun, this signifies a concern for everyone, 
and everyone's being able to count on others, and finally that 
everyone is able to count the goods available in the sense in 
which everyone is highly literate (which in this case also 
means, especially in modern society, to be highly numerate). 
Justification is inherently a matter of justifier and judge, as 
well as a reciprocal relation in which judge becomes justifier, 
and justifier judge. This is because accountability is essentially 
democratic in a society in which everyone needs not only to 
live in society but also to be alive to its multitudinous require­
ments. 
The modern world is unusually complex. To cope with it a 
people must be educated to the arts which are its drive. And 
education of this sort is possible only as the agencies of infor­
mation and intelligence are geared to accomplish the task. 
Only by such a concerted effort are a people capable of being 
informed and prepared for justifying their commitments. 
Otherwise, there is no proper accounting for their works, and 
corruption is almost certain to set in. The simplest way to 
justify actions and to give an accounting of them is by con­
sciously overcoming obvious corruptions. The corruptions in 
politics, in business, in labor, in sports, in the fine arts, in the 
home—in fact, wherever there are obvious ambitions and frus­
trations—these are, if not easy to overcome, at least easy to 
detect. But the most insidious corruptions are those which are 
so thoroughly concealed that even their perpetrators are no 
longer aware of what they are doing. The truly insidious ones 
are those which trivialize life, or just detract from it. They are 
especially destructive because they infect the very institutions 
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from which correction is to be sought—namely, the institutions 
of intelligence. Legitimate protest is thus weakened at its vital 
source, and the logic of accountability is submerged in the 
depths of irrationality. Such corruption hurts all, but those 
who suffer most deeply are those who are made most inarticu­
late and who are consequently least able to give public expres­
sion to their grievances. The further analysis of this theme, 
which leads to a discussion of the roles of the institutions of 
intelligence in modern society, I shall postpone to the follow­
ing chapter. At this point, I wish merely to elaborate the 
principle of accountability and then to examine the institu­
tional requirements necessary for working out this principle. 
The foundations of accountability lie in two directions, the 
utilities of man and the moral community. I trust we have 
sufficiently dealt for our purposes with the general nature of 
utilities, at least as pertains to their practical phase. Utilities, 
according to this view, constitute the indispensable basis for 
any society. The reasons for this should now be obvious. Upon 
the assumption that the arts are to be regarded as a necessary 
foundation of society, I think it is possible to show what the 
further requirements are for perpetuating and thus making 
them more completely justifiable. Accountability is the first of 
these requirements; the second is the idea of a moral commu­
nity. 
The Moral Community 
A moral community is that in which there is an appeal to 
the judgment of the members of a society to decide on matters 
of concern to its members as members. Implicit in this defini­
tion is the notion that morality pertains to the common con­
cerns of a society, even though the limits of society for various 
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purposes may be legitimately drawn narrowly or broadly, de­
pending upon those touched by the kind of decisions to be 
made. In any event, I would focus attention upon forms of 
action to be approved or disapproved in the judgment of those 
affected by and responsible for the decision. The variety of 
concerns is not denumerable and the qualifications for judg­
ment cannot be set with any very great precision, partly be­
cause the questions are always difficult, and partly because of 
their novelty. Yet the idea of the moral community can never 
quite be rejected inasmuch as men can never quite reject the 
necessity to justify their actions, however Machiavellian they 
would be. 
By insisting that the locus of morality is in men's common 
concerns, we exclude trivial issues from its sphere, as well as 
those which are of moment only to or for a single individual. 
This last consideration does make for perplexity: how does one 
decide which questions are of common concern? An entirely 
satisfactory answer may not be possible, but at least a partial 
one is. Moral issues usually have deep roots in tradition, and 
tradition by nature is common to a society or a segment of it. 
This is not to suggest the palpably false notion that moral 
issues can be decided by the dictates of tradition. It is only to 
suggest that many moral issues do arise out of the folklore, 
mostly because of the conflict between it and new require­
ments of social life. Yet without an understanding of the 
folklore, one can have only an imperfect understanding of the 
issues to be resolved. For the most part, folklore contains 
elements which, in a modified form, a people will reasonably 
want to retain. But in extreme instances, especially where 
there are gross injustices, it may have to be rejected. 
The correction of gross injustices is an obvious case of what 
should be of general concern to a people. Should is the proper 
term, for it clearly signifies the existence of a moral issue, 
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whether or not actual steps are taken to make it a matter of 
actual concern. We expect issues involving the correction of 
gross injustices to be cast in the language of morals—especially 
that of "rights" and "duties." Among these rights are to be 
found legitimate interests that cannot be advanced because 
the possessors of the rights have no opportunity to press their 
claims. Various factors conspire to prevent them from doing so: 
biological variations, psychological misfortunes, economic dis­
criminations, political disenfranchisement, social ostracism, and 
others. At such time as neglected rights are brought into the 
open they become matters for the attention of the moral com­
munity (the public?), and for a decision. They may, of course, 
continue to be neglected, but only at the expense of becoming 
fodder for violence and revolution. 
There are many other kinds of moral concerns which, not 
trivial, are nevertheless not so dramatic. They may pertain to 
protection of life and health and general well-being, or to 
regulating any number of mundane activities, either to pro­
mote them or to make adjudications when they come into 
conflict, or, in some instances, just to prohibit them. These are 
probably mostly concerned with the organization of the affairs 
of practical life. Again, there is the important matter of direct­
ing the young into useful and satisfying courses of conduct, as 
well as the matter of caring for the disabled. And in a some­
what different category are the concerns for forming tastes and 
developing sensitivities in areas that enhance the culture of a 
people. All of these matters, and many more, I suggest, are 
concerns in which there is correctly an appeal to the moral 
community. The authority of such a community is a legitimiz­
ing authority for decisions basic to the welfare of a society. 
Granting this authority, we still want to know by what 
reason and right such a community exercises its authority. The 
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definition I proposed above suggests the ground of the author­
ity of the moral community as being an appeal to the judgment 
of the members of a society. In the absence of the expression of 
judgment, there is no moral community. Judgment is not a 
matter of instinct, or of desire, or an expression of self-interest, 
or a hoodwinking of others in any of its multitudinous forms. 
It is a matter of being adequately informed about the issues at 
stake, of having considerable sensitivity concerning the impor­
tance of the alternatives, of being able to weigh the alterna­
tives, and of expressing a conclusion as a result of the judging 
process. Sensitivity, integrity, and knowledge are indispensable 
to carrying out the demands of the process. 
So exacting is the process and so dependent upon aids and 
checks that it requires for its realization a highly developed 
community. Moral issues are controversial. And they are vola­
tile issues, because they arise in the heat of controversy and 
their outcome is expressed in decisive, practical action. Hence, 
the extraordinary need for taking whatever precautions possi­
ble for insuring a satisfactory outcome. The issues, we have 
insisted, are matters of common concern; they are also matters 
which need to be decided on the basis of the clearest and 
fullest communication possible. Restraint may be desirable in 
the manner in which the issues are debated in order that they 
do not produce secondary conflagrations which force attention 
away from the primary issues. But restraint is destructive of 
proper controversy if it signifies the withholding of any rele­
vant ideas. Essential to the clarification of issues is, of course, 
the process of debate and of making full use of the media of 
communication, free of willful distortion. In the modern 
scene, these demands place extraordinary responsibility on the 
media of mass communication, and these demands are not met 
just by keeping the mass media free from governmental in­
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terference. No merely negative devices can insure free media, 
or better, can achieve the end suggested by the famous Hutch­
ens' Commission "a free and responsible press." 
There is a question of how the individual can play such an 
exacting role in the moral community. He is supposed to be 
bright and sensitive and will-less, a creature who can subordi­
nate his ends to those of the community, or at best participate 
in them only as one who shares things with others. The 
question, I believe, is not as difficult to answer as it is usually 
made out to be. Much of the difficulty resides in assuming 
premises that make it impossible to be a member of any 
community, let alone a moral community. The assumption is 
that man exists as a lone creature motivated by non-rational 
impulses, the immediate satisfactions of which he seeks. A 
creature who is just a bundle of desires and aversions is not one 
to belong to anything other than the captivating influence of 
his own impulses. 
The truth of the matter is that from infancy on, the human 
being begins by learning simple manipulations, along with 
other elementary things, and gradually he learns more and 
more sophisticated arts. Such learning introduces him from the 
very beginning into the society of learner and teacher, with its 
infinitely rich processes of give-and-take. The generic process is 
that of socialization, so admirably described by George Mead. 
Human beings, we need constantly to remind ourselves, are 
social animals from the very start, and this process surely 
provides the basis for understanding the individual as a mem­
ber of the moral community. We may take our clue to the 
solution of the problem from that arch-individualist of social 
philosophers, John Stuart Mill. In coping with this same prob­
lem, Mill characterizes the internal sanction of morality as "the 
conscientious feelings of mankind." This felicitous expression 
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is of the essence of the justification of the authority of the 
moral community. It signifies, as we have said and as Mill 
makes explicit, the appeal to a person of judgment, having an 
intellect and understanding of and sympathy for the ends of 
action. He who is capable of learning and who conscientiously 
(objectively, impartially, intelligently, sympathetically?) 
judges his fellow men is surely a member in good standing of 
the moral community. No more can rightly be asked of any 
person. If one is not initially disqualified by lack of normal, 
human equipment, then conscientiousness serves as his badge 
of membership in the community. 
The Moral Community as Guide 
There does, however, remain a further objection to be 
considered. If the moral community is an ideal one, can it 
really serve the practical function of providing guidance for the 
conduct of life? There is a formal answer to the question, fairly 
simple and not very satisfactory, and a complex one, which 
when spelled out should prove to be more helpful. 
The formal answer is that the moral community exists as an 
ideal community in which there is contained, within a king­
dom of ends, perfect knowledge from which perfect answers 
provide the solution of moral issues. The formal answer then 
proceeds to acknowledge that in practice there can be only an 
approximation to perfect solutions. The virtue of the answer 
lies in there being an ideal to which men can appeal, even if it 
is unattainable. Moreover, by reaching for the ideal beyond 
their grasp, men do often achieve something better than they 
otherwise would. On the one hand, this notion may well 
contain an optimism and vagueness quite insupportable, and 
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consequently the result may be a compromise worse than the 
situation to be corrected. Accordingly, from the theoretical 
point of view, we could not even pretend to know the degree 
of approximation to the ideal, for by hypothesis we have no 
inkling as to what it involves. As a faith, the point of view may 
bring about good results; but as a position to be intelligently 
adopted, it is vacuous. 
Interrelations between the Moral Community and the Arts 
The complex answer proposes that morals do exist within 
the actual community of men and that they are to be sought 
both within the workings of the arts and in their interplay. The 
idea of morality has been badly handled by sentimentalists who 
misquote Kant with approval: men are to be treated as ends in 
themselves. They are sentimentalists precisely because they 
ignore the context of human life, and thus any way for treating 
men at all. The sentimentalists discount, in Dewey's language, 
the "instrumentalities," in the absence of which they cannot 
act at all; they just ignore or let live. In their version, Kant's 
moral law is deprived of power, and therefore of social signifi­
cance, because they have omitted the qualification which he 
clearly suffixed: ". . . and not as means merely." Men are 
means: they are workers, fathers, judges, sellers, advisers, con­
sumers, and so on. In every capacity in which they act, they 
can be corrupt or not, and consequently in every capacity they 
can act morally or immorally. Those who would separate morals 
from the productive activities of men and from the require­
ments of such activities eliminate most of what makes life full 
and meaningful. By setting morals apart, they actually detract 
from them. 
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Liberation Is Social 
The theme I wish to pursue is that men's liberation is ex­
pressed through things and tools and not apart from them, and 
that his moral expressions are social involvements which arise 
out of and refer back to his use of things. The base of all mo­
rality is productive activities, and social involvements are in­
extricably interwoven with them. Morals are traditionally con­
cerned with the right relations among men. The insistence here 
is that there is no way of telling what these relations should be 
if there is no knowledge of the productive activities that sup­
port them. It is no doubt true that murder, incest, theft, as well 
as other crimes, are universally condemned in any society. 
Without wishing to argue the matter or to indulge in hair­
splitting, I think nevertheless it is fair to point out that even 
these cases need to be denned—and are differently denned—in 
different societies. "Murder," for example is not just killing, 
but "illegal killing," and so with the other examples. Perhaps it 
is straining too much to say that in all instances, morals are de­
pendent upon productive activity, but if it should be proved 
to be generally true, we may better let the case rest on that 
ground. 
To proceed with the theme. Morals are consummated in 
activities which define right relations among men. Basically, 
then, the utilities of men underlie morality. The liberalization 
of these utilities is civil life. We may insist then that morality 
is the advancement of civil life; immorality its estoppel or 
reversal. Men are ends, not by being, but by doing and mak­
ing; for in doing and making, they also make themselves. After 
all, even the "poet," as the original of the word tells us, is a 
"maker." Only as making and doing are consummatory are 
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men constituted as ends. Expressing it in different language, 
we may say that men are ends in their enjoyments of their 
activities and their insights into them, including the perception 
of the manifold relations they involve. Intellect, sensitivity, 
and imagination are the qualities of human superiority. By 
these qualities man enhances the arts, which even in their 
crude forms already place him on a scale above other biological 
creatures. 
Man and Nature 
Men are different from things and from other creatures. 
Surely there is no need to argue this point. Men are also 
similar to things and other creatures. This point likewise need 
not be argued. But we do need to be clear upon the continui­
ties and the discontinuities between man and nature; otherwise 
we misconceive things so badly that we have no satisfactory 
notion of either man's potentialities or his virtues and vices. 
The continuities clearly make him part of this world. The 
major problem of the discontinuities is the extent to which 
they separate him from the world, and if so, how his transcend­
ent qualities can possibly make sense for a creature who, after 
all, is earth bound. "Pure thought," "pure morality," "pure art," 
"pure spirit," and their cognates leave us in a quandary what 
the vocation of man can be and how he can come to terms with 
such elegances as the world contains. To clarify this question 
we need an understanding of the general principles and their 
application to the timely aspects of society. 
Man lives by his arts and by them he is known. The arts are 
utilitarian, and as such are to be judged by standards of 
efficiency. It will not do for one to insist that he prefers to chop 
down trees with thigh bones or to kill his prey with feathers, 
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however much one is enamored with bones or feathers. Men 
live in a world of motions and balances, torques and resist­
ances, and unless they can cope with physical things, they 
can't even maintain themselves. Little wonder is it then that 
we think of human properties in such terms as forceful, or 
balance, or steadfastness, or strength, or growth, or fertile, 
together with a whole host of other qualities borrowed from 
physical and biological paradigms. Whatever the elegances 
displayed in the arts—and they are many—they are properties 
which supervene upon or emerge from the employment of 
physical things. 
Thus man is, paradoxically, bound to the world even as he 
gains mastery over it. He requires a sense of the things he deals 
with and handles. His powers are expressible only as there are 
resistances to them. The world must complement him or he 
suffocates in his powerlessness. Whatever the world is in itself, 
to man it exists as a challenge—in the language of Hegel, it 
exists as alien, and the challenge is progressively to make it 
germane to his own being. In a major sense, "meaning" is the 
process by which man transcends natural things by realizing 
his objectives through them. The arts always involve manipula­
tion, and it is in this activity that man comes to understand the 
nature of the materials, how they respond to his deftness, and 
fail to respond to his clumsiness. The principle is elementary, 
but it is important to restate it because it is too often ignored or 
denigrated as being unworthy of the high nature of man, 
whose real destiny, it is said, is to experience tragedy and to 
engage in heroics. I would remind the reader of our opening 
remarks in this chapter, where we quoted from Aeschylus how 
even man's tragic stature arises from the Promethean struggle 
to deal with the industrial arts. 
Let us assume then that men first come to know things by 
manipulating them, and their manipulations become more deft 
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as the arts become established in the folkways and technologies 
of a people. In modern society, knowledge becomes much more 
complicated, but manipulation is never irrelevant to it. It gets 
taken up in science and we dub it experimentation. In science 
the structure of the materials is discovered in much more 
sophisticated ways, even though the leading ideas may be 
extremely simple. For example, the structure of the atom comes 
to be conceived of, not as a hard nugget, but as a great force by 
which particles are bound together in a very stable system. 
From then on the examination becomes very complicated, and 
the tools required to gain knowledge staggeringly complex and 
expensive. 
The Arts as Mediator between Man and Nature 
If we stay with the more primitive arts for a moment, we 
can better observe another aspect of men's connections with 
nature which is likely to be obscured in modern science. We 
seem to be on solid ground in insisting that men best come to 
have knowledge of materials by their arts of manipulating 
things. No doubt this is so, but also, since the process is two-
edged, men also reveal in it a good deal about themselves. There 
is no art without style, and style is of the essence of the human 
contribution which transforms physical things into artifacts, 
neatly and deftly. And in the repetitions that follow, once the 
arts become engrained in a society, their artifacts become 
stylized. Navahos make pots in one way; Pueblos in a different 
way. Both know their materials, but again in a somewhat 
different way because their styles are different. Still more in­
teresting is the way within a tribe that styles differ. Margarita 
will develop a style different from her mother-in-law, Maria. 
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Both are competent, and to the expert eye each is identifiable 
by unmistakable marks. 
In one sense, style is always unique, but in another it 
displays degrees of abstraction, and lends itself to generalized 
treatment. Once an artisan develops a style, he repeats himself, 
not exactly, but in his idioms. He is still a potter or a weaver 
or what-not, but there are specific kinds of recurrences which 
clearly characterize the maker. For certain purposes it is even 
more significant to recognize the more generalized techniques 
of throwing pots or weaving blankets than to recognize the 
particular idiom, since these are forms that carry over from 
artisan to artisan and that constitute the basis for calling it the 
art of potting or weaving, etc. In order that the art may 
continue to be practiced in a society, a new artisan must be 
trained in the techniques of it before he can become a master 
artisan with his own idioms. This fact tells us that an art has a 
structure and that it is an affair of society, not just a lone 
individual. 
The arts are implicitly or explicitly social, and for certain 
purposes there is an advantage in regarding an art rather than 
the individual as the unit of society. Individuals give cohesion 
to social life, not by being aloof, but by doing and making 
useful things, or by co-operating with others in doing and 
making things. The needs which are satisfied in society are 
civil needs, and for this reason man is intrinsically a civil 
being. He develops style, and although it will be unique, he 
nevertheless participates in activities that are continuations of a 
tradition, having cultural roots and having current and func­
tional significance for other members of his society. In develop­
ing and perfecting and teaching others his trade, he engages in 
activities that are at once functional and moral. More than 
anything else the arts contribute to the establishing of the right 
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relations among men. Practicality and morality are two aspects 
of the arts. This is especially the case when in coming into 
conflict with one another the arts become rationalized to better 
serve the ends of society. 
The Arts and Industrial Society 
Turning now to contemporary society, we can observe the 
same principles at work, even if in a more complicated form. 
First of all, we discover that the arts have for the most part 
been transformed by a factory system, involving a whole hier­
archy of workers from unskilled to highly skilled to profession­
als. The utilitarian advantages of this system are obvious in the 
magnitude of production, in the lessening of the work per unit 
production, as well as in an increase in the range of things 
produced. Yet, all of this can be done only at a cost, the chief 
of which is the psychical loss, which increases geometrically 
from professional to skilled to unskilled workers. This loss 
constitutes a disaster in industrial society and produces a host 
of social problems, especially in relation to those at the bottom 
of the productive scale. 
The cost may be measured in another way, namely, in the 
decreasing capacity to develop style and elegance as the scale 
moves down from professional to unskilled worker. Elegance 
does not vanish from the product, but the professional designer 
is responsible for what elegance it has, not factory hands or 
others, except in incidental ways. Beauty is calculated as a 
value for the consumer and, aside from what joy the designer 
takes in its production, is no part of the energies of the worker 
—of "the happy worker" to use what has become a quaint 
phrase. There is then in most modern production an unfortu­
nate division between utility and beauty, such that men are 
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forced to seek pleasure as consumers quite apart from their 
work. The magnitude of this problem we shall treat later as 
the problem of leisure. 
The focal institution clearly responsible for the development 
of the factory system is machine technology and the science 
that lies behind it. There are a number of phases that can be 
distinguished from the time of the Industrial Revolution to the 
present. These we need not discuss, except to indicate the 
major shifts created by the increasing role played by theoretical 
science. The degree of abstract knowledge that underlies mod­
ern production is incomparable to that which underlay the 
beginnings of the factory system, utilizing mostly water and 
steam as the sources of energy. The advancement of science, 
together with its applications to industry, has been attended by 
a startling increase in magnitude and variation of kinds of 
production, a sharp shift to the importance of skilled and 
professional workers, and an amazing degree of specialization 
and co-operation required for the production of the most ordi­
nary commodities. 
A major result is that by being transformed by the factory 
system, the arts involve social interrelations that require both 
increased specialization of civil life and co-ordinating agencies 
of a complexity and magnitude that outrun the comprehension 
of most people. Thus a premium is set upon administrative 
expertise, not just for the management of corporations but also 
for coping with the issues between corporations and other 
bodies within the society in which they operate. Such issues 
pertain to warfare within and among industries, conflicts be­
tween labor and management, as well as their own internecine 
clashes, costs of living and poverty, displacements of whole 
populations, regulation of public utilities, together with a host 
of innumerable other problems. 
The result of such warfares, discords, displacements, and 
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the like shows an increased need for continually harmonizing 
various aspects of social life. The vigor of the different depart­
ments of industrial society is a matter of their pressing their 
powers to the extreme. Profits, wages, skills, administrative 
efficiency, and many other activities maintain themselves only 
by concerted efforts to advance them. The resultant conflicts, 
however, verge on the point of disaster, with disjointments of 
society becoming increasingly obvious. If a people are to get 
along, they need to devise ways for rationalizing their activi­
ties. In contemporary civil life, this need can be met only as 
they increasingly consent to the methods of intelligent plan­
ning. Activities which were regarded as utilities turn out to be 
disutilities, however deeply engrained they are in men's habits 
and expectations. Civil adjustments become indispensable, fol­
lowing upon criticism and assessment of civil needs. The 
processes of arriving at decisions, it now becomes plain, are 
precisely those of moral ideas at work. The moral community is 
civil society advancing its own interests, nothing more and 
nothing less. The appeal is to the conscientious feelings of men 
whose responsibility lies in their capacity to make hard judg­
ments of the needs of society—judgments which provide rea­
sonable ends, which include vigor, but which do not confuse 
vigor with satisfactory achievement. Ideally, the responsibility 
is, of course, that of all men. 
Conclusion 
This conclusion reveals not only why civil life should be 
perpetuated but also the means for doing so. The satisfactory 
pursuit of the arts—in contemporary society these are the in­
dustrial arts, along with their full and liberating involvements 
—such is the means by which civil life is perpetuated. In 
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Rousseau's language this is the founding of institutions which 
alter the very character of men's lives. The tempo of industrial 
society moves at a pace that makes the processes of founding, 
altering, and sloughing off institutions an object of constant 
concern. New opportunities, new institutions, new morals— 
these are all involved in the process of perpetuating civil life, 
without which there can be only creature existence, sordid, 
fetid, and incomplete. 
Institutions have some permanence, enough at least to pro­
vide leverage for creating new ones before they sink into the 
swamps of oblivion. This leverage is the hope of civil man; if it 
fails, modern society fails and so do men, all or most. The hope 
is grounded on the empirical fact that not all institutions need 
to be changed at the same velocity. Seizing upon the differen­
tial rate of change, men have the opportunity of transforming 
their dilemmas to new ones and of constantly meeting new 
challenges instead of working on a treadmill. The principle is 
then whether there is more truth in the myth of Prometheus or 
that of Sisyphus. If we look at life from the point of view of 
death, of sheer contingency and misfortune, of sorrow, and of 
being caught inextricably in mean predicaments, we shall 
existentialist-like be attracted to Sisyphus. If, however, we look 
at it from the point of view of the productive arts, the mood 
may be one of Promethean cheer rather than of Sisyphean 
despair. The mood is a function less of our emotional predispo­
sitions than it is of the history of the human conquest over the 
environment and whether we can now cope with our fellow 
beings as well as we have with nature. The Promethean myth 
does contain its own brand of suffering; but it is a suffering 
that pertains to the stretching of the use of intelligence to its 
utmost, and not one that falters because of dread or because the 
stoppage of life is death. Intelligence can have its own drive 
and its own sensitivity, a kind which can make sentiment all 
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the more vital because it can guide it not just to parlor talk, but 
to authentic consummations. 
There are, of course, sustaining powers in the aesthetic and 
religious impulses, powers which are more than of negligible 
strength. Also, there are powers which derive from man's 
intellectual equipment. The modern world has grown to see 
these powers expressed in a prodigious way. Modern man has 
developed the language, the cultural traditions, the instrumen­
tation, and the institutionalization for continuing to make 
intelligence a powerful, liberating force. He is just beginning 
to recognize the range of this power as it bears upon every facet 
of life. "Knowledge production" is gaining and constitutes a 
significant proportion of our total productive activity. We need 
to discuss the topic, not just of the production of knowledge 
but also of its distribution and consumption, in order to observe 
how the quality of human existence can be enhanced. By 
discussing these matters under the heading of "institutions of 
intelligence," I hope to narrow the topic to the more direct 
issues of knowledge in life, including how science and technol­
ogy and education and morals come to be interwoven so as to 
yield a more concrete realization of the prospects the modern 
world holds for man. Before doing this, however, I wish to 
state the extent to which I think the argument of this chapter 
has carried us. 
Recapitulation 
The burden of the argument has been that the distinguish­
ing characteristic of human life is its reliance upon and in­
volvement in the arts. Man is distinguished by the fact that he 
can utilize nature through his artifacts and thus paradoxically 
achieve a kind of independence from nature. He rids himself 
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of complete and direct reliance upon tooth and claw by em­
ployment of instruments and weapons. The refinements of his 
artifacts are, taken with his leisure and family pursuits, the 
story of his life. And this life, we have seen, is civil life—a life 
in which things come to have a social definition, are appraised 
through the processes of criticism, and are allocated by right or 
by forfeiture. Civil society is advanced by the advancement of 
the arts, and for the rest, men brood and consume. 
Utilities, we found, are productive, not just of things, but 
also of services, even if the latter do not always serve. "Second­
ary utilities" we regarded as those, along with "primary utili­
ties," which really do serve. Further analysis of this led to our 
pointing to government as a distinctive characteristic of socie­
ties. Whatever else government does, it has the unique respon­
sibility of protecting the utilities of man, and in contemporary 
society it has the more active responsibility of actually advanc­
ing his utilities, along with whatever liberalization of them is 
feasible. 
Where there is responsibility, there is always the question of 
justification, of legitimizing actions undertaken or policies en­
acted. Justification of utilities, that is, of the arts of man, is a 
social affair. It is a question of appealing to like-minded per­
sons—like-minded because they have common concerns and 
ways in common of meeting them. The appeal is possible 
because of, and is grounded in, the objective characteristics of 
the social world. Hence, we properly call a society a common­
wealth in that it contains wealth common to a people. They 
can share in it; they have a stake in its outcome, and they have 
a common language through which they can communicate and 
debate their concerns. In the contemporary mode of ethical 
language, we say that the justification of the conduct of the 
arts resides in the giving of "good reasons." The assumption is 
that good reasons are so because they are acceptable. Moreover, 
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they are entitled to be accepted by those who are in a position 
to understand the issues at stake, the criticisms of current 
practices, and the enhancement of life made possible by alter­
ing them. When men actively engage in such processes, they 
serve as moral agents who make their arts accountable. Accord­
ingly, they are agents of "the moral community," which is not 
an abstraction, but rather "the conscientious feelings of man­
kind" at work in the criticism and evaluation of the arts. Ac­
tions based upon the continuing and conscientious appraisal 
of the impact of the arts upon the members of a society are of 
the essence of morality. 
Our final suggestion has been that the means by which civil 
life is perpetuated is the institutionalization of common and 
acceptable practices. Institutions do have a degree of perman­
ence and can be the bearers of tradition as well as functional 
units of civil life. We have noted how their pace of change has 
accelerated in the modern world, and we have traced this 
acceleration to the employment of institutionalized intelligence. 
This institutionalization of intelligence appeared on the face 
of it to be a paradox. The argument was intended to dispel the 
paradox. Our next task is to support the argument concretely 
in institutional terms. 
/ / . Science as an Institution of Intelligence 
The Paradox 
There is a paradox in speaking of "institutions of intelligence." 
On the one hand, intelligence, which by nature is critical, 
breaks through institutions in its merciless criticism of any­
thing man does or makes or thinks or feels. On the other, it 
acquires support in institutions—a base of operations from 
which it carries out its critical forays. Neither of these aspects 
of intelligence can be denied without crippling its functions. 
Were its critical character to be denied, it would lose its 
distinctive purpose and would give way to sentiment or custom 
or ritual. But if again there were nothing taken for granted, no 
ground upon which it could stand, it would be powerless to do 
its work and would end in a nihilistic skepticism. 
Our question is then, Can there exist a balance between the 
critical, destructive effects of intelligence and an institutional 
support capable of fostering its growth without causing its own 
annihilation!5 In order to answer the question, we need to 
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clarify the paradox, first, by a sharper understanding of what 
an institution of intelligence is, and secondly, by an examina­
tion of how science, as an institution of intelligence, serves as a 
focus in the organization of contemporary society. 
The Marks of an Institution of Intelligence 
As we noted at the outset, an institution of intelligence is an 
organized social activity which depends on a series of infer­
ences and which is capable of correction and of perpetuating 
itself. It has consequently an intellectual aspect and a social 
function. They need not be opposed, but sometimes they are. 
The genius of a culture consists in making them mutually 
supporting. Inference, however, is likely to be stubborn and no 
respecter of social amenities. Yet, if there is no support of each 
by the other, human life would appear to be so precarious as to 
be unsustainable. 
Inference is the act of drawing a conclusion from a proposi­
tion or propositions. Although an inference may, as we have 
seen, be expressed in action and thus be only implicit, in its 
pure form it is explicitly expressed in the drawing of a conclu­
sion from one or more propositions. If from one, the inference 
is immediate; otherwise, it is mediated—as, for example in the 
syllogism. Formally speaking, an inference may be valid as 
following from the premises of a syllogism. It need not be a 
truth about the world of things, as when Lucian says, "Where 
there are altars, there are gods. There are altars, therefore 
there are gods/' Inferences about supernatural things are surely 
possible, but they are virtually impossible to support by the 
testimony of the senses, and therefore are not obviously corrigi­
ble. The things of practice that have calculatable and repeatable 
results are capable of being tested and corrected. We may think 
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of these characteristics as being peculiar to science. No doubt 
they are, but they are first found in the arts. 
The arts are capable of being learned because there are 
regularities in nature. A novice can learn, for example, how to 
drive home nails in order to keep boards in place. He may not 
know much about hammers or nails or the fibrous structure of 
wood, but in time he can come to know how to strike nails to 
effect, avoiding knots, glancing blows, and other factors that 
defeat his purpose. At first unsure, his motions become increas­
ingly deft, and more complicated manipulations come to be 
effected with increasing ease. Thus as motions become less 
random and fortuitous, he anticipates a sequence of events, at 
first implicitly inferential, later more explicitly so. Eventually, 
the art of joining and carpentry become a full-fledged practice 
in which one can be said to have become a master. 
The rise of science is marked by a greater and much more 
explicit insistence upon inference and a decreased, and even 
tenuous, emphasis upon concrete result. We might say it is 
more the geometry of an art that interests the scientist and less 
the product, such as the building of houses or bins or what-not. 
The structure of science is basically inferential, beginning not 
with things seen, but rather with relations symbolized, as for 
example in the law of inertial movement or combinations of 
atoms to produce molecules. From these various laws or rela­
tions, the scientist can deduce consequences, not just in a 
particular case, but for any case of such and such sort. And 
these consequences may, and often do, prove to be upsetting, if 
not positively revolutionary. As a critical enterprise, science does 
have a quasi-autonomy; it possesses a generality not greatly 
fettered by the practical concerns of the moment; it relies on 
precision of technique from its own inner demands; and it 
arrives at conclusions whose rigor has no respect for sentimen­
tality. Science does not advance apart from these distinctive 
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qualities. In fact, the findings of science gain acceptance 
largely because of them. Morals, beauty, utilities are never 
quite irrelevant to the process, but they cannot account for the 
tough fiber of scientists' methods and procedures, without 
which there is nothing properly called science. 
Yet despite its inner toughness, science cannot get along 
without social arrangements, which are only partly of its own 
making. Science comes late in human history and has its roots 
in other activities which are not altogether alien to it. The most 
important of these are the arts, which already express intelli­
gence even if less finely honed than when expressed in science. 
In a less concentrated form, intelligence is at work even in the 
most primitive arts and even when they are overlaid with 
superstition and other emotional adhesions. Strategically, these 
is an advantage in looking to the advancement of the institu­
tions of intelligence as related to the arts. We can better 
appreciate how intelligence in a variety of manifestations in­
heres in them, how it promotes new arts, and even how it may 
become abstracted in a purified form from their concrete em­
bodiments and therefore freed from their previous restrictions. 
Where intelligence is, the arts cannot be far behind. 
Intelligence as Institutionally Embodied 
In order to become institutionally embodied, intelligence re­
quires a function. And to be fully operative, a function re­
quires both a motive and satisfactory results. Rousseau provides 
a provocative starting-point for a discussion of motive when he 
writes in his Discourse on the Arts and Sciences that "Astron­
omy was born of superstition, eloquence of ambition, hatred, 
falsehood, and flattery; geometry of avarice; physics of an idle 
curiosity; and even moral philosophy of human pride. Thus the 
85 Science: Institution of Intelligence 
arts and sciences owe their birth to our vices; we should be less 
doubtful of their advantages if they had sprung from our 
virtues." * There is something highly questionable about Rous­
seau's moralism. The motives he finds underlying the arts and 
sciences are a little too weighted in order to suit his theme 
song: and as a matter of fact, he even contradicts himself as he 
gets on in his Discourse. Leaving aside his particular brand of 
moralism, however, his psychological insight is engaging. The 
arts are likely to continue to be practiced by the sheer momen­
tum of custom. Only when some sensitive soul not inured to 
them by long practice brings something fresh to them do they 
yield to new developments, either in the form of the advance­
ment of the arts themselves or in that peculiarly enlightened 
form of abstraction that is called science. 
The arts in an obvious sense are institutionally embodied. 
They carry on functions more or less indispensable to the well 
being of a community. They are clearly geared to the produc­
tion of utilities, or at least what are regarded as utilities: food, 
shelter, tools, things of beauty, houses of worship, burial 
places, etc. Such arts are practiced continuously and passed on 
from generation to generation. They become, in short, part of 
the folkways of a society. As such, they are not easily changed. 
There is a kind of knowledge contained in them, such as has 
been called "the received wisdom." 
The sciences are no less institutions. They have, as we have 
noted, their motives too. The practice of them also becomes 
more or less standardized. But they differ from the arts in that 
they constantly surpass themselves, for their proximate func­
tion is the production not of things but of ideas. To a superla­
tive degree science exhibits the principle of fertility in that its 
* The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New 
York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), pp. 158-59. 
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form of knowledge constantly produces more of the same form, 
as well as stimulating the application of knowledge to human 
use. Its most recent phase, following upon the scientific revolu­
tion, has been called "knowledge production." Some of the 
traditional role of science in society and some characteristics of 
the scientific revolution are worth commenting on. 
Anticipations of the Scientific Revolution 
Before the coming of science, men apparently made mostly 
by chance the dramatic discoveries that are traditionally re­
garded as milestones of technological advancement. Their dis­
coveries must have been largely fortuitous, even though many 
of them were made simultaneously or repeatedly. For centuries 
men choked their horses and were able to get little work from 
them because no one had the ingenuity to invent the horsecol­
lar. Or they were unable to live in large communities because 
they had not devised a way of ploughing furrows deeply. 
Examples of the sort can be multiplied indefinitely. Because of 
the slow pace and the seemingly chancy way in which inven­
tions were introduced into civil life, intelligence, conceived on 
the social scale, was ingrained mostly in the arts. Until some 
catastrophe came upon men, they were apparently able to get 
along reasonably well with their traditional arts. They could 
manage by means of them their basic utilities, and they could 
realize some comforts, possibly even some elegances in life. 
With the advancement of science in the Renaissance these 
activities changed at a faster pace. But there is a real question 
whether the sciences were responsible for the advancement of 
the arts or whether they had independent histories, even if 
they were born of a common spirit. Chemistry was not suffi­
ciently advanced to enable the Renaissance scientist to under­
87 Science: Institution of Intelligence 
stand the explosive power of gunpowder, and even Gilbert 
could explain, only after the fact and very crudely, the working 
of the compass. Other inventions, such as the printing press, 
needed no scientific underpinning. No doubt there was a spirit 
of adventure that led men to want to know more about the 
world, to investigate, to manipulate, and to gain mastery over 
things both theoretically and practically. And unquestionably 
there was interplay between the practical and the theoretical. 
Even so, the practical problems, say of pumping water out of 
the mines, did more to promote the science of hydraulics than 
did hydraulics contribute to practical invention. Phrasing the 
matter differently, we may say that the Industrial Revolution 
was sparked more by practical motivations than by the applica­
tion of theoretical science to practical needs. The employment 
of steam and machinery in the Revolution was not a conse­
quence of an elaborate theory, even though Boyle's law ob­
viously could be useful in calculations pertaining to steam 
engines. 
Although the impact of theoretical science in the arts con­
tinues to gain in magnitude, the real momentum that produced 
the scientific revolution is essentially a twentieth-century affair. 
No longer can one doubt the potency of theoretical science to 
alter the arts of man. A skilled craftsman with good common 
sense could have worked out the empirical problems of con­
structing a satisfactory steam engine. Could he likewise have 
worked out the problems of constructing a hydro-electric tur­
bine? Coming to the next step, we can definitely assert that 
without a generous knowledge of theoretical physics, such a 
craftsman certainly could never have had the slightest notion 
of how to go about building an atomic accelerator. The shift to 
the importance of theoretical science is so obvious that there is 
no need to labor the point. The interesting question, however, 
is whether in this shift, the character of science itself has not 
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become radically altered. This really does seem to be the case. 
Accordingly, I wish to point out major consequences of the 
scientific revolution for twentieth-century civil life. To do this, 
I would, first, characterize the kind of change science has 
undergone and, secondly, describe the way in which it has 
become the primary institution of intelligence. 
The Revolution in Modern Science 
There is little doubt that prior to the scientific revolution 
the model of what a science should be was Newton's Princi'pia. 
Kant went so far as to construct an elaborate theory of knowl­
edge which was to prove that Newton was right and that his 
physics was indissolubly connected with Euclid's conception of 
space. The world "had" to be three-dimensional in space and 
one-dimensional in time because the mind could not possibly 
conceive it as being otherwise. And until the late nineteenth 
century, scientists, too, generally shared Kant's enthusiasm for 
the Newtonian view. The principles of the physical world 
were known through Newton's insights. The law of inertial 
motion was established once and for all. If a body is set in 
motion, it continues forever to move that way unless it is acted 
upon by some other force. For every action there is an equal 
and opposite reaction. Etc. 
The problems that remained were essentially practical prob­
lems—those of applying with great precision the laws of phys­
ics to the world. The model was capable of being expressed in 
mathematical terms, and was equally applicable to celestial and 
terrestrial motions. There were no longer two classes of motions, 
one for the heavens and another for the earth, nor was there a 
class of violent motions, contrary to natural ends and natural 
motions, ideologically approved by nature and by Aristotle. 
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The paradigm of explanation of physical events was enor­
mously simplified by Newton's law of the parallelogram of 
forces. Calculating the forces acting on a body two at a time, 
the scientist need only designate their vectors, complete the 
parallelogram, draw the diagonal, and behold! The diagonal 
perfectly represents the resultant force. Since, moreover, any 
number of forces could be so treated, the addition of vectors 
could in this way reveal the determinacy of nature, theoreti­
cally if not practically. 
This simplified version of Newton is comparable to the 
simplified version of science that was generally held before the 
scientific revolution. Nature consists of forces geometrically 
describable and therefore capable of being added. Nature is 
constituted as a huge mechanical system; it is the only perpet­
ual motion machine, incapable of losing any energy to the 
outside; because there is no outside. The properties of nature 
are measurable, and are therefore mathematically comparable. 
Nature is constituted as a determinate system. Man is an 
observer of the system, and when properly tutored is capable of 
describing it in natural terms, adequately and without inject­
ing any spiritual or psychological qualities into a world, which 
is itself devoid of such qualities. The observer consequently 
does not distort the world; he describes it in its own terms, or 
alternately, interprets it in mathematical terms because "nature 
is written in the characters of mathematics." There is some­
thing elegant about this simplified version, and something true 
—and something false. 
The elegance of the system is its self-contained adequacy 
and simplicity. It includes nothing which is not understanda­
ble. A few properties, once carefully defined and capable of 
physical measurement, the relations that hold among them, 
clearly expressed in unambiguous formulas, mathematical oper­
ations strictly carried out—these constitute the grounds of the 
 90 Institutions of Intelligence
self-containedness of the Newtonian system. And it is simple 
too. It cuts through the multitudinous qualities of the world 
and finds simplicity where common-sense experience finds con­
fusion or overwhelming riches. The simplicities are obvious— 
once a genius of Newton's stature has disclosed them to us. 
Apples fall and the moon falls too; only in the latter case, the 
centrifugal force balances the centripetal one, and the moon 
continues to circle around, while the apple rots on the ground. 
Balances of forces can apply to nonmoving things too. The 
push of the book downward equals the push of the desk 
upward; hence, forces are always at work and can explain quite 
opposite looking effects such as motion and rest. Causation is 
consequently greatly simplified over the Aristotelian version, 
which multiplies them to four or more principles. 
This kind of simplicity must contain truth. It is not only 
guaranteed by mathematics but is also verified by experiment. 
The mathematical determinacies are obvious enough. The di­
agonal of a parallelogram is a unique vector determined by the 
vectors of the sides. Experimental adequacy is effected by 
approximation to the mathematical ideal. And sure enough, the 
more precise the experiment, the closer the approximation to 
the ideal. Consequently by including the degree of probable 
error, the scientist knows what he is doing and the kind of 
accuracy he can expect from his experimentation. The constant 
refinement of his experimental findings reveals the glory and 
perfection of the workmanship by which nature was created. 
Although the Newtonian system worked well, it neverthe­
less displayed some defects. There is the matter of action at a 
distance, and the consequent need for taking a harder look at 
the meaning of gravitation. What about the ether? ether drift"? 
rectilinear motion? speeds approximating the velocity of light? 
and many other questions. Are Newton's laws really inexorable 
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laws of nature? Does the theory of experimental error cover up 
deficiencies in the theory and blunt our sensibilities to the 
subtleties of nature that only a higher sophistication can dis­
close? Not only is the system itself oversimplified but also "the 
simples" in nature are oversimplified. Newtonianism, if not 
Newton, is much too crude in what it takes ultimates to be. 
The nugget theory of atoms as having mass, shape, and size 
will not do. Nor will do the sophistication of electrons, con­
ceived on the pattern of tiny billiard balls, whirling around a 
nucleus. These models may explain the motions of ordinary 
missiles, but not electronic or atomic missiles. The radical 
difference is contained in the bonds which hold the nugget 
together such that it can no longer be regarded as a simple, 
homogeneous lump. There is, apparently, a series of radical 
consequences which make the new physics a study very differ­
ent from that of classical physics. Robert Oppenheimer summa­
rizes part of the difference as follows: 
We have almost lost the concept of equations of motion, 
having discovered that the very terms in which they are 
formulated—position, velocity, acceleration, and force— 
are not simultaneously applicable and do not, taken to­
gether, correspond to things that we know about the elec­
tron with enough accuracy to be meaningful for an 
atomic system. Instead, what we can have is a knowledge 
of the state, summarizing for us what we have found by 
observation; and the analogue of the equation of motion 
must tell us how, in response to forces acting within the 
system or upon it, this state will change with time. This, 
it turns out, is just what Schroedinger's equation does. 
And once again this equation, when applied to the fa­
miliar contexts of massive bodies and great distances, 
where the quantum of action is in fact negligibly small, 
will describe for us waves so reasonably concentrated in 
 92 Institutions of Intelligence
space, so little dispersed about their average wave length, 
that the Newtonian orbit reappears in its unaltered, classi­
cal path. . . .* 
Nuggets and determinacies give way to states and indetermina­
cies. Along with this alteration, there comes to be a highly 
speculative probing of what goes on within the nucleus, in­
cluding startling evidence for the existence of many new kinds 
of particles. More and more the notion of probable error 
becomes suspect. Scientists were beginning to realize that their 
results were of gross conditions of matter, not simple things as 
they had earlier been led to believe. Consequently, they have 
come to elevate statistics and theories of probability to a much 
more sophisticated level of mathematics and to make of them 
the only available keys to the interpretation of nature. By this 
process, nature becomes for them a looser affair than it was 
when regarded from the point of view of classical physics. 
Although a certain reconciliation between classical and modern 
physics is possible, this is because the former approximates the 
latter under special circumstances. But even if a reconciliation 
is possible at the theoretical level, science as an institution 
becomes so transformed as to make of it a radically different 
enterprise. 
The New Institutionalization of Science 
There is something comforting, if not cosy, about the old 
science, which the new science does not share. The old science 
could be carried on with a few simple instruments: some 
* Science and the Common Understanding (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1953), p. 62. 
93 Science: Institution of Intelligence 
string, some weights, balances, pendulums, magnets, batteries, 
chronometers, tubes, and glass lenses. This is a slight oversim­
plification. But what is not an oversimplification is that a 
physicist could get along well in an attic in Old Main with a 
few books, a laboratory assistant, and a knack for ideas. The 
institutional character of his work was largely obscured, and 
science could be regarded as mostly an affair of the unencum­
bered intellect. The beauty and elegance of the system was the 
thing, and experimentation was a mechanical aid to the intel­
lect, much as geometrical notations were regarded as an aid to 
the science of geometry. Science was pure—the perfecting of a 
system of concepts from which the character of the space-time 
world could be deduced. Testing was a kind of necessary 
bothersomeness, and the results were almost certain to turn out 
as predicted—or if not, there was some "detail" such as the 
discovery of a new planet which when taken into account 
would set the calculations right again. 
The institutional character of the early science was concen­
trated in the ivory tower—away from the hurly burly of in­
dustrial pursuits and only vaguely related to the utilitarianism 
that supported it. The university was the principal domicile of 
science, the institution within which it developed. For the rest, 
there were a few special institutes where serious work was done 
and a few academies and journals where the results were 
reported and discussed. On the practical side, there were those 
technologists who borrowed these results and applied them to 
practical affairs. Except in the minds of Thorstein Veblen and 
the instrumentalists, applied scientists were held in low esteem 
by the intelligentsia, because they were regarded as utilizing 
the work of others without contributing to the fund of knowl­
edge. According to this view, pure scientists inhabited the 
sphere of the intellect, while applied scientists grubbed in 
Philistine, utilitarian affairs. No doubt there was created some­
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thing of a caste system, which worked to the disadvantage of 
both theoretical and applied science. 
Underlying this classical view was the idea of a mechanistic 
interpretation of nature, which lent itself to a division of the 
castes. On the one hand, mechanistic science glorified reason as 
the instrument by which men could comprehend the system of 
nature; and, on the other, it provided the rudimentary knowl­
edge by which they could produce machines on earth. Al­
though one could see the institutionalization of knowledge on 
earth in its application to human affairs, especially in regard to 
industrialism, it was largely obscured in pure science, where 
the impact was seen to be more on men's minds than on 
material things. Only after the scientific revolution does the 
institutionalization of science become abundantly apparent. 
The new science was forecast by the inability of classical 
physics to explain a number of phenomena such as electromag­
netism, radioactivity, gravity, and some others. Faraday, Mi­
chelson and Morley, Heisenberg, Bohr, not to mention Einstein 
—these are some of the names to be reckoned with. The early 
theoretical work of the new science could still be done by 
loners, or near-loners. But when it comes to a matter of work­
ing out the details, testing, and advancing the new science, the 
picture is almost completely altered. The advancement of the 
new science requires co-operative feats of engineering in order 
that it may achieve maturity. This factor signifies a remarkable 
change from the old caste system to a rapprochement between 
science and technology that adds to the worth of each. It 
dignifies technology by requiring of it a sophistication and an 
ability not just to take over ready-made ideas, but to invent 
them and manipulate them at a high level. The rapprochement 
also has the effect of liberalizing science. First of all, science is 
no longer strait-jacketed by an outmoded passion for mecha­
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nistic interpretation. It can therefore devise innumerable mod­
els of nature and test them, not just in conjunction with 
physical phenomena but also others, for example, physiological. 
Science loses some of its majesty, that is, some of its rigidity. 
The physicist now becomes biologist or astronomer as well. He 
can intellectually range over areas of the universe that he was 
forbidden to explore because of the tight lines of the old 
science. 
The loosening process has clearly been made possible by 
co-operative work both among scientists themselves and be­
tween scientists and technologists, if we insist on retaining the 
old terminology. More and more, we observe scientists at work 
in teams, making their own divisions of labor in common 
pursuits, and by this process adding immeasurably to the fund 
of knowledge. The growth of knowledge proceeds at an unbe­
lievable rate. This may be illustrated by the Biological Sciences 
Curriculum Study which spends some eight millions in order to 
produce a set of relatively up-to-date elementary text books in 
biology. The authors declare that most biology teachers will 
have to "go back to school" to prepare themselves for its use, 
and then they dryly add that in five years the new text will be 
outdated. No doubt the same can be said for the rate at which 
knowledge is growing both in the physical and the behavioral 
sciences. No scientist in any of these fields can be said, as it 
could have been said in the old science, to have comprehensive 
knowledge of his field. 
The increased tempo of the growth of knowledge can be 
indirectly observed by the growth of its institutions. This 
growth can be measured in part by the kinds of laborato­
ries and instruments that scientists use and in part it can be 
measured by the proliferation and changes in locus of scientific 
work. On some of these aspects of the institutionalization of 
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knowledge we have some rather good data, but even where this 
is lacking, the outlines of the picture are clear. 
There exists a gap between the small attic laboratory of the 
old scientist and the well-outfitted institutes of science today, 
just as there exists a gap between the few thousand dollars 
required to equip the one and the hundreds of millions of 
dollars required to construct and maintain a 200 BEV Proton 
Accelerator. A vast change occurs, not just in outlay of funds 
or in co-operation of many highly skilled workers including no 
doubt many geniuses, but also in the attitude displayed toward 
nature. As may be observed, in the one case, science is largely a 
matter of observing nature with a minimum of distortion— 
seeing things through a glass. But in the new science, radical 
bombardments, requiring enormously concentrated energies, 
produce new particles that seldom appear in nature by them­
selves. The interference by man increases to such a degree that 
we are entitled to regard the new science as different in kind— 
even as the Rutherford atom is different in kind from that of 
Dalton. The instrumentation required to study nature is clearly 
of a different order from that of the past, and this shift is 
clearly marked by a kind of sponsorship science now receives. 
Whereas in the past science was largely tied in with the 
university, we find today that the largest share of the produc­
tion of knowledge, in the broadest sense, is to be found in 
government and industry. Professor Machlup cites statistics 
indicating the relative expenditures of government, industry, 
and universities for research and development (see the table on 
page 97).* 
* Fritz Machlup, The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in 
the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 
152, 157, and 158. I have reproduced Machlup's Tables V-l, V-3 (in 
part), and V-4 (in part), all of which have been taken from public 
sources. He notes in regard to Table V-l (reproduced under the 
headimj "Expenditures for Basic Research, 1953-54 and 1957-58 in 
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Science as the Focal Institution 
There is little doubt that science and its technological com­
plement have grown to be the focal institution of contemporary 
society, however distorted that institution may be. In a variety 
of forms, knowledge is recognized as indispensable to the aims 
of any such society that would achieve its ends. And this 
recognition finds expression in institutional form, even though 
romantics of various sorts attempt to repudiate it. The growth 
of knowledge seems irresistible, whatever the motives of the 
men who contribute to its progress. For some, the motive is a 
creative urge of the human spirit; for others it is a bid to garner 
prestige, personal or cliquish or national; for still others it is a 
way of obtaining power or wealth; or again, it is just an 
approved way of occupying time. But regardless of the effective 
personal motive or political ideology of scientists, the advance­
ment and employment of knowledge is a commitment of every 
industrial society. And we might add that the variations of its 
advancement and employment are less marked than the simi­
larities, despite iron curtains, chauvinism, religion, or philo­
sophical predispositions. The reason is that the design of gaso­
line or diesel motors, turbines, atomic piles, and the like, is an 
engineering feat, regardless of the particular uses or housings 
of such engines. Design in machine technology is more a matter 
the table on page 97) that "not all the R&D [research and development] 
expenditures of colleges and universities are for basic research; in 1957, 
only 51 per cent were." He then adds: "Lest one wonder why even 
institutions of higher education were doing so much applied research, 
we should explain that several of them administer large research centers, 
most of them off campus, under contracts with federal agencies, chiefly 
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department, and that 
about three-fourths of the work in these centers is applied research and 
development" (p. 152). 
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of function than of bias, preference, or social custom. How that 
technology is further employed may be left to whim or business 
prospects or even to rationalization of consumptive ends. The 
dynamics of gaining knowledge, especially as we know it in 
science, are peculiarly appropriate to the conditions of contem­
porary life. The secret of its dynamics appears to be nothing 
other than the secret of intelligence in the conduct of life. 
Moreover, the singular aspect of its modern form appears to 
reside in the discovery that intelligence can be embodied in 
institutional form without losing the capacity for its own ad­
vancement. 
The intelligent conduct of life requires continual reassess­
ment of beliefs and actions in the light of new awarenesses and 
in the need for achieving new harmonies. It is, we might say, a 
productive life guided by constantly new sensitivities. Science, 
too, begins in awarenesses, disjointednesses, and seeks for under­
lying regularities, such as can be articulated with mathematical 
precision. But scientists are nevertheless constantly suspi­
cious of these regularities, and need to recognize that mathe­
matical precision is a tool rather than, as the old rationalistic 
scientists believed, the essence of nature. Mathematical models 
are numerous, and their inner structures contain necessary 
connections which aid in marking certain kinds of regularities 
in nature. Since, however, nature can be subtler than any 
model, only the sensitivity of the scientist can lead him to 
disqualify models which have been regarded as satisfactory 
explanations of how a portion of nature works. Science is 
productive because it employs tools capable of yielding deter­
minate results, but it gets on beyond this because scientists are 
sensitive and are capable of rejecting the rigidities of accepted 
interpretations. This combination of imagination and critical 
rejection is the essence of their genius. 
Although science does have a history, it nevertheless is 
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radical in the sense that it is investigation that continually 
outmodes itself. Its challenge is constantly to push forth its 
frontiers, and its greatest delight and reward goes to those who 
succeed in breaking through to new land. Scientists are ex­
pected to be radical and to probe the ambiguities covered by 
dark concepts. There is often said to be an irresoluble question 
here, How can there be a logic of science, when at bottom 
science depends upon inspiration or creative genius'? The ques­
tion is rightly posed if, as Bacon sometimes suggests, there is 
assumed to be a logic of induction which when followed 
always produces results. This assumption is of course nonsensi­
cal. Science does not advance if it is limited to known proce­
dures. Because it copes with the unknown, it needs constantly 
to invent new procedures. One part of Baconian science was to 
collate instances of the conjunction of events, and then from a 
careful observation of the events so conjoined to induce middle 
axioms, that is, scientific laws, which express the form of the 
conjunction. But another part was to come to the world with 
fresh sensitivities, borrowed from other aspects of experience, 
and by the conjunction of this with empirically devised tech­
niques to discern real connections among things. This is what 
Bacon meant by "experiments of light" as contrasted with the 
more narrowly conceived "experiments of fruit." 
In its creative phase, science does rest upon imaginative 
insight, and proceeds by asking new questions. Such creativity, 
however, is not limited to science; it is also in philosophy, in 
art, in religion, in morality—in short, in any activity where the 
human spirit is at work. It is, nevertheless, especially evident in 
science today, no doubt because present society so liberally 
supports science and encourages scientists. We seek for scien­
tific talent, screen for it, and give it every manner of aid. Little 
wonder then that the mute Miltons of science have become 
articulate and that the abundance of talented men who have 
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been encouraged to doubt extensively and to question inten­
sively produces a constantly increasing body of knowledge 
incomparable to that of any previous time. I leave the uncover­
ing of the mysteries of creative imagination to those better 
suited to explain it. But I do insist upon acknowledging the 
acceleration of scientific discoveries, dramatically punctuated 
by the incidence of those who are only weeks or days too late 
in getting their results to the journals for them to be regarded 
as new discoveries. 
This acknowledgment helps to close the gap between the 
radical and the conservative phases of science. We know how 
to produce scientists and we do it in institutionalized form. 
They are spotted early in high school, or before; they are 
awarded handsome scholarships; they are further trained by the 
best scientists and their aides; they are provided with modern 
laboratory facilities; and many of them turn out to be produc­
tive scientific geniuses, who in turn continue to assist the 
training of other scientists. Teams work together; they have 
access to the use of computers, 200-inch telescopes, synchro­
trons, and other instruments necessary to advance knowledge. 
There is little to block progress and much to encourage it. The 
ritualistic elements increasingly vanish in the light of constant 
criticism both in science and in the preparation of future 
scientists. There are, however, some darkening clouds, namely, 
those that obscure scientific investigations by the new secrecy. 
By being withdrawn from the light of public debate, such 
investigations fail to achieve the kind of full disclosure that is 
vital to the advancement of science. Before pursuing this topic, 
however, I would recur once more to the paradox I originally 
posed. 
At this point we have, I think, arrived at a clarification of 
the paradox of "institutions of intelligence" suggested at the 
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opening of the chapter. Intelligence breaks through and de­
stroys the rigidities of old beliefs and attitudes, and also the 
social structures that bolster them. Yet it is clear that institu­
tions are required to sustain intelligence in any but its most 
rudimentary forms. If we regard the social complex that sus­
tains science as the paradigm of institutions of intelligence— 
and I think this to be correct—we can better understand the 
paradox as a function of the history of science. Intelligence or 
new theories do destroy the old in the sense that they outmode 
them. Post-Darwinian biology outmodes that of Linnaeus; it 
does not eliminate classification of species, but it does reject it as 
an end in itself. Similarly, the periodic table, though retained, 
appears radically different to the scientist who is concerned with 
radio-activity, isotopes, and quantum theory than it did to Men­
delyeev. Breakthroughs in science require new kinds of experi­
ments, new laboratories, new techniques, and new instrumen­
tations. Relativity theory and the "ether drag" give rise to one 
set of experiments; quantum theory to another; and both make 
obsolete old theories, old experiments, and old laboratories. 
Even though science requires a body of knowledge in order 
to attain new knowledge, scientists are notorious in their will­
ingness to neglect or forget the history of their arrival at their 
current concerns. 
An even more unique characteristic of the new science is its 
planning for its own obsolescence. Scientists no longer wait for 
quandaries to appear; they work on anticipating them in appro­
priate ways. If universities are not geared to the challenge, new 
centers or institutes are created, outfitted and manned for the 
purpose. Thus fresh problems pertaining to atmospheric re­
search or cryogenics, or the creation and study of new particles, 
or what-not—these are systematically cared for in the institu­
tions of intelligence called science. The facts are that scientific 
advancement goes along at a great pace, that many of the most 
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challenging problems are being solved, and that the gap be­
tween the potential for knowledge and the actual production 
of knowledge is decreased, to the advantage of both. However 
much of a mystery creative genius may be, the conditions for 
its discovery and employment are coming to be better known. 
The virtue of science at its best is that it produces more 
science. In eighteenth-century language, this is called progress. 
Focal interests of a society always have a way of advancing, 
whether they are religious, artistic, scientific, or whatever. Yet 
the institutions that support such activities are always subject 
to decay—though possibly less so in regard to science than to 
other activities, because science by nature is intrinsically pro­
gressive. There are some danger-signals, however, in the insti­
tutional practice of science, on which comment is now appro­
priate. 
Institutional Obstacles to Science 
The practice of science may be stultified by institutional 
obstacles. As we have suggested above, the chief of these is 
secrecy, but there are others of some potency. The trouble with 
secrecy is that science disfavors secret societies. It feeds on 
knowledge gained by anyone who is willing to learn the 
language of nature and is capable of extending it beyond what 
his predecessors could teach. Science is in this sense public and 
flourishes in processes of criticism, clarification, and repeatable 
experiments. All of these are best conducted in the open 
society in which there is maximum play of intelligence. Al­
though the technical procedures of science are furthered by 
institutions—laboratories, schools, conferences, academies, jour­
nals, etc.—it is the sponsorship of these institutions that may 
be the most telling influence of all. Clearly, sponsorship can be 
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designed to liberate or to impede the fuller progress of science. 
The most critical challenge, then, to the new science comes 
less from its technical procedures than it does from its institu­
tional restrictions. The fact is that the continued support of 
science requires enormous outlays of human and material re­
sources, and this fact is a source of both its restrictions and its 
capacity to progress. Such outlays entail policy decisions of the 
first magnitude—decisions that cannot but affect the course of 
scientific investigations. There is no turning back to the old, 
and there is no turning away from the commitment to the new. 
The crucial question is not whether but how the policy deci­
sions are to be made. Clearly, they are practical decisions and 
cannot be decided without some risk, calculated or not. The 
danger is that they will be decided in a narrowly defined po­
litical context, realistically designed to protect national interest 
or sentimentally designed to exploit chauvinistic prestige. 
Neither is by itself illegitimate, but both are subject to a maxi­
mum of arbitrariness because of their limited aims. As Hitlerites 
ironically discovered, the more national interest is emphasized 
the more it may actually be defeated, precisely because the full 
power of the new science becomes restricted by short-run and 
short-lived objectives. The question is how to get the maximum 
advantage from a science which requires an ever increasing 
portion of expenditure in talent and goods. There is an answer 
to this question, even if only a methodological one. 
Very simply, the answer is that the most effective way to 
minimize arbitrariness of decision is through publicity and 
debate to the end that the decisions may be made with greater 
rather than with less knowledge. If a National Space Agency is 
to employ its powers to the best end of exploiting the science of 
space, it is not because an inner bureaucracy has agreed upon 
techniques for attaining the end, but because the best scientific 
brains inside and outside the Agency have scrutinized the 
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plans and offered various alternatives, not toward the end of 
being first, but toward the end of contributing to human knowl­
edge and of resolving the problems of man. Magnificent as the 
bureaucratic successes may have been, they are not magnificent 
enough if those capable of understanding the problems are 
excluded from participating in policy decisions because the 
necessary information to make significant judgments is with­
held from them. 
The new science requires free institutions if it is to advance. 
"Free" does not mean without restrictions. It means freedom of 
debate and criticism and of arriving at decisions on the basis of 
the best knowledge attainable, and of being able to review 
these decisions whenever new knowledge or other changed 
circumstances intervene. In this sense, freedom is not to be 
confused with isolated individuals or bureaus, acting arbitrar­
ily. Science is in essence collective and public, and only under 
extraordinary circumstances can its secrecy be legitimate. And 
even then the risk is very great—in fact, so great that it dare 
not be taken except after debate and criticism and publicity. 
Otherwise intelligence is defeated, and with it, modern man 
too is defeated. 
Concluding Remarks 
Science has been here regarded as representing the institu­
tion of intelligence, not because it is the only such institu­
tion, but because it is focal in modern society and therefore 
colors most of what modern man does. Especially as it develops 
into the new science, it is the prototype of intelligence at work. 
Because the new science is advanced in theory and also in­
volves prodigious engineering feats co-ordinated with it, there 
is increased reason to concentrate upon it as the institution of 
intelligence. This characteristic of the new science is even 
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reflected in the new terminology which is employed to regroup 
scientific undertakings. Physics, astronomy, aeronautics and 
missiles, for example, have come commonly to be regarded as 
space sciences, just as psychology, the social sciences, and law 
have come to be regarded as the behavioral sciences. Two 
observations on this regrouping are relevant: first, the new 
terminology acknowledges the need for cutting across tradi­
tional divisions of the sciences, and second, it more closely 
relates theoretical and practical concerns without diminishing 
the importance of theory and without derogating practice to 
the level of stereotyped specialists/ 
There is a question about the point at which "knowledge 
production" is not really to be regarded as knowledge, but only 
as the application of specialized skill which is easily outmoded 
in the new scientific age. Much that goes under the title of 
"Research and Development" may actually be of this sort. 
The "R & D" scientists who are limited in training and insights 
to serve practical ends narrowed to short-lived tasks are in a 
class with those less skilled technologically unemployed who 
constitute a serious economic problem, and again an even more 
serious human problem because of their "trained incapacity." 
Problems of this sort are such as to call attention to another 
aspect of our discussion, now over-delayed, that of the dissemi­
nation of knowledge and of its relation to the production of 
further knowledge. 
* Earl D. Johnson of the Delta Airlines does seem to challenge this 
statement when he writes that "Brilliant men who were involved in the 
[space] program will not have the flexibility and productivity that they 
had in their twenties or thirties." And of specialists who believe that 
they can narrowly specialize and later find employment for their skills, 
he observes, ". . . very few companies in the civilian sector of the 
economy can use the kind of highly specialized skills that are being 
developed in the military and space sectors." Technology and Social 
Change, ed. Eli Ginzberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1964), p. 77. 
/// . The Functions of Education 
Dissemination of Knowledge 
Like the production of knowledge, the dissemination of knowl­
edge is highly institutionalized, and rightly so. Moreover, as an 
institution of intelligence, the dissemination of knowledge like­
wise raises a nest of questions as to how it can truly be 
constituted as intelligence and at the same time be forwarded 
by its primary institution, the school. Intelligence, we have 
seen, is necessarily radical; the school, it seems inevitable, is 
conservative. Intelligence feeds on spontaneity and creativity; 
the school upon orderly lines of progressions. Intelligence 
works on a cutting edge; the school on rounded experience. 
The oppositions appear to be sufficiently sharp to cause one to 
wonder how the school can possibly be the instrumentality of 
intelligence and provide the background for a person of intel­
ligence to assume a place in a society geared to the new 
science. Is it possible to reconcile this opposition, or is there 
perhaps no real opposition? Have we possibly stated one when 
in fact none such really exists? 
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Whatever the answers may be, I propose that we approach 
these questions from the point of view of education as related 
to the arts broadly considered, and that we then come to terms 
with the demands on education created by the rise of the new 
science. This approach has the advantage of placing the issues 
in the contemporary mode. And I would add that if we ignore 
this mode, education becomes irrelevant to the things of most 
concern to the modern condition. To expedite the discussion, I 
shall divide it into the following topics: first, the primitive arts 
by which the young person initially comes to cope with his 
immediate and highly protected environment; secondly, the 
school as geared to the demands of the arts; and finally, the 
challenge of the new science to the theory and practice of 
higher education. 
The Arts and the Uninitiated 
From an abundance of studies over the years in human and 
animal life, we learn that intelligence is a trait of all animals 
and that it begins to show at birth. We may no longer rightly 
insist that intelligence is first exercised at an "age of discre­
tion"; on the contrary, it appears in the beginnings of life or 
not at all. The current belief has deep roots both in Darwinian 
biology and in Freudian psychology. The Darwinian view 
discourages the notion that intelligence makes its first appear­
ance in man. To be sure, its development through the arts 
marks decisive steps in the history of institutions. Nevertheless, 
the fact of intelligence in most, if not all, animal life is 
established beyond doubt. And if biology establishes some 
continuity of intelligence in all animal life, Freudian psychol­
ogy equally establishes the continuity of a conative factor 
which is perpetually overriding and cancelling the power of 
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intelligence. Thus we are less inclined today to divide the child 
from the man or the irrational from the rational. Intelligence 
makes its way in all stages of life, and in all stages it is 
generously interlarded with non-adaptive, ill-directed conduct. 
I am not suggesting that we should confuse intelligence with 
stupidity or that we cannot be clear on the differences between 
what constitutes intelligence and what defeats it. Rather, I am 
suggesting that the standards we employ to distinguish them 
refer to kinds of actions and not to ages or kinds of people. 
Homo sapiens is also homo stultus, and no one can ever quite 
avoid being both. It is true that men can be aided in being 
intelligent and that the aids come largely from the arts of doing 
and making. The display of intelligence consequently has 
much of its source in social life, for two reasons: first, it 
provides direction for conduct and secondly it provides tech­
niques for realizing direction. The two are concomitant, not 
separate. 
The psychological problem to be solved is clearly that of 
explaining how random behavior becomes adaptive and purpo­
sive. The solution of this problem is not our task. But it is our 
task to note the terms without which the psychological pro­
posal fails to accomplish its work. Intelligence is purposive, 
adaptive, and social. Therefore, the psychological account 
needs to show how random, unadaptive, a-social movements 
become converted into intelligent conduct. Otherwise, the psy­
chological account is defective. Sophisticated theories which 
speak of "sign" and "referent" or even of "stimulus" and "re­
sponse" are correct in pointing to the gross fact of purposive­
ness, but they beg the question of intelligence instead of 
explaining it. This is so because the relation of sign to referent 
is already selective and purposive. And the same is at least 
partially true of stimulus and response. At this point, organiza­
tion has already taken place. Therefore, it does not tell us how 
Institutions of Intelligence 110 
such relations have come to be established. A theory such as 
that of "synaptic connections" may commend itself as a better 
attack upon the problem, not in that it is necessarily true but 
in that, whatever its inadequacy, it nevertheless suggests a 
mechanism capable of being investigated/ 
There are two good reasons, I think, for acknowledging the 
play of intelligence in infant behavior before we proceed to its 
institutional phase. First, it helps us to see how intelligent 
conduct makes an intelligent being capable of even further 
intelligent conduct. And secondly, it helps us to see the objec­
tive and social character of the play of intelligence. Much of 
the fascination of observing the infant develop resides in the 
profundity of the change from a being dependent upon others 
to an independent agent. At first quite incapable of contending 
with its environment, the infant progressively manages satisfac­
torily to relate himself to it. Accordingly, the play of intelli­
gence represents a good deal more than mere cerebration. It 
represents a multitude of adaptations by which the growing 
individual comes to have new prowesses, new outlooks, and 
new enthusiasms. With the defeat of intelligence, the processes 
are reversed. 
As the intelligence of the infant is furthered, he becomes 
accustomed to the ways of others both by responding to them 
and by making demands upon them. He comes to be a member 
of a community of interests, however much he requires care in 
order to continue to create his selfhood. Although the involve­
ment is one devoted very largely to the personal needs of the 
transforming infant, the patterns of responses that evolve are 
* On the level of a philosophical account, which nevertheless fully 
acknowledges the psychological problem, I commend the reader to 
Stephen Pepper's admirable analysis of purposive behavior in his 
The Sources of Value (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1958). 
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such as to give him standing in the community: the ability to 
feed himself, look after his personal hygiene, communicate 
wants and demands, perform some services, become increas­
ingly sensitive to things, gadgets, and other persons, and possi­
bly in rather simple ways to make things of his own contriv­
ance. In other words, the infant is, on his own level, doing the 
kinds of things that a mature person does. He progresses in his 
own way as an artisan and a member of society who is capable 
of developing a variety of talents. 
From the very beginning, the infant progressively becomes a 
member of civil society, and like the more mature members of 
this society, he is capable of engaging in the progressive con­
tract by constantly coming anew to terms with other members 
of his society—or we should say, coming to terms and falling 
out with other members of his society. Although limited, 
the infant's society continues to expand concomitantly with the 
arts that are learned. In fact, they are a measure of the 
advancement of the infant's membership in civil society. As he 
learns more of the arts, he is more capable of participating in 
an expanded social context. Such participation signifies both 
that he is geared to the new requirements of the larger context 
and that he is better prepared to make demands on that society 
—namely, the demands necessary for practicing his arts. 
The School in Relation to the Arts 
The arts of personal involvement, first supported by the 
family, inevitably expand into the larger society that surrounds 
it. Thus new demands are made upon the child and new 
opportunities are open to him. He must cope with others less 
committed to his own well-being and even with those alien and 
unfriendly to him. In order to do this successfully the child 
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needs to advance his civil life beyond the arts guided and 
protected within family bounds. The process is a part of 
culture, dependent as it is upon various degrees of knowledge 
of things and persons and upon skills in achieving satisfactory 
relationships that bind persons together in a viable society. The 
development is at once moral and educational, both of which 
require support from the institutions of intelligence. In con­
temporary society this development is marked by a shift from 
family to school, and, as we have throughout insisted, all of 
this in the context of the pervasive challenge from the new 
science. Accordingly, I wish to consider, first, the dictates 
legitimately made upon the school in the light of the commit­
ment of modern society to science and technology, and sec­
ondly, the nature of the cultural requirements for meeting the 
challenge of the new science and technology. 
The shift in emphasis from the family to the school is from 
the arts of personal involvement to those of impersonal knowl­
edge and cultural skills; but, since intelligence is at play in 
both, the difference is one of emphasis rather than of kind. 
Whatever else it is, the family is an institution of intelligence, 
and by the same token the defeat of the family is the defeat of 
intelligence, especially for the child. It surely learns its elemen­
tary skills under the care required to nurture them, including 
the approval and disapproval necessary to establish and re-en­
force them. Moreover, the spontaneities displayed in the learn­
ing process involve child, parents, siblings, and any others who 
are part of the family circle. The learning process is a commu­
nity affair, the community being the family, though not exclu­
sively. The broken family accordingly takes its toll, and the 
child no doubt finds it more difficult to learn his skills than he 
would in a family that has reasonable concern for his well­
being. The peculiar virtue of the family in nurturing the child 
is its capacity to appreciate the child's attainments coupled 
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with a foreknowledge that he will be better prepared to cope 
with challenges that are certain to be encountered. Already 
there is forecast the larger world and the larger society in 
which he will have to make his way. The school serves as the 
more impersonal and major institution of intelligence designed 
to support the child in his further ventures. 
Before considering how the various stages within the school 
can serve to relate the child to the arts, a comment pertaining 
to preschool is in order. Apparently, the task of preschool is to 
bridge the gap between the arts of personal involvement, 
which it is the task of the family to develop, and the less 
personal arts, which are those of the school. In the one the care 
is solicitous (often over-solicitous); in the other it is objectively 
conceived (often too objectively). In either case the rationale 
consists in a happy combination of satisfaction and satisfactory 
attainment. Coupled with the joy of learning how to do some­
thing, there needs to be an explicit realization that something 
was learned, even though the latter appears to come in view 
only after the former has been learned. The preschool, I 
assume, purports to broaden the environment, in that it ex­
cludes the family in those activities that are peculiar to the 
school. Its design makes inevitable a reduction of the solicitous 
care which the child-oriented family displays. The school has 
the task of easing the child into a somewhat more precarious 
environment with new toys, games, and an increasingly severe 
discipline. A part of this environment includes the ever-explo­
sive relation of youngsters facing one another and supervised 
without the tender bias of parental concern. A new dimension 
in the world is accompanied by a new opportunity for arousing 
his curiosity about things in a rather controlled environment as 
well as with the indispensability of learning manners in a peer 
group. 
Both in theory and in practice there is reason to conjoin 
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manipulation of things with a lively sense of interplay of 
minds. The one is necessary if the child is to muster sufficient 
force in coming to terms with the world; the other adds to the 
effectiveness of intelligence. Manipulation is the test of one's 
mastery over things. In the absence of it, the child loses contact 
with the world. And his idle curiosity, so potent a factor in his 
development, withers into empty sentiment. Manipulation is 
motor, but it is ideational too. To seize upon and apply ideas is 
no less necessary than the body for doing things. Although 
intelligence has subterranean sources within the child, he 
cannot develop far without feeding upon other minds. His 
appreciation of the learning process requires him to acknowl­
edge his appropriation of ideas from others. Without such 
appropriation, he cannot move deftly in exploiting nature. The 
employment of motor skills demands a sureness, a confidence, 
uninhibited by doubts or self-pity or other aberrations. The 
play of intelligence is quite other. It is an interplay: a give-
and-take, a weighing and balancing, a willingness to entertain, 
to be quizzical, and to reject or accept ideas. It is opposite to 
the manipulative in that even when he rejects, he needs to 
preserve that humility which respects another person as a 
source from which ideas, suggestions, and criticisms may come. 
Not wholly inner directed, the child can come to the realiza­
tion that his idle curiosity has sources in his involvements with 
his peers and that it gets expressed in his actually altering 
things. In this way the child can come to see that the manipu­
lative and the social are complementaries, each necessary, and 
each with its own logic and rewards. 
The advantage offered by the preschool is clear: it makes for 
the child an ease of transition from the family to the world 
beyond in the hope of minimizing traumatic effects upon him. 
In the bourgeois world of our times this would appear to be 
helpful. A characteristic of the times is that social life has 
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shifted from the home to the outside—the school, the play­
ground, the canteen, the camp, as well as to a host of other 
institutions appropriate to age, development, and sex. The 
child needs to make his way in the expanded environment and 
thus to be less dependent on the direct presence of members of 
his family. The reason for this new kind of orientation goes 
deep into the character of the world, which is dominated by 
science and technology and which manifests, among other 
things, mobility of the family, a society of specialists and of 
urban dwellers, industrialism, and even global concerns—all of 
which tend to outmode familialism and parochialism.* The 
magnitude of the task by which one comes to terms with others 
in an urban setting is appalling. To learn such an art and still 
to display integrity marks an enviable achievement. It is an art, 
not of etiquette, but of manners that contain a wealth of 
human expression, including intelligence, spontaneity, learn­
ing, sensitivity, wit, humor, warmth, honesty, and, no doubt, 
some genuine sense of commitment. The moulding of such 
traits into an authentic pattern of life, if at all possible, is 
nothing less than greatness. I wish to return to this theme in 
the next chapter; here I wish only to suggest that the art has its 
foundations in the way in which the child masters the arts of 
personal involvement and comes to terms with others, who are 
not taken for granted as if they were part of the family circle, 
as well as with things. If the preschool successfully introduces 
* As a beginning to an understanding of the problem, one may 
advantageously turn to Louis Wirth's "Urbanism as a Way of Life," 
American Journal of Sociology, XLIV, No. 1 (July 1938), 1-24. Cf., 
for example, when he writes: "The contacts of the city may indeed be 
face to face, but they are nevertheless impersonal, superficial, transitory, 
and segmental. The reserve, the indifference, and the blase outlook 
which urbanites manifest in their relationships may thus be regarded 
as devices for immunizing themselves against the personal claims and 
expectations of others." (p. 12). 
 116 Institutions of Intelligence
youngsters to the rigors of these objectives, it certainly justifies 
its existence. And if only bourgeois families enjoy for their 
children the opportunities of preschool education, then there is 
a challenge to see that others, not so privileged, are provided 
with similarly appropriate opportunities. 
If, as we have insisted, some sense of objectivity and imper­
sonality is necessary for introducing youngsters to the rigors of 
interpersonal relations, it appears reasonable that a sense of 
objectivity is re-enforced by introducing them also to appropri­
ate objectivities and impersonalities of the world of things, 
including their structures and their capacities for being manip­
ulated. The level of attainment possible may surprise us, once 
we see how curiosity may be educed and a creative sense for 
the exploration of the workings of physical things can be 
sustained.* There is a difficult topic here concerned with 
relating an objective and manipulative attitude towards things 
to a decent objective attitude towards persons; for we tradition­
ally regard the manipulation of persons as immoral and im­
proper, and no doubt rightly so. This topic I wish to postpone 
for later discussion, and only to suggest now that there is reason 
to place emphasis upon learning certain arts dictated by the new 
science, which I hasten to add need not conflict with the 
development of decent attitudes towards persons. 
The Challenge of the New Science for Education 
When the child has mastered the elementary arts of per­
sonal involvement and has been introduced to the arts of 
* My colleague, Professor David Hawkins, along with others, 
reports amazing successes in teaching elementary science from tender 
ages in preschool through elementary and junior schools. See his "On 
Messing About in Science," Science and Children, II, No. 5 (February, 
1965), 5-9. 
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interpersonal relations and of simple manipulation of things, 
along with the concept-formations they require, he is ready to 
begin mastering the arts of literacy and numeracy—arts indis­
pensable to the industrial world. The learning of these arts and 
their implications I take to be the central objectives of elemen­
tary education. Primitive societies could apparently get along 
tolerably well without the written word and with only simple 
forms of counting. The modern world cannot, and no one can 
participate in modern culture unless he can fluently read and 
write and speak at least one language and have some compe­
tence in understanding mathematical functions and statistics. 
The major problem here is not where, but how he shall become 
literate and numerate. The problem is how to attain the skills 
of literacy and numeracy without impairing their functional 
ends and without loss of the full and rich qualities of human 
life appropriate to them. If these arts are to serve their masters, 
they must be so learned that they can be used with accuracy 
and precision and with a dexterity consonant with the tempo 
of industrial life. Yet, there is another sense in which it is 
wrong to attain this mastery if it destroys curiosity, depth of 
connotative meanings, the joy of discovery, and, we should 
add, the community of learners and the decent social relation­
ships within which that community exists. 
Literacy 
Literacy takes many forms, and no doubt the child should 
not have foisted on him techniques of learning to read or write 
or speak which are not extensions of what he can directly relate 
to his perceptions of and involvements with things, processes, 
and persons, and their various interrelations. I think we must 
admit that Dewey was absolutely right in inveighing against 
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both rote and cerebral tasks which are divorced from experienc­
ings and doings and which thus remove the child from activity 
meaningful to him. In any of its manifestations, if use of 
language is not meaningful, it may better be foregone. What 
the newer philosophy from Wittgenstein and others emphati­
cally calls to our attention is that there are many uses of 
language and that a wide variety of uses may all be appropri­
ate. This suggestion can lead to fruitful, new approaches to the 
learning of language. A consideration of concrete nouns, ab­
stract nouns, adverbs and adverbial phrases, to mention only a 
beginning, suggests the need for new experimentations in ways 
of teaching children to become literate, especially when the 
experimenter constantly bears in mind that linguistic expres­
sions are always to be related to extralinguistic realities with 
which they are correctly associated and for which they may 
create a completed form. 
This relation of language to things and undergoings is 
certainly part of Dewey's fundamental philosophical outlook. 
Experience is not just cognitive, nor even primarily so. It has 
multitudinous forms, which include aesthetic, practical, and 
intellectual dimensions, including their various interrelations. 
Literacy thus goes far beyond cognitive apprehensions, even 
under optimum conditions when cognition involves spontane­
ity and creativity in concept-formation at whatever level it may 
occur. Literacy also goes far beyond utilitarian demands for 
making practical arrangements and for communicating and 
acknowledging information and requests so that one can carry 
on the formalities of organized social functions. Literacy is 
necessary for the acquisition of knowledge and for "getting 
along" in the world, but equally important it provides opportu­
nities for the expansion of the human spirit in the poetic and 
lyrical dimensions, without which life is impoverished. The 
poetic and the lyrical—the two need to be combined and 
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invariably are, such that poetry as a making is fused with the 
lyrical as the rhythmic and moving qualities of life. 
Literacy is not, it becomes clear, an independent activity. It 
is not just a phrasing of something already known, and there­
fore it is not a mechanical transcription of something already 
completed. On the contrary, it is an activity, creative as well as 
useful and informative. Closely associated with nationality, 
language, along with folklore and custom, is no doubt properly 
recognized as a characteristic of the life of a people. Just as 
differences in language make people talk differently, so also 
they make people think differently and act differently and feel 
differently. There is no need to go into the question of the 
adequacy of translations from one language to another, but 
from the fact that translations are never quite adequate, we are 
entitled to conclude that language expresses a dimension be­
yond the cognitive. The learning of language is an art, a 
necessary one, if a person is to participate in his culture. 
Because a natural language cannot fail to embody the spirit of 
a people, it deserves a central position in the curriculum of the 
elementary school. To learn a language is to have one's charac­
ter shaped such that one may be fit to participate in a sophisti­
cated society. Without a fluent use of language, feelings are 
dumb, action is limited and divisive, knowledge is rude, and 
the creative spirit is stifled. 
There is an important objection to this account of language. 
If, as has been suggested, literacy is an expression of extralin­
guistic and non-cognitive matters, is it not also true that lan­
guage is parochial or nationalistic or possibly even chauvinistic 
in its employments? There is some truth in this objection. If 
language is fundamentally an expression of undergoings and 
mores and of culture, does it not necessarily divide people into 
culturally disparate societies and thus prevent cross-cultural 
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communication? Much of the history of the world has actually 
answered this question in the affirmative. Nationalistic and 
religious conflicts and warfare have certainly been a dominant 
part of history, and continue to be so. Aggressiveness, sup­
ported by language barriers, greed, economic interests, and 
ideological differences, has served as a basis for collective antip­
athies and violence of increasing magnitudes. The traditional 
pattern of love for in-groups, hate for out-groups, has too much 
reality for the safety of modern society. The picture, though 
not black, is dark gray. But the important question is whether 
this account of language is correct. Surely not all language is so 
embedded in the cultural concerns of a single society that it 
prevents understanding of other societies. Cultural relativism 
carried to such an extreme is surely insupportable. 
There must be ways out of the impasse of cultural relativ­
ism. One of the most usual is that of attaching pre-eminent 
value to the cognitive use of language, and in some sense this is 
a position well taken. Whatever other functions language has 
—and it has many others—one of them is to express proposi­
tions which are true or false, or at least which possess a degree 
of probability of truth or falsity. The formal contradiction that 
is supposed to result from the denial that there are true proposi­
tions, a statement which itself is said to be true or false, is no 
longer very formidable. But what is formidable is the employ­
ment of science, utilizing all its safeguards, for deriving con­
stantly more accurate and corrigible statements about the 
world. Modern science connotes two things: it is experimental 
and it is mathematical. Both of these aspects of it are difficult 
to explain precisely, and it is not our task to try. But there 
attaches sufficient importance to mathematics—a sense of nu­
meracy—to focus upon it as an indispensable subject of study 
if one is to have any appreciation for the production of knowl­
edge, which figures so large an aspect of modern culture. Along 
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with literacy, it surely belongs to the elementary curriculum if 
the object is to help the young to become full-fledged partici­
pants in society. 
Numeracy 
Whereas the function of literacy is to expand the human 
spirit in all its richness, the function of numeracy is to concen­
trate the spirit upon precision and economy of expression in 
order to cut through, even if it does not destroy, the qualitative 
richness of things. "One person, one vote" cuts through to an 
essential correlation, it does not belittle the worth of a person 
or of a vote—quite the contrary. Nor does the formula, s = 
Vi gt2, detract from the qualities of a falling object, even if it 
sometimes detracts from a person's dignity. I am not suggesting 
a Renaissance notion that all science must be mathematical, 
although it may be valuable to regard nature as if it were 
written in mathematical characters. I insist simply that science 
and technology as ways of discerning truth in the world are so 
thoroughly committed to questions of measurement, degree, 
and correlations that a vast darkness is the lot of one who is not 
with mathematics. So important is it for conversing about our 
world that the child is profitably introduced to it as soon as he 
is able to understand it. And surely this is not later than the 
beginning of elementary education. 
There is, of course, danger of traumatizing the youngster by 
introducing to him mathematical notions beyond his capacity. 
But this danger exists with respect to any kind of learning. 
True, with respect to mathematics the peril has become a kind 
of cultural trait, and because of its roots in the mores, it is 
especially difficult to combat. Such a peril, however, needs to 
be overcome; for next to illiteracy, innumeracy is the gravest 
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cultural fault of the day. Some philosophies, from that of 
Socrates to that of modern existentialism, attempt in the name 
of humanism to justify the exclusion of mathematico-scientific 
culture. But in the modern context this exclusion has the effect 
of reducing their power to contend with primary forces at work 
in society and of making their philosophies that much more 
irrelevant than they would otherwise be. Such philosophies 
sacrifice relevance for dramatics, and rely upon a symbolism 
weakened by preciosity. In contrast, Whitehead's attempt to 
bring together mathematical techniques (in the method of 
extensive abstraction) and developmental techniques (in the 
genetic method) commends itself in that it makes both abstract 
numeracy and expressive literacy germane to the exploration 
and knowledge of reality. 
The young child is in a position to understand numerate 
levels of abstraction. Professor Bruner insists that virtually any 
subject can with intellectual honesty be presented to the child 
at his peculiar level of development and that he can grasp it.* 
Empirical studies have indeed shown that very young children 
are capable of working out complex mathematics, such as 
Archimedes did, in connection with balancing a beam on a 
fulcrum. Moreover, it has been discovered that they can even 
formulate correct hypotheses of why, when there are knots on 
one side of the beam, the two ends of the balanced beam are 
not equidistant from the fulcrum. The child's ability to grasp 
and formulate mathematical constants in matters of this sort 
appears to be less one of the complexity of the mathematics 
than it is one of the manner and the excitement engendered in 
stimulating the child to work out the questions for himself. 
Apparently, we have much yet to discover from a truly empiri­
* Jerome Bruner, The Process of Education (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1960). 
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cal approach to the learning process. Even so, the evidence 
suggests that a stage of "pure science" expressed in mathemati­
cal laws may be more appropriate for youngsters freshly awak­
ened to a curiosity about the structures of nature than to 
mature scientists who rely less upon a numerate innocence 
about nature and more upon issues posed by their scientific 
forebears. Just because innocence is a necessary ingredient in 
science, we may well encourage it, even in sophisticated mathe­
matical clothing, in a youth encouraged to see and to invent 
and to manipulate in his own unspoiled ways. 
As in literacy, so in numeracy there are two considerations 
that qualify it as worthy of a pre-eminent place in the curricu­
lum: it possesses intrinsic values and it is a commitment of 
contemporary man to his culture. The intrinsic values have 
long been acknowledged. There is joy in being able to express 
decisively, precisely, and with economy, relations that exist in 
nature. Gravitation, Boyle's law, the conversion of matter into 
energy—these are decisive formulations that express natural 
relations in engaging ways. They exhibit the intellect at work 
at its very best, and they provide man with a joy of discovering 
the timeless in the timely. This pursuit is one of the magnifi­
cent human accomplishments and it is one that the child, 
under proper direction, can create in his own magnificent 
fashion. Finally, it has the aesthetic virtue of significant form in 
contrast to the equally impelling aesthetic virtue of literacy, 
which gets expressed primarily in richness of content rather 
than in simplicity of form. 
Finally, numeracy is contemporary man's commitment to a 
culture in which mathematical, experimental science sets the 
stage for whatever drama he can make out of his life. Knowl­
edge of this science is acquaintance with the ambiance in 
which he may employ the world as his theater. He can make 
the most of the theater only as his crude, first-hand generaliza­
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tions are supplemented by the precise, established generaliza­
tions that are of the essence of science. This science creates 
new—and sophisticated—perils for man. Contemporary man 
must be comparably sophisticated if he is to be equal to the 
challenges of a culture oriented to a scientific-technological 
complex. 
Secondary Education as Cultural Sophistication 
Besides the arts of personal involvement and those of liter­
acy and numeracy, there are others necessary for anyone who 
would be of his times. I suggest that we call them the arts of 
cultural sophistication. These latter may be distinguished from 
those of literacy and numeracy in the emphasis to be placed 
upon a wisdom about cultural affairs rather than upon inno­
cence and spontaneity in the freshness with which the child 
looks upon persons and things. 
The shift in emphasis from primary to secondary education 
—and emphasis it is, for surely no one with reasonable intelli­
gence can live in a society without becoming sophisticated in its 
ways-—is upon cultural attainments and cultural drives rather 
than upon linguistic and mathematical expertise. The more 
sophisticated arts of cultural attainments are concealed in sym­
bolic terms, decipherable only as one has protracted acquaint­
ance with the symbolism, such as in government, history, and 
the fine arts, along with specialties that are peculiar to a given 
society in the fields of business, folklore, philosophy, religion, 
sports, and the like. No doubt young children can and should 
be introduced to these cultural attainments, but a more inten­
sive study of them seems appropriate to an age of puberty 
when one looks anew, not so much at the natural world as to 
that of sophisticated cultural arrangements. Government, for 
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example, then becomes something more than ruler and ruled, 
and the subject might well excite nice questions of social 
power, vested interests, consent, groupings, legal fictions, and 
public needs. Such topics as these may be analyzed in depth, 
and interest in them may be sustained by a sense that the 
student is learning about himself and his people in uncovering 
unsuspected layers of social life. Similar analyses are possible 
in other cultural areas where profundity of investigation re­
veals deep-lying forces that have moulded the ethos of a peo­
ple, whether these exhibit contradictions in the make-up of a 
people or a more harmonious organization of institutional life 
centered upon some focal energies. 
As an institution of intelligence, the secondary school can­
not avoid the inclusion of subject matter in the curriculum. 
There is really no dispute about this, however much dispute 
there may be about what that subject matter should be, what 
approaches should be taken toward it, and what kinds of 
consideration should be given to the students who are intro­
duced to it. At this point, one comment, even if cryptic, may 
suffice on the topic of the consideration to be given to students. 
They are persons and this fact had better not be forgotten in 
concentrating upon subject matter. The question of content, 
however, that is, the question of what subject matter should be 
studied and how intensively, is controversial. Such light as we 
may be able to throw on it will have to come mostly from 
enlightened theory of the purpose of education. 
Subject matter pertaining to any topic of cultural sophistica­
tion is illimitable. All that we can hope to suggest for delimit­
ing it is a reliance upon the principle of relevance. Unfortu­
nately, in the application of this principle we cannot avoid all 
ambiguities. History, government, literature, the arts; and the 
like—such topics are not intrinsically worth treating. They are 
in themselves only pigeon-holes for filing information which 
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has been passed on from generation to generation. There are, 
however, two considerations which may transform the lifeless 
topics into burning, apposite issues, and which may convert 
inconsequential information into indispensable resources for 
pursuing those issues to decisive outcomes. The one pertains to 
the learner, who needs a teacher to bring to bear upon him the 
subject matter in a way which fires him to pursue it on his 
own. This consideration has been amply discussed by educators 
and laymen; its correctness in principle need not be debated, 
however much it is ignored in practice. The second considera­
tion, however, has received little attention and is worthy of 
treatment, namely, the institutional relevance of subject mat­
ter to the authentic concerns of a society. 
The practical arts represent the sustaining power of a so­
ciety. In an institutional sense, cultural relevance will be 
determined by them. Ideally, these arts will fit together in some 
kind of harmonious pattern, and the cultural focus of a society 
will be set by the dominant arts, to which others will in general 
conform. Some societies may be principally dairy societies, 
others agricultural, others industrial, etc., whatever their spe­
cific definition. Practically, the patterns are never quite clear. A 
number of foci are likely to be the case. Moreover, conflict is 
certain to be present, and clashes of interest can be resolved, 
not by looking to past harmonies, but only by creating new 
ones. Yet it seems clear that relevance may be determined, when 
the ideal state does not prevail, only by looking to the actual 
issues and the reasonable outcomes that they may hold. This 
condition contains the key to the understanding of why the 
principle of relevance is itself ambiguous. Where controversy 
exists, the antagonists make different assessments of what are 
to be regarded as the authentic issues. Again, some of them look 
to tradition and traditional ways; others to new answers and the 
establishment of new ways. Still again, ideological considera­
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tions may be decisive, and authentic issues ignored. And all of 
this controversy is bound to be reflected in the school—espe­
cially in secondary and higher education, where cultural con­
cerns are likely to be more intensely disputed. The bearing of 
this discussion on the curriculum is direct. Relevance is to be 
sought in the practical arts, because these are the arts to which 
a society is committed. Moreover, there must be some harmoni­
zation of these arts; otherwise a society dissolves. 
As for our own society, these arts are more deeply intellec­
tually founded than they have been at any previous time. The 
practical arts exhibit an intelligence inextricably intertwined 
with that which is found in science and technology. The two 
are so wedded that they could be sundered only by a cata­
strophic upheaval—not by romanticists, beatniks, ministers of 
the gospel, or congressmen. For better or for worse, the scien­
tific-technological complex is a condition of man, the theatre of 
his salvation or destruction—or compromises. Unless this con­
dition of man is understood, culture can only suffer from the 
prevailing state of ignorance. The problem is particularly vex­
ing for modern man. Unlike his forebears who could with 
some ease understand and even engage in most of the practical 
arts, modern man does well if he masters even one of the 
complex arts of our times. I am not suggesting he need become 
a specialist, but I am suggesting that unless he understands the 
bearing of science and technology on common endeavors, he is 
by his innocence incapacitated to act or even to pass judgment 
on matters other than those of immediate and transient per­
sonal concern. Lacking sensitivity, he is out of touch with the 
realities of culture and is helpless to understand what, were 
they proposed, would constitute likely solutions to the dilem­
mas of the times. Some illustrations may help. 
What, for example, might be the bearing of the scientific-
technological complex on politics and the law? I content my­
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self with a single illustration—namely, the kinds of questions 
raised by the development of administrative law. If we are 
satisfied with analyzing American government as a system of 
checks and balances among the three divisions of government, 
we lose insight into powerful forces at work with which gov­
ernment must come to terms. When government and law 
cannot get on by employing traditional means, new ones must 
be invented. Administrative law is a branch which does cope 
with just such novel forces: utilities and communications, 
transportation and aeronautics; and on the financial and corpo­
rate side, securities and labor-management disputes, etc. The 
commissions established to meet the various issues at hand are 
intended to provide agencies capable of informality and resili­
ence in facing new and delicate quandaries, while yet retaining 
an objectivity and rigor sufficient to enforce practices consistent 
with the general welfare. Consequently, various commissions 
and agencies responsible for a multitude of tasks and regula­
tions of modern politics need to be created so as to take 
advantage of the new science and to use the resultant knowl­
edge in meeting the demands of the new corporate and mass 
society (which itself is already a response to the new science). 
A study of politics that does not contend with such focal issues 
of modern life suffers from impotence because it is plainly 
irrelevant. It cannot but fail as an educational discipline be­
cause it is an exercise without intelligence and without signifi­
cant direction. 
Even in poetry, literature and the other fine arts there is 
reason for relating these activities to the culture out of which 
they arise and to which they refer. Often it is difficult to do 
this because so very much of the arts is escapist in the worst 
sense of the term, namely, as a refusal even to acknowledge the 
sources from which literature and the arts would escape. Mar­
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ianne Moore says that "business documents and school books" 
are relevant even if "when dragged into prominence by half 
poets, the result is not poetry." She continues: 
. . . if you demand on the one hand, 
the raw material of poetry in 
all its rawness and 
that which is on the other hand 
genuine, you are interested in -poetry.* 
I would urge that poetry needs to deal with the outlook of a 
sensitive mind to a world transformed by the new science, not 
directly with the institutions themselves. Auden can do the 
latter as rollicking travesty, as he does in "The Unknown 
Citizen": 
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to he 
One against whom there was no official complaint, 
And all the reports on his conduct agree 
That, in the modern sense of an old-fashioned word, 
he was a saint, 
For in everything he did he served the Greater 
Community. 
Except for the War till the day he retired 
He worked in a factory and never got fired, 
But satisfied his employers, Fudge Motors Inc. 
Yet he wasn't a scab or odd in his views, 
For his Union reports that he paid his dues, 
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound) 
* From "Poetry" (1921), Selected Poems (New York: Macmillan, 
1935). Reprinted with the kind permission of Marianne Moore. 
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And our Social Psychology workers found





Auden then asks and replies as follows: 
he free? Was he happy? The question 
is absurd: 
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly 
have heard.* 
Along with every other cultural activity, the arts require a 
stimulus from the life of a people and their focal concerns at 
the peril of merely titillating the soul's fancy. Without this, art 
loses the qualities of clarification and intensification of experi­
ence, qualities Dewey well emphasized in his Art as Experi­
ence.^ These qualities are not necessarily destructive of the 
abstract mode; indeed, we may reasonably say that the measure 
of great art is the capacity of the artist to conciliate the two, as 
a Cezanne, a Bartok, or possibly even an Auden or a Frost 
does. 
By insisting that the arts of cultural sophistication come to 
terms with the questions of the day, we are prepared to respond 
to some recent controversies in education. What of "basic 
education"? Should the schools teach "subject matter" instead 
* Reprinted by permission of Faber and Faber, Ltd., Curtis Brown, 
Ltd., and by Random House, Inc., from "The Unknown Citizen" by 
W. H. Auden from Collected Shorter Poems, 1927-1957, © 1934 by 
W. H. Auden. 
t See especially p. 46 of Art as Experience (New York: Minton, 
Balch and Co., 1934). 
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of "methods"? What about the psyche of the learner1? Should 
education be concerned with the "whole man"? If we take our 
clues from the arts, the guidelines are set. Of course we should 
insist upon basic education. Of course we want students to 
know history, their own and those of the peoples of the world 
with whom they are inevitably in cultural contact—or with 
whom they clash. Of course we want students who are literate 
and numerate. And of course much else. But how much else? 
I would answer, somewhat peremptorily, all we can possibly 
learn for the perfection of the arts. I would want to qualify this 
answer only by noting that there are no arts without artists and 
that the creative process requires one who can summon all his 
faculties of memory, vision, rationality, sensitivity, capacity to 
handle the tools and materials necessary for the advancement 
of the arts, and finally a sense of their relevance to the commit­
ments of a culture. These qualities are indispensable to the 
institutions of intelligence, and require both subject matter and 
method appropriately conceived to further the timeliness of 
sophisticated action. The proponents of basic education do a 
service in pointing out the stupidities, the foibles, and the 
vacuities of educational practice. Such practices are indefensi­
ble. Nevertheless, since subject matter is illimitable in the 
absence of a principle of relevancy, the proponents of basic 
education must select on this principle or else on one more 
arbitrary and less defensible, whether or not they deign to 
define it. Provided only that sophistication in cultural attain­
ments never loses sight of the arts of which it is a sophistica­
tion, it is assured of being relevant to human concerns. The 
real danger of sophistication lies with persons who do not 
quickly grasp the importance of innovations, whether in the 
realm of theory or in the establishment of new practical arts. 
Yet, sophistication, sensitively conceived, cannot but be the 
hallmark of higher education. 
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The Tasks of Higher Education 
Higher education has its own peculiar emphasis. In the 
absence of a degree of cultural sophistication, it cannot quite 
be regarded as genuine. Nevertheless, its unique emphasis lies 
in its creative power, from which flow the resultant accom­
plishments of creative scholarship. The difficult problem for 
higher education is precisely that of reconciling creativity and 
scholarship. Plodding scholarship is not difficult of attainment; 
the difficulty is to avoid it. And a similar case can be made for 
undisciplined creativity—the kind of novelty ignoramuses can 
achieve: partial and short-lived. Lack of knowledge and an 
unconstrained sense of passionate venture are the best possible 
qualifications for its attainment. Sometimes its results are im­
pressive, but usually they are tinsels, fast tarnishing. Higher 
education comes to authentic fulfilment when it contains 
depth and breadth plus brilliance. 
Verbally, it is easy to reconcile in higher education the 
dimensions of depth and breadth; practically, it is very difficult. 
The virtues of the verbal expression are worth spelling out if 
only we remain aware of their pitfalls. For a beginning, we 
may speak of them as "circumspect specialization"; this has the 
advantage of placing emphasis upon specialization, which is 
certainly a necessity for creative work in the arts. The deriva­
tion of the term is worth keeping in mind. Specialization does 
derive from special, and although the former is often regarded 
as an ugly term, the latter is not. The latter connotes not only 
individuality, uniqueness, and concreteness, but also superior­
ity, excellence, and that which is regarded with favor. When 
we regard specialization with disfavor, we usually prefix it by 
the adjective narrow. The prefix, however, derogates not so 
much from the activity as it does from a quality of mind that 
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accompanies it. Clearly, however, the mind can engage in the 
most narrow of activities without its being narrow-minded. 
The artist who is incapable of keeping in mind the least details 
of his composition is no artist, and the scientist who can cope 
with only two variables at a time, one dependent and one 
independent, is no scientist. The virtue of specialization is that 
it permits the specialist to keep in mind a great many details 
and to weave them into new patterns, thereby laying bare 
novelties in the subject matter. His love and infinite patience 
and capacity for creating configurations are of the essence of 
creativity. But he can be creative only as he has familiarity 
with his materials and thus regards them in a way that is 
special. So far from being innocent, his creativity is ultra-so­
phisticated. 
Specialties are a part of modern society that it cannot do 
without. Yet there are evils of specialism that need to be 
carefully located. It is not evil to learn in ever greater detail 
and with ever greater precision what nature is. There is some­
thing right in the spirit of nominalism that searches for reality 
in the most minute detail, for the mind which discloses such 
realities is the richer for it, especially as the search relates these 
details to one another. This kind of searching surely cannot be 
called an evil. I would suggest that the evils are of two sorts 
and that they pertain to: (a) policy decisions, and (b) the 
specialist. 
The specialist is, as we have said, sophisticated with respect 
to his speciality, for sophistication is the badge of his being a 
specialist. Now although specialties are not in themselves bad, 
they may and often are put to bad uses. A number of medical 
practices no doubt suffer by being too narrowly conceived. But 
other practical arts likewise suffer in such widely divergent 
fields as warfare, pest-control, slum clearance, TV program­
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ming, or space exploration. The purposes of virtually all of 
these arts are defensible, but they get narrowed by the easy 
exploitation of limited knowledge. Knowledge, of course, is 
always incomplete, and men must learn to live in this recogni­
tion and accordingly to develop intellectual modesty. Yet some 
of their mistakes can be prevented if only the distinction is 
clearly made between theoretical and practical issues, especially 
when the latter are of the nature of policy questions that affect 
the quality of a culture. Under these circumstances, any partic­
ular decision cries out for a wisdom that places the immediate 
purpose in the perspective of other cultural activities. Health is 
good, so is the elimination of pests and slums, and likewise the 
protection from invasion and the investigation of space and of 
the bottoms of the oceans. But every decision to realize such 
ends is economic, and therefore needs to be considered in 
relation to alternatives, as well as in relation to its effects upon 
other aspects of life. Hence, with the best of intentions, those 
responsible for political decisions can make egregious errors in 
slavishly following the recommendations of specialists. Special­
ists are necessary, but specialism that dominates policy deci­
sions is the root of much that is wrong in modern society. It is 
the defeat of intelligence and may be regarded as the chief 
"pseudo-institution of intelligence." 
The other evil of specialism is one that pertains to the 
specialist. Although it is less disastrous for society, it counts as 
a genuine loss of values in the world and is not lightly to be 
dismissed. The specialist is prone to the disease of concentrat­
ing so thoroughly on his immediate interest that he fails to 
acknowledge not just wider segments of reality, but even the 
particular context in which his specialty falls. The medical 
man who ignores health in the study of disease or the expert on 
slum clearance who disregards those who are dispossessed in 
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order to clean up the slums, etc., have incapacitated themselves 
as human agents. Having lost touch with the realities, they 
engage in projects which, though meaningful in a limited way, 
are absurd. The question is whether much of our science has 
also become absurd in this way, and this question leads back to 
our topic of the curriculum in higher education. 
Higher education has the double purpose of conserving 
high culture and of advancing knowledge. The result is not a 
happy one, for the two purposes more often conflict than not. 
Three major considerations define the nature of the conflict; 
they pertain to: (a) methods (b) end results, and (c) social 
context. 
However correct those critics are who point to the similar 
values of science and the humanities,* the fact remains that 
science and the humanistic studies do differ in the training 
which is required, the methods employed in pursuing their 
ends, and in the kinds of insights to which they lead. No 
detailed discussion of these considerations is required, even 
though there are some nice points of controversy. Humanistic 
studies are literary and artistic, require special training in 
languages, and demand high sensitivity to things of the senses 
and feelings. In contrast science is prosaic, utilizes measure­
ment and mathematics, and survives or not, depending upon 
the rigors of the process of verification. The tools are different, 
the mentalities are different, and the expectations and appeals 
are different. These differences do not preclude a community 
* Cf., for example, J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1965); A. N. Whitehead, Science and the 
Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925), chap, xiii; and more 
recently, David Hawkins, "The Informed Vision: An Essay on Science 
Education," Daedalus (Summer, 1965), pp. 538-52. 
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of scholars and scientists, but they make it more difficult in 
that there is required considerable imagination, tolerance, and 
the cultivation of new appreciations on the part of both. 
Even so, a further strain is created by the end results. The 
scholar's rewards are mostly those of the ivy tower; the scientist 
moves from the laboratory to the market place and the Con­
gressional hearing and back. The scholar's community is the 
seminar room, the journal, and those fellow scholars who share 
his interest; that of the scientist is in the conference, both 
when devoted to scientific matters and when devoted to politi­
cal and economic matters. The influence each exerts upon 
society is in proportion to the diversity of the interrelated 
interests that are encompassed; and the rewards are incompara­
ble. The high specialization of the scientist is seldom without 
some power or pressure or political group which is willing to 
support his researches. The scholar who prides himself on 
having his work "good for nothing" usually reaps rewards 
commensurate with his pride. Those who forsake the tower for 
administrative work often speak well for their former col­
leagues, but they ensure funds for scholarship only after a 
healthy budget for scientific research has been allocated. 
Finally, the changing social structure has tended to promote 
the sciences rather than the humanities. Traditionally, human­
ists have been elitist, if not downright snobbish. The high 
tradition of the humanities has made itself, often for good 
reasons, remote even from the middle brow. The long period of 
training, its vocabularies, and its huge tomes make it unap­
proachable, save to novices willing to undergo the indignities 
of graduate study. The tradition has been the genteel one and 
its members have not usually looked kindly upon the anti-au­
thoritarian democratization that has come more from science 
than from the humanities. Science and democracy are more 
committed to the present; the humanities to the past. The rebel 
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humanists—those who create the literature and theater of the 
absurd, pop-artists, composers of electronic music, and the like 
—give little comfort to those steeped in the traditional humani­
ties. It is true that the rebels insist on being more pointedly 
contemporary and thus are more in the rhythm of science than 
in that of the humanities, which are more hospitable to the 
long span, if not to the eternal verities. 
For higher education the problem remains pressing: how to 
achieve a circumspect specialization which will do justice to 
the claims of both the sciences and the humanities? In princi­
ple this means, How temper science with the humanistic spirit 
and how liberalize humanism with the scientific spirit? In 
practice this means, How does one persuade the politicians to 
adopt a saner view of science and to subsidize it more pru­
dently, and how does one make humanists appreciative of 
science and sufficiently imaginative to exploit the authentic 
humanistic qualities of a culture committed to the new sci­
ence? Science cannot forego specialization, but specialism as 
ignorance of its own activity, it can and must forego. The 
scientist who fails to explore the context of his specialty is as 
equally benighted as the elite humanist who disdains science. 
The difference is that the one is gaining power and the other 
losing it. To aid in effecting a more just balance between the 
two, higher education requires a rejuvenation, both to make it 
higher and to make it more educative. Without this rejuvena­
tion, it fails to reach its place as an institution of intelligence. 
If it is to begin to rise to an appropriate level, the curricu­
lum will need to aim at providing specialists, not just with a 
knowledge of their specialties but also with an awareness of 
how their specialties systematically relate to the corpus of 
science. We are told now that specialized engineers in aeronau­
tics as well as in some other fields have a professional life-span 
of about ten years. Thereafter their skills and knowledge are 
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obsolete. Clearly, universities are failing if they do not provide 
an education which will permit specialists to move from one 
specialty to another. Likewise, industry is failing if it does not 
provide in-training study directed towards keeping their scien­
tists abreast of newer developments. Since the institutional 
emphasis for research has now definitely shifted from universi­
ties to industry,* the latter cannot long avoid its responsibility 
to share the educational burden to increase the professional 
life-span of its scientists. And surely this should include not 
just up-dated technical training but also correlated humanistic 
studies associated with it, political, aesthetic, and intellectual. 
If research and development can be part of profit-making 
industry, then industry can afford to accept the obligation to 
care for the extended well-being of its personnel. Either this, or 
research will have to be shifted back to government and uni­
versities, along with ways of providing for the educational and 
economic welfare of these scientists. 
The demands to be made on higher education become 
increasingly clear in respect to what it should exclude and 
what it should include. The exclusions are the simpler matters. 
Colleges and universities need not exist as marriage mills, 
country clubs, nurseries, military camps, athletic proving 
grounds, or as remedial institutes for illiterates or innumerates. 
Congenial atmosphere, recreation, and the arts of personal 
involvements need not be ignored; but neither should they be 
permitted to determine or distort the ends of higher education. 
Robert Hutchens has eloquently inveighed against the weak­
nesses and distortions of our colleges and universities in these 
* Cf. Fritz Machlup, who writes: "Of the total R&D [as research and 
development is commonly abbreviated] in this country, 76 per cent 
is done by industry, 15 per cent by government agencies, 7 per cent 
by colleges and universities, and 2 per cent by other nonprofit organiza­
tions. This, at least, was the distribution of R&D expenditures in 1956— 
57." Of. cit., p. 145. 
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respects. To his criticisms, we can only add our applause. He 
has also shown unmistakably—as have Mr. Conant and Mr. 
Dubridge more recently—that we have been guilty of indefen­
sible waste both in high school and in the first two years of 
college. The high-school has failed to excite students and to 
guide them into the kinds of sophistication of which they are 
capable. And, as has been abundantly documented, the first 
two years of college are repetitious, boring, and pointless to the 
extreme. The failure is not so much in the youth as in the 
institutions, which for innumerable reasons, have become clut­
tered, and have only muddlingly and uneconomically achieved 
their ends. The price is too high, especially insofar as the 
remedies are quite clear. They include an insistence upon 
literacy and numeracy, and upon at least a minimum of sophis­
tication in the wisdom of modern culture: its arts and politics, 
its geography and history, and its scientific ventures and its 
industrial bias. These matters should certainly not be repeated 
in college, but they should be deepened and enlightened 
through the examination of a variety of alternative explana­
tions, and the insights they involve. 
The exclusions are suggestive of the inclusions. Whether or 
not students in colleges and universities are stimulated to 
engage in the advancement of knowledge, they can at least be 
expected to have some clear notions about and respect for what 
that advancement portends. They should all have a notion of 
what the new science is—the exploration into microscopic and 
macroscopic physics, theories of cell growth and physiological 
functions, the learning process, the new economics (and the 
Marxian too), political power structures, mass behavioral 
movements, and the plight of the lost individual, to mention 
only a few of the obvious topics. Some of the restless minds 
will want to wrestle vigorously with some of these topics on 
their own; they will become the important future scientists. 
 140 Institutions of Intelligence
Most will have to content themselves with the humble appre­
ciation that there are endless ways of carrying on new investi­
gations about the world of physical and biological and social 
things. 
Advancements are possible in humanistic studies too, but of 
a sort less calculated to change the world than to speculate 
about it or to mull it over, reflect upon it, or just to savor its 
qualities. The literary and artistic, the historical and philo­
sophic minds—these are the humanistic minds to which a long 
development of higher education has committed itself, some­
times effectively, usually not. The philosophical orientation (I 
do not say philosophy) must be the chief of these, for it insists 
upon relating tradition to the contemporary perplexities of 
man. Higher education, in whatever institutional form it may 
take, must contend with this demand. For this reason, higher 
education fails if it concentrates upon the production and 
dissemination of knowledge to the exclusion of its consumma­
tion. The function of higher education is incomplete in the 
absence of a consummatory phase which relates past to present 
and which comes to terms with the ever-changing condition 
of man. The new science represents above all the condition of 
man, not as an answer but as a question. The curriculum of 
the university mirrors the question even if it does not unambig­
uously answer it. To see what this curriculum in the final 
analysis needs, we can better turn to the chief quandary of our 
times, which I would like to pose as the question, What 
consummatory arts (the liberal arts?) are possible for contem­
porary man? 
IV. The Liberal Arts: The Consummation of the 
Scientific Revolution 
The Question 
The liberal arts assume an importance for modern man because 
he has succeeded so well in isolating them from the practical 
arts. Modern man has a luxury civilization. As a consequence, 
he frantically seeks for compensatory goods as far removed as 
possible from the factory or office. His work contains little of 
intrinsic worth for him; for the most part it consists of chores to 
be got over as soon as possible; and his liberation from them is 
sought in activities or induced states of mind uncontaminated 
by practical affairs. Primitive societies, subject as they were to 
the perils of existence, seem not to have had their arts and reli­
gion and thought dissociated so completely from their practical 
concerns as do modern societies. Their songs and dances appear 
to be more closely expressive of their work and loves; their tools 
shaped with human care; their religion, a magic intimately 
linked with good fortune; and their metaphysics a rationaliza­
tion of their mores and beliefs reflecting practical fulfilments. I 
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do not wish to idealize their cultures, but it is probably fair to 
say that their ecstasies were, despite induced seizures and 
supervening priestcraft, more often a sense of fulfilment arising 
from successful daily affairs than elation unconnected with 
them. Modern culture, on the contrary, concerns itself with 
fine arts, professional athletics, pure intellectual discipline, a 
belief in the supernatural not effable in the language of things 
of sense or even of reason, and amusements which are part of a 
play-world oblivious to the doings and makings of the world of 
work and utility. Modern society, with all its luxury, thus 
makes for itself a series of dislocations difficult to set aright. 
The most nagging question of all seems to be, can we get our 
society together again, in one piece? I wish first of all to refine 
the question and especially to observe its connection with 
modern science and technology; secondly, to examine the role 
that a broadened conception of the liberal arts may play in 
achieving consummatory values for modern man; and finally, 
to suggest directions for revising the notion of leisure in order 
that it can more appropriately serve the demands of modern 
culture. 
The Question Refined 
There is a hunger, no doubt widely felt, for an all-consum­
ing experience by which man can come to his highest fulfil­
ment. This may variously be connected with love, art, religion, 
or knowledge, or even induced as a kind of mystical experience 
by narcotics. Freud suggests in his Future of An Illusion that 
as an "oceanic feeling" it may have its origins in the depths of 
the unconscious. As a naturalist, he is unwilling to regard it as 
revelatory of some great reality beyond. Surely if it were to be 
regarded as revealing such a reality, incomparable to anything 
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known in the world of sense and reason, this would entail 
either the rejection of this world for another, or at best a 
tentative acceptance of the temporal world as a preparation for 
one of pure light and consummation. 
There is a difficulty, probably insuperable, in this notion of 
an ultimate consummation, which is suggested by the title of 
Freud's pungent treatise. What is illusion and what is reality? 
Oceanic or all-consuming experiences may very well provide 
insights. But the question remains, How are we to know 
whether they are insights or illusions? Strength of conviction, a 
sense of superiority, an elated state of mind, immediacy of 
experience—personal states such as these are no guarantee that 
they reveal truths. The mystic is hard put to say what connec­
tions there may be between anything he can do and the 
ultimate insight conferred upon him. Although he may insist 
upon faith and prayer and grace, his insistence does not lend 
itself to making clear any causal connection between his acts 
and presence of divine consummation. From his point of view, 
the divine spirit is regarded as having its own kind of exist­
ence, far removed from the earthly, and not subject to the crass 
facticity of the natural world. I am not suggesting that religion 
may not manifest itself in the natural world. When, however, 
it does get expressed in the natural world of men's actions, 
together with their concrete issues, it necessarily rejects the 
mystic's indifference to worldly things. Less concerned with 
purity of spirit and self-contained consummatory experience, 
the religious mind that is world-oriented must wrestle with 
human finitude and the religious expression of which it is 
capable. So oriented, this religious mind is less addicted to the 
flight of the spirit to "the pure upper world" and causes the 
spirit to be weighted down by its adherence to finite, empiri­
cally discernible actions. 
A more current version of the oceanic illusion plays upon 
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the theme of disillusionment. Disillusionment arises from the 
same source as the oceanic illusion, but is frustrated, and its 
philosophy is an elaboration of this frustration. It goes by the 
name of humanistic existentialism, and takes off from 
Nietzsche's "God is dead." God being dead, there is said to be 
no meaningful world, and human action is absurd—one might 
almost say it displays a kind of cosmic frustration. From man's 
condition of non-fulfilment, there is no exit, only anxiety and 
vacuity, or possibly even lassitude. "Projects" may be under­
taken, but their worth is evanescent and trivial, since their 
ends have little magnitude. The play is over and life is 
rounded with a sleep, without consciousness, conscience, or 
issue. Death is made much of but only because it is regarded 
from the point of view of the anticonsummatory living, rather 
than from that of the non-consummatory dead. In this view, 
science is an idle undertaking and industry an aberration. 
There may be a point in this attitude toward man and the 
world, especially when contrasted with "sweetness and light." 
Arnold said of this perfection that "He who works for sweet­
ness and light, works to make reason and the will of God 
prevail. He who works for machinery, he who works for 
hatred, works only for confusion. Culture looks beyond ma­
chinery, culture hates hatred, culture has one great passion, the 
passion for sweetness and light." Arnold was against anarchy 
because anarchy is against culture and "culture, which is the 
study of perfection, leads us . .  . to conceive of true human 
perfection as a harmonious perfection, developing all sides of 
our humanity; and as a general perfection, developing all parts 
of our society." In our anti-Hebraising, that is, our depreciation 
of religion, we may find it difficult to adopt Arnold's notion of 
perfection and especially that "harmonious perfection, develop­
ing all sides of our humanity." The question is whether our 
skepticism should reach so far as to cause us to repudiate all 
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aspects of perfectibility because we see the shallowness in, if 
not the impossibility of, developing all aspects of human 
perfection. What we lose in breadth, however, we may gain in 
depth. 
Yet this concern with depth of human personality contains 
its own peculiar limitation. It harbors a bias that leads one to 
renounce a meaningful concern with society. Arnold saw this 
defect in an uncommonly clear way, even if he was frightened 
by its "machinery." To give up all notions of perfectibility is to 
give up all notions of meaningfulness in life and thus to 
espouse "the absurd." And again, to renounce the transindivid­
ual claims of culture is to reduce what could be authentic 
consummations into an affair of private titillations. I do not 
mean to suggest that consummation is just a matter of a 
"being-with-others"; it is this but also much more. It may be a 
matter of being for others, which can be especially difficult 
when, as often happens, the others don't know their own 
minds. Then what is required is not a cosy togetherness but 
rather a hard analysis that lays bare why it is more reasonable 
to do one thing than another. In this case, the discussion, 
debate, and warranted decision are necessary if arbitrary and 
capricious choice is to be avoided. And if freedom is regarded 
as action undertaken following upon such decisions, then to 
insist that all such decisions are absurd and without real 
consequence for man is itself absurd. We may favor either 
absurdity as the principal trait of life or freedom which is 
expressed as the attainment of ends vital, consequential, and 
consummatory; but not both. The ontology and the ethics, 
unless jejune, simply do not fit together. And, I would add, 
each by itself is too incomplete to constitute with verisimilitude 
a picture of either man or the world. Another try is therefore 
appropriate. 
Human choice is a function of alternatives within life. In 
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Christian Bay's terms it involves capacity, opportunity, and 
incentive; * and if any of these conditions is missing, freedom 
is aborted. Bay's terms are suggestive for unraveling some of 
the tangles in connection with a difficult topic. In the case of 
human choice, we need to know whether alternatives do pre­
vail and whether they do make a difference. I would avoid 
arguing here the nice metaphysical questions, and simply ac­
knowledge the commonly made distinction between two sets of 
terms, often taken to be synonymous, but which are not: 
determinism and indeterminism, and compulsion and free­
dom.j" If freedom is to be regarded, as I believe it is, as 
significant choices that a person can make in order to realize 
alternatives, then his freedom always pertains to concrete mat­
ters. At least they become concrete at that point at which 
choice becomes significant. As applicable to human life, the 
question may be posed as that between being and not being; or 
better, so as not to confuse it with philosophies that employ the 
terms idiosyncratically, between life and death. Should one 
choose to live or to die? The question is of course too blunt. 
Who would raise such a question and why? Clearly, it needs 
some explanation, for, out of context, it is an odd one. In the 
beginning it does not arise; only later. The beginning of life 
appears innocent enough and full of possibility. It possesses 
momentum, excitement, creativity. Like health and fortune, it 
needs no justification. It is self-justifying, and it makes no 
sense to ask whether death is better. Only after the mind 
suffers "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" or when 
one suffers "a sea of troubles," then, as Hamlet does, one may 
* The Structure of Freedom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1958), p. 65 and passim. 
t In Knowledge and Society (New York: Appleton-Century, 1938), 
chap. vi. The University of California Associates have left little doubt 
as to the need for such a distinction. 
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properly question life, not innocent and emerging life, but "the 
calamity of so long life," the "grunt and sweat under a weary 
life." When at every turn life is a suffering, an enduring, then 
one may want to cry out: 
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time, 
The oppressors wrong, the proud man's contumely; 
The pangs of despis'd love, the law's delay, 
The insolence of office, and the spurns 
That patient merit of the unworthy takes, 
When he himself might his quietus make 
With a bare bodkin? 
The alternatives exhausted, the decision might then be made; 
yet the alternatives may be inexhaustible. Shakespeare under­
stands this "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" and the 
conscience that makes "cowards of us all." The Hamlet in us 
all is not innocence, and does not permit us to ask innocently 
whether we are to be or not to be. The question makes sense 
only as we spell it out solemnly and then come to recognize at 
the end complexities such that "their currents turn awry/ And 
lose the name of action." Indecision is a result of incapacity to 
exhaust reasonably or unreasonably the alternatives. Mad per­
sons who vacillate are not free, nor are sane ones who are 
rightly confused. And to call honestly induced indecision a 
decision is to play on language rather than to disclose a truth. 
It may not be overly contentious to remind ourselves that 
Hamlet was a prince, who did not even have the responsibility 
for practicing the art of ruling. I have no interest in denying a 
range of interests outside the arts—especially those arts that a 
man regards as being wholly unsuitable to his own apprecia­
tion of life. His is then a decision pertaining to integrity and 
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compromise, and especially pertaining to the point at which he 
feels he must refuse to compromise. But I would suggest that 
without a respect for the sustaining arts, there is no basis for 
choice but whim or exploitation, and the vacillation or tyranny 
that goes with them. The importance of the sustaining arts is 
that they provide clues to the answers to two kinds of ques­
tions, neither of which is quite separate. In what lies the 
degradation of man, and in what lies the sense of reality for 
man? 
Degradation and Consummation 
Principally, it seems that degradation is a distortion of con­
summations in men's relations to the world and in their relations 
to one another. Consummatory experience is not a sensation of 
pleasure, but an activity pleasurable in its course and satisfying 
in its result. Freud saw this clearly in distinguishing as he did 
"fore-pleasure" and "end-pleasure." Although he made the dis­
tinction in connection with the sexual act, clearly it has rele­
vance to all consummatory activities. Results are accomplished 
only as a consequence of considered activity from which they 
issue. However much the activity is intrinsically pleasurable, it 
requires also a sense of direction and actual accomplishment. 
In persistent activities in which either pleasure or accomplish­
ment is missing, there is distortion, a failure of consummation, 
and degradation. Activity without pleasure is mechanical, a 
chore to be got over as quickly as possible. A life of such 
activities is dulling, really drudgery more than life, and cer­
tainly not self-justifying. What, on the other hand, of consum­
mations without previous preparation, without reference to 
antecedent activities of which they are consummations? If 
there is experience of this sort, it is weird or unreal, merely 
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fortuitous. Men may be searching and hoping for such experi­
ence, but it is doubtful whether we should even call it by the 
name. Experience is not like sensation; it is revelatory of 
connections of things of the world, and in the absence of a 
disclosure of such connections, it loses its worth. It no longer 
provides us with a sense of having mastered something; it only 
shocks us with its genie-like appearance; it is an intruder 
which, however pleasant, is unaccounted for, and accounts for 
little. 
Degradation is not just a matter of the individual psyche; it 
is equally one of society. Activities are incomplete without 
their rewards, and rewards that are externally related to them 
are not genuinely satisfactory—just as pecuniary rewards are 
commonly recognized as not satisfactory to those who spend 
their energies in debilitating work. But worst of all is that 
condition of life in which one is asked to work when the 
external benefits accrue not to the worker but to another. This 
kind of exploitation is obvious enough, and needs no elabora­
tion. But what is not so obvious is the effect upon the exploiter 
and the sort of consummatory value he is said to enjoy. Here 
too there is a gap between activity and end result. The enjoy­
ment bears no intelligible relation to the sacrifices that have 
made it possible. In a pecuniary society, the complex financial 
activities may obscure an actual gap, for there may be manipu­
lations which are confused with productive activities—even 
with those that are broadly enough conceived to include mana­
gerial and other talents required for operation of industrial 
pursuits which supply the needs of a society. An example 
reduced to simple proportions may help. 
Persons do eat, and eating is an activity which is usually 
pleasant and not degrading. People consume food. Is the con­
sumption of food therefore a consummatory activity in the 
sense of a satisfying accomplishment, and not just a satiation? 
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Generally speaking, it is probably not; but at its best it is so; 
and at its best it is a festival—a feasting in wbich a whole 
company partakes. Festivals are gay, having their fore-pleasures 
and end-pleasures; but festivals are sad too, for they are tinged 
with thought and meaning and intensification and vivification 
of life. The consummatory value attaches to the whole complex 
and any discordant note affects the gaiety of the festivities. A 
misfortune to one produces a hush over the whole party, for it 
is the whole party which is the locus of the consummatory 
activities. This may be an idealized picture, but not overly so. 
Josef Pieper has perceptively developed the theme in respect to 
"celebration." * Celebration is not just a breaking through 
from daily habits; it is not a kind of wantonness; on the 
contrary, it is a heedful activity, which even in its gaiety 
penetrates to depths of life expressed in a communal way. 
Hence, where there is celebration there is also communion, a 
sense of identity of all who participate in the preparation and 
enjoyment of it. And in an important way. Pieper makes it a 
norm of life, not just an exceptional activity. Life led deeply is 
a celebration of human existence because it is an experienced 
realization of layers of meaning and a sense of wholeness; in 
short, it is consummatory, a continuing drama coming to its 
continuing fulfilment. 
Mechanical, insensitive, or abrupt actions impair the spirit 
of celebration. This occurs, for example, in the bolting of food 
instead of in the partaking of it. The distinction is a common 
and important one, marking the difference between an elemen­
tary function and a sensitive activity—between gourmand 
and gourmet, fressen and essen. The distinction clearly marks 
the difference between the human quality capable of raising 
life to the level of consummatory experience and the animal 
* Cf. Pieper, Leisure, the Basis of Culture, trans. Dru (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1952). 
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quality, which only faintly approaches it. In its brutish sense, 
exploitation is the failure to heed those who are responsible for 
making achievements possible and to share with them the 
culmination. From the consummatory point of view, it is a 
distortion in that it disjoints the course of activity from its ends 
and therefore does violence to both. From the moral point of 
view, it constitutes injustice, and thus breaks communication 
and upsets human relations among men. Such foreshortening 
of consummation attenuates its quality and reduces the institu­
tions of intelligence to institutions of power. 
Clearly, there are two dimensions of the continuities in­
volved in consummatory values: the sharing of the rewards by 
those who are responsible for their creation and the establish­
ing of connections which make the continuities real. The first 
dimension is essentially moral; the second cognitive. The sec­
ond deserves further consideration. 
How the New Science Requires a Re orientation of the Liberal 
Arts 
The practical arts contain the germs of consummatory val­
ues. But often infected as they are with folklore, consumma­
tory values may be aborted. Modern culture more than any 
other, has developed reliable methods for ascertaining connec­
tions that hold within natural processes, and especially so in 
the new science. To ignore the new science is to adhere to 
some kind of folklore or romanticism which erects individuality 
from subjective feelings. Although folklore does possess the 
advantage of creating solidarity within a society, it is neverthe­
less precarious in that it may lead a whole people to disaster. 
On the other hand, although reliance upon scientific technol­
ogy may lead to ventures that turn out badly, it holds more 
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promise of success than does reliance upon folklore. And even 
if not, the method is still useful for locating the point at which 
calculations go awry and for evolving new predictions of what 
is likely to occur. Our question is whether scientific knowledge 
can assist in the process of establishing ends and therefore of 
engendering new consummations. This consideration is crucial 
for determining our belief in the role that science can play in 
social life. The critics who refuse to assign science to a central 
position in shaping the ends of social life challenge us to be 
clearer on the forces within culture that limit peoples' actions. 
To meet this challenge, we need to be clear, first, on the 
definition of culture, and second, on the place of utilitarian 
concerns within culture. The two are closely related, but dis­
tinct. 
Definition of Culture 
Broadly speaking, definitions of culture may be divided into 
two classes: those that include and those that exclude practical 
action. The latter are traditionalistic and formalistic; the for­
mer are functional and holistic. There are of course others, but 
this distinction serves the purpose at hand without prejudging 
extraneous issues. On the one side, we may reasonably place 
those who regard culture as the best that has been thought and 
felt and who concentrate upon the transmission and perpetua­
tion of them. This idea of culture emphasizes the refined 
sensibilities, both as contained in art and literature and in the 
perfection of the intellect which becomes expressed in abstract 
systems of thought. Together they constitute a kind of romanti­
cism combined with pure mathematics that is erected into a 
metaphysical structure. The product contains a dilute mixture 
of Matthew Arnold and Plato, spiced with themes from T. S. 
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Eliot. Except for the cultivation of etiquette or good manners, 
this idea of culture insists on keeping distinct mind and action. 
Since mind in its highest cultivation is the distinguishing 
characteristic of man, the intellect and the refined sensibilities 
constitute the unique expression of culture as that for the sake 
of which other things are to be done. This idea of pure culture 
comes down from the high tradition in philosophy and smiles 
kindly on the classics. From a knowledge of them, man is 
supposed to be prepared to cope with the things that count 
most. Mathematics, however, remains as the sturdy structure of 
reality, a knowledge of which is most to be sought for.* Truth 
is thus essentially an affair of the mind, and action is a kind of 
compromise, sometimes helpful in attaining truth, but not a 
part of it. 
In contrast to this idea of culture, there is an opposite one 
that insists on preserving the unity of thought and feeling and 
action within the social context. The resultant integrity pre-em­
inently regarded as constituting the ideal of culture. Accord­
ingly, thought is not only by itself incompetent to provide the 
ends of culture, but is also, in the absence of feeling and 
action, quite incomplete. Thought is thus regarded as fully 
intelligible only when it is embodied in moving ideas that are 
capable of realization in consequential actions or in something 
closely derivative from them. So far as it figures in this kind of 
cultural ideal, its expression requires beauty and utility to 
complete it. Otherwise it would not serve the ends of life, and 
* In this vein, Anthony Standen has written, "There is one science, 
and only one, that is actually true. That is mathematics. The others, 
from physics downwards, do not lead to known truth but only to 
probable opinion." Science Is a Sacred Cow (New York: E. P. Dutton, 
1950), p. 175. According to this view, science is concerned with the 
abstract, which alone is regarded as real. Standen writes, "For physics 
is not about the real world, it is about 'abstractions' from the real 
world, and this is what makes it so scientific" (p. 61). 
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it could be domiciled only in a hothouse of "abstractions." In 
its relations to things of elegance and use, thought is thus a 
prime ingredient of culture. By overcoming its isolation, it 
achieves a degree of concreteness which guarantees to it both 
vitality and relevance. 
Utility and Culture 
These two ideas of culture thus contain two attitudes to­
ward utilitarian pursuits. In the one case, utilitarian actions are 
regarded as intrusions that undermine the dignity of man. 
They are viewed as obstacles to the human calling, which 
disdains interference with pure thought and with feeling that 
should remain uncontaminated by compromising earthy con­
cerns. In the other case, utility provides the ground from which 
thought and feeling can arise and on which they can have 
their ambiance. Cut loose from the ground, Ariel-like they soar 
into nebulous shapelessness. The opposition between the two 
views of culture finally is expressed as that between an elite 
and a democratic organization of society. In the one case, the 
division of functions requires the support of a division of 
classes. In the other, the interplay of activities requires the 
interplay of persons and interests in the articulation of social 
life. If we adopt the second idea of culture, we still are obliged 
to explain the sense in which science may shape the ends of 
social life. Are the critics right in insisting that science does not 
shape these ends? 
They are right if to "shape the ends" signifies some auto­
matic and committed ends, some destiny that men are power­
less to alter. Such an attitude is a denial of the adage that 
knowledge is power. No doubt the truth in the adage is that 
knowledge allows a kind of choice that men otherwise would 
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not be allowed. In that choice surely resides one virtue of 
knowledge. If, however, science commits us, it can be only 
because we are committed to science—to knowledge, and, 
should we not add, to human invention? Even so, the commit­
ment is a limited one, for within it, choice is still ours to make. 
By this, we mean to say that science and technology do not 
eliminate choice, but rather they transform old into new alter­
natives from which we may choose. A few illustrations may 
serve the purpose of clarifying this statement. 
If Professor Lynn White is correct, * the invention of the 
stirrup altered the whole character of medieval warfare and 
made for the blossoming of feudal society. By the introduction 
of the stirrup, the knight was enabled to use his horse not just 
for getting from a to h, but for making it an intrinsic agent of 
warfare. Because of the lateral stability the stirrup provided 
him, a knight could use his lance well secured under his arm to 
run through both light armor and his opponent so armed. 
Clearly, the knight did not have to engage in such warfare— 
except, of course, if he wanted to remain a knight and if others 
were engaged in such warfare. But having made the choice and 
his opponents having made a similar choice, heavier armor was 
the indisputable answer for better protecting himself from the 
new kind of thrust. Along with heavy armor, however, were 
required heavy armor-makers, as well as a whole retinue to 
dress the knight and to care for the perquisites of his office. 
Now the metal might have been used to make heavy ploughs 
instead of heavy armor, and medieval man might have turned 
away from warfare to making ploughshares and to the more 
bucolic, if somewhat more densely populated, life that the new 
agriculture would have entailed. The stirrup and its attendant 
technology made possible, even if not necessary, a new kind of 
* See his Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1962). 
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warfare, seemingly attractive to the growth of knighthood. But 
the commitment to knighthood did, according to this version, 
make necessary the adoption of new techniques if one were to 
compete in this profession. 
The same principles do, of course, also relate to modern 
warfare, whether of the trench-type in World War I, or of the 
more mobile type of panzer divisions in World War II, or even 
in the option of a newer type employing nuclear and jet-pro­
pelled instruments such as have been more recently developed. 
Again, the same principles hold. The commitment to the new 
technologies is not really an open question. Advanced in­
dustrial societies cannot afford to ignore the basic innovations, 
both in their theoretical aspects and in their practical applica­
tions. But the significant choice remains as to whether they 
employ their talents to enhance human life in the larger social 
context or to detract from it for the purposes of more limited 
social objectives. Accordingly, the point does hold that science 
and technology do transform social life, and therefore they do 
define the options, among which peoples are free to choose. 
The institutional base of intelligence is seen in these options 
as scientific technology. No society can be without a technol­
ogy, and its technology inevitably defines and limits its options. 
Especially in Freedom and Culture, Dewey has made clear the 
principle that is involved. In essence, he insists as against 
Hume that reason is not the slave of the passions but that the 
passions are themselves transformed by reason. A person does 
not enter life with a repertoire of desires and instincts, only to 
have them run their course at the commands of nature. On the 
contrary, feeling is transformed by being expressed, and its 
expression is a function of the reorganization of things, which 
is the work of intelligence. The proper changes being made, 
the principle holds both for individuals and for social policy. 
Intelligence may be at work in both. 
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Science plays an exact—and exacting—role. We cannot 
deny its superiority in providing men with better means for 
acting and therefore we can understand the widespread and 
eager attempts to adopt it in modern cultures. But science is 
less a determinant than it is an opportunity. Its employment, 
however, exacts a price from modern man. It transforms life 
and therefore it creates tensions and clashes within societies. It 
cannot be ignored, but it can be misused, and generally is. The 
fault is not in its nature, but in the tardiness and inability of 
man to make the accommodations required to enjoy its oppor­
tunities. The fault, however, applies to the vulgarizations of 
science rather than to its intrinsic character. On the one hand, 
those who vulgarize science seldom comprehend scientific 
method, and the difficulties they encounter in attempting to 
apply science to practical affairs pertain less to science than to 
their corruption of it. On the other hand, scientists themselves 
easily make a mess of applying science to practical affairs, and 
their error resides not in their ignorance of scientific matters 
but rather in their ignorance of practical affairs. Therefore, 
they tend to be uncritical of so-called practical demands, which 
are permitted to dictate kinds of actions that should not be 
undertaken. The consequent corruptions and failure of accom­
modating science and practice to each other often give rise to a 
new romanticism that rejects both science and practice. Yet the 
romantic who blinds himself to the power that may be un­
leashed by scientific knowledge for bettering the human estate 
is more likely to give himself over to sentimentalism and 
cynicism than to the development of authentic sensibilities and 
wisdom. 
No, the most trenchant criticism of science is that which 
sees how it undermines the cherished folklore of a culture but 
nevertheless requires a new mentality if it is to make its full 
contribution to social life. Greek science unquestionably under­
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mined Greek mythology; Renaissance science, the Aristotelian-
Thomistic synthesis; Darwinian science, the static or cyclical 
view of nature; and social science, the complacency of compart­
mentalized bourgeois industrialism together with its unstable 
and misfortunate efforts to separate fact and value, with all the 
ludicrous consequences that follow from such efforts.* Science 
is not some demonic expression of perverts or subverts; it is not 
an answer to all of man's deep-seated agonies and bedevil­
ments; but it does provide an intelligent way of utilizing 
expertise in transforming many human problems into activities 
that are more rewarding and less given to hopeless or despair­
ing frustrations and self-destruction. It can therefore aid men 
in a life of dignity as opposed to wantonness, but only if they 
are fully committed to it; otherwise, civil strife, war, violence, 
riots, and a host of other indignities of which we are at present 
excruciatingly conscious are more likely to continue to be the 
case. 
The practical arts do embody a large measure of intelligence 
and, being practical, they necessarily employ and transform 
things and forces of nature to serve human purposes. These 
arts therefore can never lose contact with nature, and the 
knowledge that goes into them conduces to make them both 
useful and relevant to the world in which man lives and moves 
and has his being. In this sense they may, as we have already 
noted, be regarded as the original institutions of intelligence. 
Yet obviously they are much more, partly because they ordinar­
ily incarnate an aesthetic simplicity and elegance that one can 
feel and prize for their own sake, partly because they breed 
feelings of wonder and transcendent powers that carry one far 
beyond the limits of utility. Thus although the practice of 
* For a detailed and extended discussion of this theme, Cf. Science, 
Folklore, and Philosophy, Harry Girvetz, et al. (New York, Harper 
and Row, 1966). 
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these arts institutionalize intelligence, they also engender ex­
pressive qualities, which, when systematically exploited, occa­
sion institutions of expression in the form of fine art or of 
religion. Fine art constitutes the purest form of expression, 
whereas religion may be regarded as a hybrid, with expression 
dominant and intelligence recessive. The practical arts thus 
give rise to the liberal arts, which cultivate sometimes the 
intellect, sometimes the feelings, and sometimes both. The 
liberal arts have a character of their own—so much so that men 
often consider them as proper ends to pursue apart from 
anything else. I wish now, however, not just to recognize what 
these ends are but also to spell out the functional relations 
between the liberal and the practical arts. 
How the Liberal Arts Liberate 
The liberal arts may serve to liberate the practical arts from 
overly narrow, and thus dehumanizing, concerns. Although 
they arise from the practical arts, they gain an adulthood and 
enjoy a quasi-independence from the utilitarian concerns from 
which they take their rise. Being critical of sheer utilities, they 
appeal to standards that transcend utilitarian matters in the 
name of a logic and an end of their own. In general, they can be 
said to aim at satisfying psychic needs beyond those of creature 
comforts and the anxious concerns for the urgencies of daily 
life. Although they have elements in common, they take three 
distinct forms: an aesthetic, a religious, and an intellectual. 
Each of these bears upon some aspect of the practical arts in 
that each from its own perspective may pass criticisms on them 
and thus may serve to illuminate virtues and shortcomings of 
the various practices. Each form of criticism is distinctive and 
expresses a temper of mind that colors a world outlook and that 
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places utilitarian life within a larger scheme of things. The 
aesthetic insists upon transforming means into something in­
trinsically enjoyable; the religious makes a determined effort to 
integrate the relation of means to end in a larger context of 
meaning; and the intellectual emphasizes the appreciation of 
the theoretical structures that suggest additional structures by 
which men may realize more inclusive purposes. Accordingly, 
the liberal arts make utilities less grubby and restricted and 
give freer play to human ingenuity and satisfaction. 
Aesthetic Liberation 
The aesthetic approach possesses a unique kind of sophisti­
cation. It cuts through so much of the tradition and folklore of 
a people insofar as it demands a freshness of life and at the 
same time a kind of distance from it. It finds freshness in the 
immediate joys of experience, and distance in that it locates joy 
in things themselves—"pleasure objectified as the quality of a 
thing," as Santayana characterized it. But this characterization 
also implies a serenity not as a loss of power but rather as a 
mastery over new facets of experience. The combination of 
power and beauty is better manifested, however, in the practi­
cal arts than in qualities in which one takes delight apart from 
them and for their own sake. When aesthetic criticism turns 
towards practices, it serves to insist upon conditions in which 
immediate joy is to be found in the workaday world. It then 
demands elegance as well as delight—in short, it demands that 
things be done in style. Efficiency, according to aesthetic criti­
cism, is not enough; excellence also is required—both in the 
style of making and doing things and in the product, which is 
mute testimony of what the workman has done. In the fine 
arts, the separation from the practical becomes complete—or 
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we should say, almost complete—and the work of the artist is 
often said to be incomparable to that of the artisan. But 
whether the aesthetic demand is one that is directed immedi­
ately to the practical arts, such as in design of products, in 
architecture, and the like, or immediately to a way of life, only 
abstractly embodied in fine art, aesthetic fulfilment reflects 
prized criticisms of life in an amazing variety of forms. 
The Aesthetic and the Practical 
Before attacking the pressing problem of how to advance 
the integration of aesthetic consummation and the practical 
arts, there is an elementary issue that ought to be resolved once 
and for all—namely, the issue of whether aesthetic value is 
inherently contrary to the pursuit of practical ends. No doubt 
when means are regarded as holding no intrinsic interest for 
man but only as an obstacle to be avoided, there is a conflict 
between being absorbed in the immediacies of experience and 
ignoring them in order to get on to some further end. Such 
conflict is destructive, if not of immediate enjoyment, at least 
of the course of experience that has as its end the consumma­
tion of its consciously apprehended antecedents. Practical ends 
are a threat to aesthetic fulfilment because they easily become 
the major object of interest and suppress all but a perfunctory 
concern with the means by which they are achieved. This 
threat is especially real when the ends sought become mechani­
cal through being repeated. Aesthetic fulfilment is easier to 
come by when a person has enough skill to cope with the 
technical difficulties of a practice and at the same time can 
subordinate technique to the challenge of creating something 
new. He will not have to trouble himself whether the finished 
work is important; it will be so if its origins lie in his inescap­
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able concerns with nature and with the practical arts. In the 
absence of such origins, his work will no doubt be effete and 
not worth the bother. 
The question of whether art and practical ends clash looks 
as if it need never have been raised. The artist and the artisan 
are kinfolk, and neither can ply his trade without tools and the 
makings of things. The problem, then, is why the problem 
should ever have been posed. By keeping in mind the tool-us­
ing function of man, we are, I think, in a better position to 
show how art can liberate, and to do this both from the point 
of view of the fine arts and from the point of view of the 
machine arts, each of which requires a somewhat different 
treatment. 
Fine Art 
The peculiarity of the fine arts in the contemporary world 
resides in the degree to which they have come to be dissociated 
from other affairs, especially practical and religious. They do 
enjoy a kind of life of their own, and therefore warrant being 
called "fine arts." Undeniably, they require an expertness in 
the handling of their media, and they have a history, involving 
specialized treatment of color and space, sound and time, words 
and composition, and a great deal more. The ability to handle 
the media and to experiment with them has proved to be 
endless in its variations and complications and in its resultant 
works of art. Form is traditionally a characteristic of all art. 
And even though some contemporary experimentalists have 
tried to avoid it, one important tendency is more towards 
making the arts purely formal and denying to them content to 
be derived from anything other than their intrinsic properties. 
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In fact, the movement of "non-objective art," or by whatever 
other names it goes, is so ingrained as to be generally accepta­
ble by artists, and now even by laymen. 
The issues pertaining to formal art have been so thor­
oughly treated by aestheticians that they need not be detailed 
here. A large and important school—if not the dominant trend 
in the fine arts—insists upon the separation of art from life and 
from nature. The degree to which so many artists have been 
able to make the separations is amazing. Paintings, poetry, 
music, sculpture, and the rest, are not supposed to derive their 
meaning from either life or nature, but to have meaning 
intrinsic to the art-work itself. Art, then, is said to have a 
special kind of meaning all its own. In some sense this must be 
correct, for it is generally conceded that art has its own lan­
guage and is untranslatable. This much must be granted; 
otherwise there would be no art or else it would have no 
character which would distinguish it from other things. And 
this would be absurd. Our question consequently concerns 
what is meant by its special kind of meaning. 
The potency of art is transmitted by the formal organization 
of its matter: brush strokes, the musical line, the chipped 
marble, etc.* No one, I suspect, quarrels with this statement, 
for in the absence of materials organized into a perceptible 
thing, there surely could be no work of fine art. The quarrel 
arises from the fact whether the formal organization is the 
meaning or whether it is a bearer of meaning which carries 
with it other qualities as well. A loopy bronze is certainly 
constituted as loops, but loops that, besides pleasing the eye, 
* The literary arts do of course raise some nice questions. They 
do, however, involve "making" and "composing" and can, when the 
proper changes are made, conform to the generalized description of 
fine arts, having sensuous, if not tangible, components. 
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may contain tensions and a lilt that express the grace of a dancer 
who employs gravity to achieve levity. If the example is 
granted, the principle becomes clear that formal organization is 
not contrary to meaning that transcends it. In fact, the formal 
organization is required for the expression of transcendent 
meaning and could not be a precise meaning if the formal 
character of the object were otherwise. Art then achieves only 
the verisimilitude which resides between the form which ex­
presses and the meaning which is expressed. Neither is possible 
without the other. This is different, say, from a drawn rectangle 
of three by five inches with a dot placed one inch from the top 
and two from the right. The rectangle is not a work of art, but 
it might be a diagram that signifies, say, where an object 
should be placed in a room with similar proportions. There 
would be a correspondence between the two, but no expression 
properly regarded as a work of fine art. Two comments may 
clarify the matter sufficiently for our purposes. 
First, fine art is not established by the fact that something is 
pleasing to the eye. Pleasant proportions are aesthetic, but not 
sufficiently so to constitute a work of art. It is questionable 
whether those who would nicely place a large red dot on a 
dead white canvas are creating a work of art. Decorative it may 
be, and titillating to the senses; but art it probably is not, even 
if some would have it so. Secondly, even if it is uniquely 
expressed by a given form, meaning has a universality as well 
as a particularity in the sense that a loopy bronze has an 
essential connection with gravity and levity, with the dancer, 
and its sculptured whirls. All of these derive from antecedent 
experience and refer to new possibilities of experience without 
losing an iota of immediate satisfaction concentrated in percep­
tion of the bronze. It has its own inevitability, its own consum­
mation. Moreover, it is full in that it contains various levels of 
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meaning, complementary rather than in conflict. Cezanne 
paints apples perceived in this way; Raphael, madonnas; Kan­
dinsky, landscapes; Bacon, cadavers. Mondriaan and Victor Va­
sarely would be geometers of space, and otherwise eliminate 
(except possibly for color) anything else of interest. The for­
mer enhance their paintings by expressing, as Aristotle would 
say, the universal in the particular. The latter denude their 
paintings by draining off the particular into the universal. The 
former achieve their results by expressing the light of nature 
filtered into plastic form; the latter, paint by formula, touched 
by pleasure. Parallels can be found in the other arts: Bartok vs. 
Krenek; Joyce vs. Beckett, and the like. 
I am not suggesting that art should not be experimental or 
that it should not depart from tradition or that it must eschew 
geometry. On the contrary, artists who do not engage in all 
manners of experimentalism, from gooey plastics to pop and op 
art, or still better, those who avoid the fads and make their own 
experiments, are the ones who, like Beethoven or Michaelan­
gelo or Prokofief or Lipchitz in their day, are most likely to 
bring to consummation visions that add to the meaning of our 
own culture. The art which would seem to be not worth the 
bother is that which is precious and devoid of contact with the 
realities of the practical arts and of nature. Such art is 
nothing more than baubles, and is sure to be cast aside as soon 
as we engage in any of the serious issues of how man is to 
make himself at home in the world. Without such concerns, 
the cultural arts can serve no educational function nor can they 
contribute to our becoming better oriented to our world. The 
fine arts will of course continue as long as society continues, 
but they will not achieve their live potential unless artists 
respond to the condition of man by exploring it instead of 
avoiding it. 
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The Machine Arts 
Contemporary man can explore another avenue of aesthetic 
consummation more directly related to his doings and makings 
than are the fine arts; that is, the exploration of the aesthetic 
potential contained in the practical arts themselves. If, as we 
have suggested, practice is not inherently contrary to aesthetic 
fulfilment, there is at least no a priori reason why such fulfil­
ment cannot be sought more directly in practice. The artifacts 
of primitive societies suggest that this is so. The question is 
whether contemporary society depends upon activities that 
would prohibit similar outcomes. 
Since the time of the rise of the factory system and its 
criticism by Utopian and scientific socialists, the western world 
has become increasingly aware of the stupendous difficulties in 
achieving consummatory values. Marx's classic discussion of 
the fetish of the machine and of the alienation of man has left 
modern man uneasy in his attempts to find solutions for his 
predicament. Solutions which attempt to dignify labor or to 
have labor share in profits or to expropriate property or to make 
democracy industrial, along with innumerable other schemes 
for alleviating the predicament—such proposals have not 
proved to be more than palliatives. This is not the place to 
enter into a discussion of these topics, even though we dare not 
ignore the workingman in dealing with the idea of consumma­
tory values in contemporary culture. Later, I wish to discuss 
one aspect of the matter—that is, how leisure as an institution 
of intelligence can promote consummatory values. At present, I 
wish to confine my remarks to the specific question of whether 
aesthetic values can be realized in the industrial arts. Two 
parts of the question can be answered in principle quite di­
rectly. There will still remain, however, a quandary, which is 
167 The Liberal Arts 
the paradox of industrial society. The two answers pertain to 
the designing of machine goods and the product capable of 
being produced. 
We have finally come to understand that machine goods 
need not be ugly. The older prejudice was that hand-made 
goods were superior to machine-made. In part the prejudice 
was a not unreasonable protest against shoddy goods, but in 
part it was a snobbish desire to prove one's class superiority. 
There is however a marked distinction between, say, pre-
World War II goods and those since. A significant part of that 
difference resides in design/ The designer has come to occupy 
an increasingly important position in the production of goods 
that bear the stamp of aesthetic quality. The Russell Wrights, 
for example, are designers who are capable of revolutionizing 
the quality of goods of modern society and are artists who 
display quite as much genius as those who work in the fine 
arts. Theirs is a skill which respects the purpose that a thing is 
to serve and yet to go beyond utility in the creation of a thing 
of beauty. The first question we can answer then with some 
assurance is that aesthetic quality is capable of realization in 
the industrial arts because there is a growing number of artists 
—that is, industrial designers—who have the skill to transform 
practical things into things also of beauty. 
To be sure designers are limited in what they can import 
into their designs for two reasons. First, "form follows func­
tion," and second, much of the tradition that could be imported 
would be monstrous. Where form is antagonistic to function, 
the object as a useful thing is incapacitated. Beauty then 
becomes an intrusion on the thing, and the conflict between 
the utilitarian and the aesthetic function works to the detri­
* Cf., for example, Lewis Mumford's classic discussion of "cheap 
and durable" goods in Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., 1934), pp. 100 ff. 
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ment of both, and therefore prevents the realization of consum­
matory value. Accordingly, design as ornament is not to be 
confused with design as following function. The latter is not a 
matter of resting satisfied with function. It is more in that, first 
it pleases the eye and other senses, and thus, secondly, it makes 
the object a better candidate for contemplation and for observ­
ing what other qualities it may possess. Not least of these other 
qualities is that of utility transvaluated by becoming the object 
of contemplation. Whatever other non-inhibiting qualities the 
designer can add are all to the good. But he is limited in 
possibilities, because of what has been said about attempting to 
import tradition into modern design. To introduce classical or 
Victorian motifs into machine products was a common way of 
prettifying them. The results proved to be aesthetic failures, 
even though they now may add to our joy in a museum of 
antiquities. Pumps decorated with rosettes, music boxes with 
classical columns, and such like, will not pass muster. The 
decorations are plastered on; they are anti-aesthetic; they need 
to be superseded by other designs that are appropriate to the 
newer culture in which man finds himself and must make his 
way. 
Designers there are who are competent to achieve designs 
worthy of modern culture. The second part of the answer, 
then, is to be found in the fact that the objects themselves are 
in fact being made. Utensils and cookware, packaged goods 
and plastics, furniture and clothes, public buildings and pri­
vate housing—these are surely some of the likely candidates for 
commodities that are well designed and that give man a sense 
of achievement and pride in his works. I am not suggesting 
that there are not badly designed goods in each of the above 
categories, for there certainly are numerous monstrosities in 
every one. Yet the fact is that there is abundant quality in 
every one: Finnish stainless steelware; ceramic-metal cookware; 
169 The Liberal Arts 
packaging in translucent materials, Danish furniture, Royal 
Festival Music Halls, the Santa Barbara Campus—these exam­
ples taken at random satisfy both functional and rigorous 
design requirements. Industrial society is capable of producing 
goods of which it need not be ashamed. The functional and 
the aesthetic need not be in conflict. 
On the other side, probably the worst examples can be 
found in automobile design and in tract housing. First of all, 
the institution of the automobile is fraught with evils: smog, 
traffic, accidents, built-in obsolescence, economic wastes, scalp­
ing financing, and deterrents to exercise and self-propulsion. In 
our commitment to the automobile we are committed to a 
thoroughly insane institution. The body designs of most autos 
are dishonest. Repairs are costly, safety factors are ignored, 
lights and shiny chrome are lavishly displayed, size is dispro­
portionate to function, and gadgetry runs riot—these are some 
of the charges which have been substantiated in instances 
numerous enough to question the intelligence of our commit­
ment. Its genuine consummations are so completely con­
founded with the spurious as to constitute one of the most 
difficult problems of policy in an industrial society. 
Another example of disingenuous policy is the tract house. 
No doubt in many ways it serves its purpose well—especially 
when compared with the tenement house. It is an individual 
unit; it has some ground and light; and it may be sufficiently 
roomy and well planned to permit domestic felicity. Beyond 
these considerable limits, it is probably a blight on modern 
culture—in the monotony and lack of imagination in the 
planning, and even more, in the total unconcern of domestic 
life as connected with industry and the livelihood and the 
transportation of persons to and from the tract. Domestic life, 
especially for workingmen and the middle class, is another one 
of those policy matters in which industrial society is just 
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beginning to make some headway. But it has a long way to go 
before its potential in consummatory values is to be realized. 
Finally, there is the really staggering quandary of industrial 
society. Modern man has discovered through science and tech­
nology means for producing endless goods of utility and of 
quality. There is every reason to believe that if society lasts, he 
can continue to produce goods of even better quality and 
design and that he can establish more rational ends, involving 
less of waste and destruction and more of satisfaction in the 
life-processes. The consummatory process can go on at a pace, 
except for one factor of the productive process necessary to 
it—work. The quandary resides in the fact that so much of the 
work in industrial society is contrary to the life-processes. It is 
routine, monotonous, mechanical, fatiguing, and depressing. 
Its rewards are external, remote, disproportionate to need, and 
in general a cause of conflict and frustration/ Evidence points 
to the fact that the only mentality geared to the rigors of the 
assembly line is the moronicf Of the various proposals that 
have been made for the correction of the evils—shorter hours, 
more pay, better facilities, fringe benefits, big-brotherly care, 
psychoanalysis, music, etc.—all are palliatives. Only one pro­
posal, the really radical one, goes beyond this, and that is to get 
the worker out of the factory. Automation can help; so can the 
rationalization of ends; and possibly a faith in salvation in 
another world. Yet the fact seems to be that in the foreseeable 
future a significant proportion of men will be condemned to 
spend, say, upwards of six hours a day for some twenty-five or 
thirty years on debilitating work. Increased leisure can in 
part remedy their lot, but it cannot make wholly consumma­
* For an intelligent and empirically documented analysis of these 
charges, see Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization, the Con­
flict hetween System and the Individual (New York: Harper, 1957). 
t Ibid, p. 68. 
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tory a life in which so much is given over to the diminution of 
vital processes. Condemnation to the monotony of factory work 
remains as a stigma on a culture otherwise capable of authentic 
consummations. 
Religion 
There is a difficulty about consummatory values as aes­
thetic: they are framed so as to set them off from the rest of the 
world. Their gain in intensity is matched by their loss in 
extensity. Man certainly needs the enclosure, if only the better 
to face the world in its extensity. The aesthetic serves well as a 
summing up, as a gaining of composure, and as a being in 
touch with the immediate vibrancy of things. But there is 
another part of life less well served by the aesthetic: the itch to 
break the bonds and to search for the new, the horizon beyond. 
This kind of venture is essential to the religious dimension—a 
search for a wholeness or meaningfulness of life not bounded 
by a frame. In this search man is the mediator between things 
of sense and immediacy and things of spirit and transcendence. 
He is the clue to the interpretation in that he is enmeshed in 
both the particularities of existence and the universalities of 
transcendence, and must come to terms with both. The particu­
larities are trivial, binding, and suffocating unless he can dis­
cern their universalities, and the universalities are functionless 
symbols unless he can understand their expressions as involv­
ing existence. The former is sense-binding; the latter is ontolog­
ically expressive of whatever ultimate meaning there is to be 
found in wholeness and completeness. The critical aspect of 
religion may be expressed in literary-testamentary form, in 
theological-exemplary, or in mystical intuition; but they are all 
interrelated facets of the religious enterprise. 
 172 Institutions of Intelligence
Part of the religious spirit may be so overwhelming as to 
block consummation; another, yet related, part may require 
servility to a degree that also blocks it. Kierkegaard found the 
essence of religion in the confrontation of finite man by the 
infinite spirit, a relation he frankly admitted was beyond 
human understanding. It led him to anguish, to fear and 
trembling, and to renunciation to an extent that he mostly 
belittled the works of man, and sought a release from conven­
tion, human powers, the arrogance of the human spirit, and 
the effrontery of human assertion. He was a man in the world 
but not of it. Another facet of the incomprehensibility of the 
transcendent God is to require of man "to do justly, and to love 
mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God/' This has less verve 
to it; it induces an attitude of acceptance; and it reduces the 
venturesomeness of man to a mild good will and humility, 
made "sweet" by the reflected glory of God. It is the "Hebrais­
ing" of life at the expense of "Hellenising" it, if once more we 
may employ Arnold's suggestive terms. 
The religious ideal of consummation that liberates culture is 
one that relates the arts of personal involvement to those of 
utility and exploration of nature. It is a way of coming to terms 
with the personal and unique idiom of selfhood in a world 
which is otherwise without style or fulfilment. But care is 
required so that we do not confuse the idiom with a subjectiv­
ity that blights the community of men. The religious spirit 
would seem to require reconciliation of the many sidedness of 
man's activities—his aloneness, his togetherness, his utilities, 
and his expanding knowledge. To omit any of these is to invite 
a partiality and divisiveness that cannot but cripple the spirit. 
The task is enormous, but no less than the enormity of living a 
life of consummation, especially in view of the manifest inade­
quacies of the consummations separately derived from speciali­
zation of interests. Perhaps the words of Micah should be 
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reconsidered to the end of advancing a more enlightened 
meaning of the expression "to walk humbly with thy God." 
The phrase may signify the willingness to acknowledge the 
various facets of life and not to move recklessly and without a 
sense of the precariousness of the present. It may also connote 
the majesty of the world in comparison with the pettiness of 
the individual, who is cut off from the mainland. The serious 
question for religion is whether it is possible to effect a union 
of the variety of life-activities that so insistently refuse to be 
neglected. I shall try to pose the major issues rather than to 
attempt answers. 
Mysticism and Agony 
There is a kind of religion-—or mysticism—that seeks for the 
effacement of the individual. It seeks for a union of self with 
godhead in which there is complete absorption of the one into 
the other. And in the East is the interesting variant, at least as 
popularly misinterpreted in the West, of the absorption of the 
self into nothingness—Nirvana. The mystic may possess the 
truth; but if he does, there appears to be a serious flaw in his 
attitude. Does not his withdrawal from the world make "the 
truth" irrelevant? Does he not refuse to cope with life, and to 
belittle it? Does he not make everything, if not illusion, at least 
trivial? Is not his wisdom escapist, a refusal to engage seriously 
in anything but a preparation for his ultimate consummation? 
There is a question whether any meaning can be attached to 
the notion of "ultimate consummation." From one point of 
view the notion is surely meaningless, that is, the point of view 
of life-processes as life-giving and fulfilling activities. From this 
point of view the notion is at best an extrapolation from 
experience such that it constitutes a denial both of all future 
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experience and of the personal idiom. He who opts for this 
may indeed suffer agonies but he can realize no consummation 
save as he becomes transfigured into another kind of being—a 
non-natural one. 
A mature religion, even as a mature person, must acknowl­
edge and interpret agony. Religion has thrived on it; philistines 
have ignored it; a few utilitarians, especially Bentham and 
Mill, have counted it in; and existentialists have tried to make 
a philosophy of it. The latter have at least made us acutely 
aware of the vapidness of a philosophy which would ignore it 
as an inescapable condition of human life. The aloneness of 
the individual, the awesome responsibilities he must shoulder, 
are surely a part of the religious transaction. Man was seen in 
his nakedness in the Garden, and unless he sees himself in his 
own nakedness when he is confronted with crucial decisions, 
he surely must be regarded as something less than a man. The 
appeal is to a depth of human existence, the removal of layer 
after layer of custom serving as an armor to hide himself from 
himself. It is, however, not quite clear what is to be found as 
the outer layers are removed. Traditional religion would have 
it as the soul, sometimes shaky, as in the story of Job, but other 
times solid, as in the story of Moses. Because they are less 
cluttered with dogma, religious expressions in literary-testamen­
tal forms can better catch the religious drama with its full 
depth of human character and conflicts of personal aspirations. 
Where there is character, this method can reveal the personal 
idiom through which it is manifested. 
Greatness, whether as a capacity for suffering or for stead­
fastness or for wisdom or in any other of its illimitable forms, 
makes for religious drama. A protagonist with strength, such as 
when David attacked Goliath, is required if a searching revela­
tion of the powers of man, together with their limitations, for 
enlarging life is to be had. Greek tragic drama achieves this 
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masterfully; it may therefore be regarded as religious drama, 
culminating as it usually does in agony touched by wisdom. In 
contrast, much of modern drama and literature is aborted, 
mostly because its characters are insipid or senile or puerile, its 
situations contrived, and its outcomes absurd. Whitehead ap­
preciates the necessity for depth of meaning in the religious 
search when he defines it as what man does with his solitari­
ness. And wisely he adds that the expression demands that man 
return to society. Religious expression cannot do without alone­
ness, but paradoxically it also cannot do without togetherness. 
There is a strong presumption that there is something wrong 
with a religion—or a philosophy—that makes one answerable 
only to oneself. 
Man and Man 
The Hebraic-Christian tradition would have it different. It 
insists that you should "love the Lord thy God with all thine 
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might." This 
sounds like a total commitment, however unclear the object of 
it may be. Less unclear is it when it commands, "Love thy 
neighbor." Whether "love" means the same in both these and 
various other contexts is for the scholar to say. I would note, 
however, that the last is not just self-effacement, since Mat­
thew says one is to love one's neighbor as thyself. A religion 
does not fare well without the sense of the communal. "To­
getherness" may have ugly connotations today, but the gospel 
proclaims that where two or three of you are gathered in my 
name, I am there among you. The sense of solidarity is indis­
pensable to a religion that has a tradition and that is meant to 
appeal to members in a church. Love is a bond that unites 
men, just as hate is a contrary force that separates. The latter 
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plays its role only as a counterpart to the former. Hatred is 
usually reserved for an out-group, but there can be an out-
group only as there is an in-group. 
In reaching for completeness, the religious spirit requires a 
sense of unity among men as well as a sense of unity between 
man and nature. How these are to be expressed are matters of 
ingenuity of cult and ceremony in fashioning spirit to things of 
society and things of the senses. In his lectures on Christianity, 
Josiah Royce suggests a way of engendering society as a com­
munity of hope. His suggestion provides a way of mediating 
between a society that does not exist and the actualization of 
forces to bring about a society that might exist. The religious 
spirit is then capable of being progressively realized (or de­
feated) as the society itself is realized (or defeated). Whole­
ness in turn becomes an ideal instead of a dogma, and it places 
the burden for its realization on human ingenuity and atti­
tudes. Moreover, the test of progress consists then not in 
ecumenical councils, but in the creation of institutions that 
unite instead of dividing men. Brotherhood is less dependent 
on the idea of the Fatherhood of God than on the works of 
men in seeking their common aspirations in erecting institu­
tions of intelligence appropriate to their demands, the results of 
which may properly be celebrated in institutions of intelli­
gence. 
Man and Nature 
Modern man may find it even more difficult to establish 
wholeness as a continuity between himself and nature than 
between himself and other men. Primitive religions had fewer 
obstacles to the invention of sprites and spirits in nature akin 
to the human spirit. Animism and animalism were unham­
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pered by a scientific attitude that sought to interpret the 
inanimate and even the animate in rigorously mechanical 
terms. Modern man cannot seriously entertain animistic and 
animalistic notions, nor can he quite people the world with its 
fantasies. His ideas of utility have reached into nature, and he 
has found that he can better exploit it by experimenting with it 
and manipulating it than by propitiating or appeasing its forces 
through prayer and ceremonial rites. His exploitation of it has 
long been a public scandal: air, water, and land have become 
unfit for human use. Nature worship has consequently been 
mostly a fad, practiced by nudists or vegetarians or lovers of 
wild life. Utility and continuity between man and nature have 
enjoyed only tenuous connections. The antitheses come easily 
to our lips. Man has dignity; nature has uses. Man has an 
inner soul; nature has forces. Man is subject; nature is object. 
And so on, with a host of other oppositions that could be 
spelled out. Bourgeois democracy and "carboniferous capital­
ism" helped to make wide the gap between man and nature— 
and mostly to the detriment of religion. First it was nature that 
was regarded as alien; then it was society; and finally the full 
consequence dawned, man was alien. Such alienation is pro­
ductive of nihilism rather than religion. It trivialized the practi­
cal arts, and it trivialized man. The question is whether reli­
gion can serve as a liberal art in aiding man and nature 
through the practical arts to become complementary instead of 
antagonistic. 
No doubt I have overdrawn the degree of separation of man 
and nature. It has, however, been real, and probably more so 
intellectually than practically. But even intellectually it was 
never quite complete. Descartes, for example, who drew rigid 
lines between extended and thinking things wrestled in the 
last book of his Meditations to provide a "real union" between 
body and soul. And in another vein, the Deist, John Locke, 
Institutions of Intelligence 178 
sought a reconciliation between man and nature by mixing his 
labor with bounties of nature. And the economists from Adam 
Smith to Karl Marx and Henry George had a sense of a union 
of man and nature that should not be intruded on by the 
misuses of wealth—such as was displayed by the anomaly of 
creating poverty through progress. 
There has been since the thirties one important institution­
alization of a rapprochement between the practical arts and a 
genuine respect for the continuities between man and nature. 
This has been the development of the Tennessee Valley. Land 
has been reclaimed, crops rationalized, mountains reforested, 
river courses controlled, mined strips filled, humus and phos­
phates put back into the soil, and in general the land made 
more habitable. Moreover, all this has been accompanied by an 
advancement of the arts, practical and liberal. Electrification of 
the countryside, transportation of goods, especially by water; 
development of agriculture, manufacturing, and trade; build­
ing of communities with more adequate hospitals, schools, 
libraries, and other public facilities; provisions for recreation 
and felicitous social arrangements. These are some of the most 
important categories of developments. And behind it all is 
what one of the inspiriting founders, David Lilienthal, wrote 
of at length as 'The Seamless Web of Nature." * The violation 
of the unity of nature only brings home "nature's remorseless 
arithmetic." Despite its shortcomings, TVA stands as a monu­
mental development of an institution of intelligence for en­
lightening practice by religious fervor directed to the liberation 
of the practical arts. This institution stands in marked contrast 
to faddistic worships. It was built on a notion of what dams, 
hydroturbines, electric power, fertilizers, and appropriate ma­
chinery can do when there is respect for nature and for the 
* Cf. his TVA: Democracy on the March (New York: Harper & 
Sons, 1953), chap. vii. 
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advancement of the lives of men. Behind these ends stood 
science as an intelligent and liberative force. To employ sci­
ence in this way, mindful of the seamless web, the authors of 
the program saw that it involved, not arbitrary works here and 
there, but rather the development of the resources of the River 
Valley in its entirety. And this, I assume, is rightly conceived 
of as a religious impulse which in man's successful search for 
meaning enlarges his world. 
There are also more recent stirrings of religion regarded as a 
liberal art for bringing about rapprochements between man 
and nature. Both in the exploration of outer space and of the 
deep seas, there are possibilities of fusing the practical and the 
liberal, especially if the methods are designed to prevent viola­
tions of nature while advancing human life. These topics are 
much too complicated to enter into here. I would only suggest 
that although they do possess a potential for amalgamating the 
practical and the liberal arts, nevertheless caution is in order so 
that these avenues are not created at the expense of others that 
may well hold out greater promise for human fulfilment. 
The Role of the Intellect 
Underlying the liberation of the practical arts, the intellec­
tual phase occupies the position of prominence. Many would 
deny to the intellect this position for a variety of reasons, 
practical, religious, aesthetic, or just the common garden vari­
ety of anti-intellectualism. Their denials, however, are incom­
petent in the sense that they are repudiations of modern 
culture and would wreck havoc with society. Aestheticism, 
philistinism, asceticism, and obscurantism do exist among the 
confusions about society today, but they are not substitutes for 
a viable existence. As denials of the progress of science and 
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technology, none of them is a match for meeting the demands 
of continued existence, let alone of culture. Only as they serve 
to liberalize the practical arts can any of them gain standing. I 
have already discussed how the aesthetic and the religious can 
serve this end; philistinism and anti-intellectualism are thor­
oughly unacceptable because their claims to the good life are 
clearly such as only to incapacitate it. The philistine so narrows 
the conception of the practical as to deny the joys beyond that 
of "the bellymad." The anti-intellectualist, usually in the name 
of some tired morality, is just confused and ignorant—and is 
usually egged on by the press for reasons of its own. 
The intellectual impulse finds its proximate fulfilment in 
conceptual systems. Concepts are, of course, inescapable as­
pects of all the practical arts. Nevertheless the difference be­
tween their employment in the traditional practical arts and in 
"pure theory" is of a magnitude so great as to constitute 
virtually a difference in kind. In the simplest versions of the 
former, concepts are like names—pointers whose referents are 
easily discernible in commonly shared experience, such as 
sticks and stones and identifiable artifacts. The names of the 
skills by which the artifacts are made may represent ideas less 
easily gained, and may even be mysteries to all but those who 
have themselves become initiated into special skills, skills such 
as spinning, weaving, trapping, and what-not. But the obscu­
rity of such terms, expressed in words, is positively elementary 
in comparison with even the common abstractions in mathe­
matics and the sciences, as, for example, when compared with 
"number," "energy," "atom," "motion," "tissue," etc. Although 
concepts such as these are in a sense simple, they nevertheless 
defy clear-cut definition and need to be constantly redefined as 
science progresses. The "penumbra of obscurity" remains even 
at the stages of the greatest advancement of science, and often 
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the obscurity may even increase at the higher levels of under­
standing. 
Besides a high degree of conceptual abstraction, advanced 
intellectual activity is characterized by the systematic way in 
which concepts are related to one another. Manipulation of 
symbols according to rule is indispensable to intellectual activ­
ity. Even when the rules themselves are comparatively few, the 
manipulations may involve long and involved processes, requir­
ing considerable expertise. Science does mean that things are 
studied in a systematic way, and despite the contrary elements 
that are always cropping up in it, there is nothing properly 
called science unless it contains a wide degree of generality as 
well as a recognized way of moving about from one part of the 
discipline to another. As many writers on the subject have 
quite correctly insisted, science does not consist in the accumu­
lation of facts. Unless the facts can be placed in a broader 
scheme of things, they are not scientifically cured. 
Both aspects of science, the conceptual and the systematic, 
provide clues to the way in which science serves to criticize the 
practical arts. The obvious virtue of the practical arts is that 
they contain knowledge for doing and making things; yet the 
precision of practical knowledge is severely limited. On the 
conceptual level, for instance, men from time immemorial have 
certainly known what "heft" is; and certainly it figured in 
nearly everything they did, but it was not until after the rise of 
modern science that they came to have a precise notion of 
"mass," together with the ultrarefined notion of mass being 
concentrated at a point in the center of a body. The refining of 
concepts does go on at a pace in the practical pursuits, but the 
pace is immeasurably accelerated when men who are not bur­
dened with immediate practicalities take thought about the 
world and devise experiments which lay bare more considered 
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principles than those formulated under the pressing demands 
for quick results. 
Behind the practical arts, then, lies science. There is no 
need to discuss this further. Nor is there need to discuss 
further the intrinsic values of science except to observe that the 
practice of science has its own morality, its own ecstasies, and 
enlightenment. But it can no more stand independently as a 
culture than can art or religion. Science has served to liberate 
the practical arts. About this there is no longer any doubt. But 
there is a further question as to what can liberate science? This 
may sound like a strange question. Yet once we dissolve its 
ambiguities, I think we find it not so. Part of the question is, 
What are the reverse liberations of art, religion, and practice 
upon science? The other part is, How can the intellect liberate 
science from itself? The first question we can now deal with 
summarily. The second, which is metascientific, or I should 
prefer, philosophical, deserves more extended discussion. 
Art and religion as institutions of expression liberate science 
insofar as they explore feelings that are consonant with it. 
Together, art, religion, and science then constitute a greater 
harmony of institutions. Such is their power of liberation. The 
practical arts, on the other hand, liberate science as an exten­
sion of experimentation and manipulation already inherent in 
science. In the context of education, Pestalozzi gave it classical 
expression when he wrote in How Gertrude Teaches Her 
Children: 
Man! needing much and desiring all, thou must to sat­
isfy thy wants and wishes, know and think, but for this 
thou must also [can and] do. And knowing and doing are 
so closely connected that if one ceases the other ceases 
with it. But there can be this harmony between thy life 
and thy inmost nature only if the fowers of doing (with­
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out which it is impossible to satisfy thy wishes and wants) 
are cultivated in thee with just the same art, and raised 
to the same degree of perfection, as thy insight into the 
objects of thy wants and wishes. The cultivation of these 
activities rests then on the same organic laws as the culti­
vation of knowledge.* 
Thinking can and should be enjoyed for its own sake. But 
aside from the aesthetic delight in doing so, the chief reason is 
that it gets inhibited if it is not sufficiently released from 
immediate ends. Since, however, the intellect is a mode of 
intelligence, it needs to be referred back to practice if it is to 
enjoy its full liberative capacities. 
Philosophy and the Intellect 
Although intellectual activity is associated in modern cul­
ture primarily with science and technology, including the 
practical arts derived from them, it is not exclusively limited to 
these distinctive areas of the contemporary world. Intellect is 
also a function of philosophical expression, where philosophy 
has the task of analyzing the clash of cultural elements in 
society to the end of effecting a reconciliation of them. The 
philosophical task has various modes, but they can be viewed 
according as they emphasize analysis, synthesis, or prophecy. 
Some would have it that philosophy can rely exclusively on 
one of these modes, but to do so is to make clarity, coherence, 
or guidance a ruling principle at the expense of the others. 
Each of them is not just laudable, but is required if philosophy 
is to make its full contribution to human understanding. 
* Trans. Lucy E. Holland and Frances C. Turner (Syracuse, New
York: C. W. Bardeen, 1898), pp. 270-71. 
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Analysis 
At least in Western philosophy, analysis has been an indis­
pensable mode from the beginnings. This mode is clearly 
revealed in an examination of the remains of that early Greek 
philosophy where there exist more than very incomplete ex­
cerpts. Surely by the time of the Eleatics, the evidence is clear. 
Parmenides' presentation of the arguments for the reality of 
the one and for the unreality of the many and Zeno's still 
bothersome paradoxes of motion are a clear indication that the 
philosophical mode requires more than common-sense analysis. 
The mode of analysis in Greek philosophy seems not to be lost 
sight of throughout its whole tradition. It is true that there is 
no clear agreement on what the units of analysis should be. 
Sometimes it is bodies, sometimes motions, or again it may be 
sensations or concepts or forms, variously construed in various 
contexts. But in the absence of some kind of unit, even if 
entertained only for the purpose of criticism, philosophical 
discourse is doomed. 
Renaissance philosophy thoroughly explored analysis of 
bodies in motion and came up with a variety of interpretations 
of mechanism. Following its lead, but with roots in medieval 
nominalism, empirical philosophy did the same for sensations 
and ended with structural psychology and positivism. After an 
interlude of idealism, which was critical of all forms of atom­
ism, Western philosophy turned toward various forms of 
realism, some emphasizing process and some reverting to the 
older atomism made wiser by mathematics and the new sci­
ence. But the most effective forms of analysis have been pro­
vided by the linguistic philosophers, who, along with logical 
positivists, have done most to discredit traditional metaphysics. 
The burning philosophical question today involves discovering 
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whether this form of analysis has anything additional to offer. 
Linguistic philosophy, we observed earlier, is not without 
deep roots in tradition, especially in that of Aristotle and the 
British empiricists. Among contemporary philosophers, it owes 
much to G. E. Moore, who, though opposed to its linguistic 
bias, did lay a ground work for this bias by insisting that 
philosophy not depart from common-sense experience, or from 
the plain views of the plain man. Those who, under the 
stimulus of Wittgenstein, carried the method foreward into 
linguistic analysis believed that philosophy was very largely a 
mistaken venture. Moreover, they regarded its new mission to 
be the dissolution of false problems engendered by the misuse 
of language. In one important version of this mode, words are 
regarded as having meaning by virtue of their use in sentences. 
Philosophical problems will not arise if we confine language to 
such appropriate uses. Mysteries "whereof one cannot speak" do 
of course arise, but they are not philosophical because one 
cannot speak of them. The mystic may, and often does, ignore 
analysis, but the philosopher cannot. Without it he has no 
trade. The question is, what kind of analysis and to what end? 
There is reason to believe that the new analysis has suc­
ceeded in discrediting old puzzles and has made progress on 
such topics as "referring," "mind," "dreaming," "believing," 
"knowing," "evidence," "reasons," "voluntary," and many 
others. And surely this has relevance to a culture disillusioned 
with metaphysical prepossessions remote from the realities of a 
secular civilization. Just as it has been said that Aristotle's main 
concern was to understand Greece, so we may say that the 
analysts want to understand the understandable things of to­
day's common sense. And that this understanding is best got at, 
though not exclusively, by the method of linguistic analysis. 
The bias then is not one of changing the world but of 
understanding it—as things, as properties, as intentions, as 
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acts, etc. And this analysis is to be done with all the sophistica­
tion possible. Part of the sophistication is to avoid simple 
conclusions and to respect the complexities of knowing, believ­
ing, acting, and the like. Another part of it is to avoid systems, 
because they oversimplify and distort and mislead. Therefore a 
new method is required. It is the method of "doing philoso­
phy." To do philosophy is to analyze locutions, to discover the 
varieties of their plain meanings, to distinguish them from the 
"odd" sayings in which philosophers especially are prone to 
indulge, and only then very cautiously to arrive, where possi­
ble, at generalizations. The chief expertise of philosophers is 
the analysis of meanings contained in locutions. Philosophers 
can be in a position to know common sense things as well as 
anybody else, but they do not qua philosophers have the 
competence of the scientist doing science, the politician doing 
politics, the reformer making reforms, etc. Hence, the philoso­
pher's interest in these subjects is limited mostly to the ways in 
which various kinds of activities differ from one another and 
can be spoken of meaningfully. It is true there is little ortho­
doxy in the "school," and that various linguistic or analytic 
philosophers do philosophy in different ways—so much so that 
some of them who come out of this tradition are willing to do 
metaphysics of a sort. But on the whole, their philosophical 
predispositions make for a very loose world, with a maximum 
of tolerance and a minimum of system. 
Synthesis 
Another deeply embedded motive that has been a part of 
Western philosophy from the beginning is represented by the 
maxim of Bacon "I have taken all knowledge to be my prov­
ince." When Thales said all is water, and Parmenides reality is 
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one, and when Plato said that the Good is the ultimate explan­
atory principle of all things, they were all searching for a 
unifying principle to make more understandable nature and 
man and society and whatever else there might be. Behind this 
kind of explanation is the refusal to accept atomism in any of 
its forms—mechanistic, sensationalistic, individualistic, linguis­
tic—and to insist upon the contextual relations of all things, 
the seamless web. It makes for a philosophy with less clarity, 
but it gains another dimension by searching for, and often 
finding, connections that otherwise would be lost sight of. If 
only it can propose a strategy, it often succeeds remarkably 
well. Hegel and Marx proposed it as the dialectical method; 
Dewey as the experimental method. There is much to be said 
in favor of both methods, especially when interest is focused 
upon the productive forces in society. 
Both Marx and Dewey sought to rid philosophy of the 
arbitrary divisions of social life. Marx thought he could discern 
a unifying principle underlying class warfare in all of its 
manifestations, economic, political, legal, religious, artistic, 
family-relations, and what-not. The "relations of production" 
are the clue to understanding both exploitation and its demise. 
There is a fabric of society and the patterns are repeated within 
it in multifarious expression. Although the economic, modified 
by forces of nature as well as the means of production, is the 
primary manifestation, there are others too, which complete the 
many-faceted definition of a society. The Marxian position has 
of course been redefined in a variety of ways, among which is 
the institutionalization of it, especially in Russia and China. 
Dewey's account of contextualism has an American twist, 
but it has roots in German idealism and even more in Dar­
winian naturalism. Dewey sought for integral connections 
among man and nature, and he found them primarily in the 
rhythms of nature, expressed in "natural law" in man, in 
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ceremonials and rites, in art and society, and in science and 
philosophy.* His strategy, as we have said, is founded in the 
experimental method. This method, though characteristic of 
science, is nevertheless broader than science. It respects the 
empirically discovered connections among things wherever 
they are found—in nature, art, society, education, morals, 
religion, industry, the corporation, law, politics, and in any 
other relations into which men or things enter. The strategy 
behind the empirical method is man-centered, for it is engaged 
only in the face of problems or difficulties or ambiguities or 
challenges or adventures. In the presence of such confronta­
tions, men engage themselves for solving problems or achieving 
ends or effecting consummations or for making determinate the 
indeterminate. Dewey thus attempted to avoid the necessity of 
pronouncing arbitrary judgments about the world; rather, he 
proposed that judgments be expressions for making situations 
definite. The kind of definiteness would depend upon the 
context—warranted assertibility for knowledge, growth for ed­
ucation, satisfactoriness for morals, consummation for art, etc. 
But in any event, instead of defining the context a priori, he 
insisted upon allowing it to be disclosed in the course of 
inquiry, that is, by effecting the appropriate relations in experi­
ence. In particular, Dewey constantly inveighed against the 
complacent acceptance of various dualisms—mind and body, 
theory and practice, school and society, individual and state, 
nature and God, and any other that arbitrarily set apart one 
thing from another such that no inquiry into their relations 
would be possible. 
Marx and Dewey stopped short of asserting the existence of 
a single context for all reality, such as is asserted in various 
proposals by idealists and mechanists and neo-Thomists and 
* For a brief and lively discussion of this, cf. Art as Experience, 
pp. 147 ff. 
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even by some emergent evolutionists. The high traditions from 
the Eleatics to St. Thomas and Spinoza and Hegel and Berg-
son and Whitehead has favored monism over pluralism. But it 
has never been able to sustain the thesis of a single, ultimate 
context without yielding the empirical approach and ending in 
a form of mysticism. Because of this anomaly, radical pluralists 
could employ the analytic method effectively to counter the 
thesis of a single context. The thesis committed its protagonist 
to assume the air of omniscience, which practically was ex­
pressed in arbitrary, if not suffocating, forms of religious fanati­
cism or political nationalism, or even racist elitism. In the face 
of a shaken faith in idealism, the synthetic method was easy 
prey for those who advocated the analytic method, together 
with the atomism it implies. Yet when extreme contextualism 
gave way in its blind faith in dialectic to a commitment to the 
empirical method of searching for connections among things, it 
could not be casually overthrown by analysts. When this kind 
of toughness is inherent in contextualism, analysts have in­
creasingly come to acknowledge i t* Analysis which is in keep­
ing with the structure of knowledge cannot afford to lose sight 
of synthesis regarded as a search for the interconnections of 
things. The new science, as well as the practical arts, has 
capably demonstrated the existence of such interconnections. 
When philosophy is out of tune with such demonstrations, it 
loses its relevance and becomes academic. 
Philosophy as Orientation 
Both the analytic and the synthetic methods in philosophy 
are futile if they are out of touch with the moving forces of 
* Hence, the newer phase of "analytic philosophy" which has come to 
acknowledge the need for "metaphysics," following the clue by P. F. 
Strawson in his Individuals (London: Methuen and Co., 1959). 
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society and their potentials. Hence, the uselessness of philo­
sophic method which does not at the same time provide man 
with a sense of orientation to his world. Again, Western 
philosophy has demonstrated a prophetic quality from its be­
ginnings: Thales and Pythagoras anticipating science and cos­
mology; Protagoras, high humanism; Plato, the need for social 
reconstruction. The founders of modern philosophy did the 
same for their world: Bacon and Descartes, Locke and Leibniz. 
In the nineteenth century there were Hegel, Schopenhauer, 
and Spencer; and in the twentieth, the philosophers of process, 
of science, and of society. 
Prophecy is abhorrent unless it has vision supported by 
method; it is sheerly evangelical unless it is informed and 
informative and capable of being cultivated in a public and 
responsible way. The strictures are thus severe, and the savant 
or the sage or the "Hoosier Philosopher" does not qualify. The 
Pre-Socratics did qualify with their trust in reason; Plato did 
with his dialectic; Bacon with this theory of induction; Des-
cartes with the mathematical method; and in a similar way 
certain contemporary philosophers have made their impact: 
Marx and Dewey, Bergson and Whitehead, Russell and 
Moore, Carnap and Wittgenstein. There is a sense then in 
which philosophy is not quite capable unless it develops a 
"school." But there are again heavy strictures to be placed also 
upon the school, and therefore not just any old kind of school 
will do. The members must be able to employ the method of the 
founder, and they must be able to do so with both precision 
and imagination. The disciples will seldom be a match for the 
founder but they can have understanding and they can explore 
new areas, and some of their number will certainly have to be 
distinguished. 
Vision is a faculty with many forms. Those forms that catch 
on in philosophy have to penetrate distinctive aspects of a 
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culture as well as to suggest new directions by which clashes 
between the old and new can be reconciled. To accomplish this 
end, a philosophy requires the elaboration of its method for 
exploring: the range of human interests and for making them 
germane to one another. The Pythagoreans did this in employ­
ing number to reveal the essence of geometrical forms, har­
monic relations of vibrating strings, motions of the heavenly 
bodies, and moral qualities. The method served well, and even 
better when Plato seized upon it and gave it a more universal 
significance than the Pythagoreans were able to do. In a vastly 
different intellectual climate, Descartes performed equivalent 
feats by using the mathematical method to explore nature and 
the intellectual method to explore mind. Although he found 
close analogies between the two, he could never quite over­
come the dualism involved. Yet this dualism also served well in 
making the world safe for science while at the same time it 
declared the glory of God. To be sure Descartes' works were 
placed on the Index, but even that could not detract from the 
power of his vision for interpreting the modern world. In the 
post-Darwinian world, process-philosophies looked to the bio­
logical sciences for their paradigm, and succeeded remarkably 
well in orienting man to a world of dynamic realities and 
creativity. Whitehead wrestled with philosophical problems in 
order to bring together both the biological and the mathemati­
cal into a single system. Dewey, adopting history as his par­
adigm, sought to reconcile the great community with the new 
science. Still others have looked to the subconscious and inner 
being of man, or alternatively, to language and ineffability as 
the prophetic qualities most likely to provide orientation for 
man in his present predicament. 
However indispensable the method of prophecy may be to 
philosophy, its weaknesses are apparent, and possibly insur­
mountable. Is there any basis for judging one philosophy to be 
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any more acceptable than another? Is philosophy at bottom a 
matter of temperament? Does the skill applied to implementing 
a vision really add to its validity? Is there any reliable way of 
distinguishing a fad from an authentic philosophy? These are 
some of the innumerable questions that haunt our steps in any 
attempt to seek out a philosophy at once grounded in the 
nature of things and appropriate to the times. From the histori­
cal point of view, this double standard may be more readily 
judged. Although we may be deceived by our historical pro­
nouncements, we can better observe, after the fact, how philoso­
phies mesh with historical circumstance and shed light upon 
them. And even with respect to the standard of making philos­
ophy appropriate to reality, we can, again from the historical 
point of view, observe the way in which it does take its clue 
from the science or other focal activities of the time and point 
directions for resolving the clashes between it and other indis­
pensable activities. A philosophy which does not enlighten its 
society, one which does not hold the mirror up to man so that 
he can see himself in relation to nature and human under­
takings in the depth of their commitments and to the kinds of 
consummations open to himself and to his fellow men—such a 
philosophy is a trifling thing. 
My proposal is that there therefore exists a test, even if 
difficult to make and not always accurate, by which a philoso­
phy can justify itself. The supreme test is the degree to which 
a philosophy is reasonably clear in its basic concepts, systematic 
enough to cover the major commitments of a society and to 
provide criticisms of their incoherencies, and capable of pro­
ducing a critical philosophical tradition to carry on continu­
ously these tasks. More simply, the test of an adequate philoso­
phy is its capacity to become established as the most general 
critical institution of intelligence in a society. Classical Greece 
did this very well; Rome did not and neither did the so-called 
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Dark Ages. From the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries 
Europe did it well, and so did the Renaissance even up to the 
Enlightenment. The later nineteenth century and early twen­
tieth century often did it effectively. The last twenty years 
have been very active with very spotty results. Often, during 
these years, philosophy has abdicated, sometimes to a technical 
facility, sometimes to a romanticism (two sides of the same 
coin) that has inhibited its principal task. My final suggestion 
is that by looking to philosophy as the inclusive institution of 
intelligence we can recover its high tradition and allow it to 
perform its sustained and critical function. In the twentieth 
century, that institution will be seen to have its foundation in 
the leisure that is provided by the affluent society. 

V. The New Leisure 
Aristotle was right in suggesting that there could be no good life 
without leisure. He was also right in identifying leisure in 
Greece with the classes who minimized work and who engaged 
in it only begrudgingly. Yet, anyone would be wrong who 
attempted to employ in our society the limited standards that 
Aristotle employed in his. Today no man is "by nature" a slave, 
except some morons—and they are more likely to be drains on 
the affluent society than producers in it. In the truly affluent 
society of today, there is instead of a leisured class, a leisured 
society—at least, such a society is a reasonable goal. The 
question is, what kind of leisure is most rewarding and what 
are the major requirements for it to have its play in a genuine 
culture1? In order to answer these questions I wish to consider 
(a) major social conditions which give shape to the unique 
character of leisure in contemporary industrial society, (b) the 
irresponsible use of leisure time and some institutional poten­
tials for the transformation of leisure into consummatory values, 
and (c) the peaceful, philosophical climate in which the new 
leisure can flourish. 
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Mass Leisure 
Modern industry not only produces goods at an increasing 
rate (some 6 per cent increase per year) but it also forecasts a 
constantly increased amount of free time for its people.* No 
doubt these two factors supply adequate reasons for an in­
dustrial revolution. Regardless of what else industrial life 
brings in its wake, the fact of more goods and less work appears 
to be an irresistible inducement for men to revolutionize their 
lives. And on the whole it seems worth it. Natural catastrophes 
can often be avoided; the environment can be reshaped; new 
desires can be awakened and many of them satisfied; persons 
can move about with more security and comfort; and not least, 
the working classes can enjoy many of the formerly denied 
goods that were the privilege of the upper classes; for example, 
artificial light, heat, and to some degree, sanitation, entertain­
ment, and various other public benefits. In the course of 
industrial development the catastrophes have very much 
shifted from natural ones to man-made ones. The new catas­
trophes are not to be slighted—slums, artificial depredations, 
devastation and pollution of natural resources, and worst of all, 
full-scale war. Yet such catastrophes do not hold the same kind 
of inevitability; since they are made by man, many, if not all, 
may also be unmade. 
There really is not much point in debating whether the 
* It is estimated that from 1900-1950, leisure time has increased 
three to four times. Cf. the insightful discussion of James C. Charles-
worth, "A Comprehensive Plan for the Wise Use of Leisure" in 
Leisure in America: Blessing or Curse, Monograph 4, American 
Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia, 1964). Charles-
worth observes that "the wise use of leisure is genuine education and 
its own reason for being," p. 35. 
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conversion to industrial society should have come about. As we 
have generously reiterated, the industrial system now predomi­
nates in much of the world and underdeveloped areas are 
seeking to industrialize as rapidly as possible. The more inter­
esting question, once the conversion has been made, is whether 
man can make out of it a genuine culture, more satisfying than 
dissatisfying to the peoples of the world, and less given to the 
catastrophes that plague man today? I suggest that to do so, the 
industrial revolution needs to be completed by the political, 
social, and cultural revolutions, which are their complements. 
These revolutions—or more accurately and appropriately, these 
evolutions—have already, somewhat incompletely, come about. 
At least they have sufficiently done so that we can observe the 
kind of leisure they allow and estimate their further potential. 
Concentrated as it is in urban areas, modern industry has 
transformed agricultural society into mass society. Moreover, 
mass society has a kind of coherence by which it can be 
recognized, especially in the standards of conformity it imposes 
upon its people at work and at play, in politics and religion, in 
their attitudes towards nature and other men. Older traditions 
and cultural elites, though they persist, become anachronisms 
and lose their power. There are, to be sure, variations in 
patterns, but the dynamics of the system appear increasingly to 
be reducing them to similarities. One student of the subject 
who would have us mindful of the range of variations that 
exists nevertheless believes that there certainly is a kind of 
inner consistency in values and beliefs and behavior patterns. 
He makes certain assumptions about this kind of society, no 
doubt with more than a casual amount of empirical knowledge, 
which suggests that they contain a measure of reality. For this 
reason, I believe that they are worth quoting. His assumptions 
about the "mass" character of modern society are: 
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(1) social differentiation persists, even increases; (2) cul­
tural uniformity also grows; (3) in rich countries there is 
more independent variation of social structure and culture 
than in poor ones, although some of this incongruity is 
due to imprecise measures of structure; (4) developments 
in the aesthetic-recreational sphere as well as the political 
sphere may remain isolated from those in the economy and 
locality for some time, so that in the short run mass be­
havior in one sphere may not become mass behavior in 
another; but (5) over several generations, and as rich 
countries grow richer, there is a strain toward consistency 
between structure and culture and between behavior in 
one institutional sphere and that in a second.* 
For our purposes, the most important consideration is the fact 
that mass society develops its own character, and that inherent 
in it is its own kind (or kinds) of leisure. Professor Wilensky 
finds this kind of leisure increasingly inconsistent with the 
elitist leisure of earlier society. His own concern is to show how 
free time spent on mass communications—especially TV— 
breaks through the more traditional divisions of society. No 
doubt his conclusion is warranted, and I shall turn to the 
question of mass communications after considering some fur­
ther characteristics of mass society. 
First, there is the changing political pattern of mass society. 
Mass society surely does give an assist to the political leveling 
of modern society. The franchise and the popular vote have 
come to be an aspect of industrial society. Although there are 
many ways of manipulating votes and many ways of nullify­
ing their effect, there exists nevertheless an important consider­
* Harold L. Wilensky, "Mass Society and Mass Culture: Inter­
pendence or Independence," American Sociological Review, XXIX, 
No. 2 (April, 1964), 176. 
199 The New Leisure 
ation in that politicians have to take into account popular 
sentiments. These may be crudely overrun, as in totalitarian 
societies, or they may be more subtly controlled by public 
relations techniques, as in less completely totalitarian societies, 
or they may even respond to public sentiment, and possibly 
even to sentiment that is informed and that has some clear 
notions about the ends to be instituted. In other words, the 
ideal of equality may still be an end that merits pursuit. 
Equality as an ideal of mass society, it is worth observing, 
becomes a reality only when it gets truly expressed in the lives 
of the masses. Clearly it can do so only if there is a legitimate 
sense in which it appeals to a sense of the solidarity of man­
kind. This is, of course, the fraternal ideal. It means that what 
happens in Kenya or South Africa or Bylorussia or Mississippi 
is of concern to all men. A Universal Declaration of the Rights 
of Man is a political necessity because it is a moral necessity in 
a world dominated by industrial technology. To flaunt this 
necessity is to court disaster in human affairs and to cause more 
unrest than can possibly be caused by respecting the necessity. 
Finally, because of the social structures characteristic of this 
kind of society, it becomes imperative to redefine liberty con­
cretely in relation to the realities of the social world, rather 
than as a psychological phenomenon that bears no relevance to 
what men actually do or can do within the limits of an 
industrial, mass complex. Thus the liberty to do whatever one 
chooses is a notion less acceptable than the enhancement of 
conditions that help men to do what is to their likings when 
they can exist as viable choices. Under these circumstances the 
island-theory of mankind needs to give way to the bell-theory, 
not for the tolling of mankind but for the celebration of him. 
Men's freedom will then come to its most adequate expression 
in their leisure time, for industrial man has a right to claim 
such time as the longest part of his waking life and as that in 
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which he can be most human. Leisure then is not to be 
regarded primarily as relaxation or diversion or any other 
attribute which is an escape from monotony or burdensome 
work. Rather it is to be regarded as fulfilment of such capaci­
ties as may be open to men in their non-invidious world. 
Aimlessness or the happy hour need not be excluded in such a 
world. No doubt they will exist, and they can even be justified 
by the fact that they are a requirement of leisure to insure the 
vocation of man; that is, the celebration of him. Such a 
celebration is not a matter of ritual, even though it may 
contain ritual, but a matter of works, of human doings where 
doings are an expression of his best knowledge and of his most 
acute sensibilities. 
Work and Leisure 
It is axiomatic that leisure is connected with work. Yet as 
the character of work changes, so does leisure. Moreover, 
since the more insistent factor is work rather than leisure, we 
shall do well to note the categories of work before proceeding to 
further discussion of leisure. Santayana's categorization of 
work * appears as useful as any other: want, ambition, and love 
of occupation. The last named we can easily dismiss with a 
brief comment, since it exists more as the solution of a problem 
than as the setting of one. Unless it is socially repugnant, such 
as mayhem or public relations or other like forms of sadism, the 
professional who loves his occupation is in an enviable posi­
tion. He is almost certain to reach high standards of profes­
sional development, as well as enjoying a sense of mature 
achievement that will sustain him in the more tedious require­
* Quoted by Nels Anderson, Work and Leisure (New York: Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 27. 
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ments of his chosen work. His "instinct for workmanship" can 
certainly carry him far towards the realization of satisfactory 
ends. Yet however successful such a man may be in his occupa­
tion, he cannot well avoid the turmoil involved in coming to 
terms with his extra-professional, personal involvements as well 
as with an inevitable concern for his larger cultural involve­
ments. If he can manage his personal affairs, such a man is 
likely to make a genuine contribution to culture and to be a 
competent critic of it, especially as regarded from his profes­
sional point of view. 
The more serious dislocations of both work and leisure and 
their interconnections are better seen in the other two catego­
ries: those who surfer from ambition or from want. The man of 
ambition often performs extraordinarily useful services. But he 
is not quite to be trusted because his judgment is easily clouded 
by "vaulting ambition." Institutionally speaking, the ambitious 
man may find his ambitions best satisfied in the business world, 
especially as profits are virtually unlimited and as the man of 
business is both highly respected and occupies a position of 
power. No doubt the age of captains of business is past, but 
there are nevertheless attractive rewards open for those with 
executive ability and for those with talent for financial manip­
ulation. Certainly not all who enter these fields are philistines, 
but it is not unfair to suggest that the nature of the occupations 
is, in the higher ranks, such as to favor philistinism. In the 
lower ranks in these fields there is evidence that men in busi­
ness have tempered their ambitions and seek release for their 
energies in other personal involvements, sometimes extending 
into larger social and belle lettrist affairs. But the evidence 
suggests that they are more likely to be intelligent appreciators 
of the good life than those who actively shape it. 
The truly agonizing problem of work is found in situations 
in which those who engage in it do so from want. The factory 
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system, including the assembly-line monotony it imposes on 
men and women, is, as we have already suggested, the stigma 
of the industrial world. However much it has been alleviated 
by shortened hours, improved conditions of work, and increased 
rewards, it remains nevertheless an inhuman burden, even if 
an inescapable one, as accumulated empirical evidence clearly 
shows. * From a more theoretical point of view, the indictment 
is made by Nels Anderson as follows: 
When rationalized, work emerges as naked performance 
detached from whatever is not pertinent. The work place 
has been detached from the home and separated from non-
work distractions. Skill has been separated from the worker 
and converted into a uniform predictable work quality. 
All activities and interests having a leisure content have 
been separated from work. 
Finally, work is now separated from the personality of 
the worker or, better said, it makes few demands on his 
personality, which finds expression in leisure.f 
It seems highly unlikely that this statement is over-critical of 
the predicament of those who work because of want. Surely 
only a handful would choose to do such work except for the 
external rewards it brings. Even if the rewards are increased to 
staggering proportions, t the problem of creating a satisfying 
* For an intelligent and detailed indictment o£ the contemporary 
industrial system, see again Chris Argyris, Personality and Organization, 
especially pp. 232—35. 
f Dimensions of Work (New York: David McKay Co., 1964), p. 
viii. 
t Charles K. Brightbill, quoting George Soule, writes that "if the 
gain in real income continues for another 80 years as it has for the 
last 80, the average income (in the U.S.A.) at that time will be 
$37,500." The Challenge of Leisure (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1963), p. 17. 
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relation between work and leisure remains unsolved. Despite 
its unsettling conflicts, the compromise may nevertheless be 
required in order to permit an industrial society to continue to 
exist. Constituted as the least evil available, the compromise 
may still permit some major increment of satisfaction if the 
conditions of work are not permitted to dictate the institution­
alization of leisure. If it does, the chances are that leisure will 
continue to be constituted as bread and circuses, with all its 
sensual accompaniments.* 
There is reason to believe that as industrial societies advance 
in the twentieth century the social gap between factory work­
ers and others tends to decrease. There are still rich and poor, 
and, at the extremes, the vocabularies differ so greatly as to 
make communication impossible. Otherwise, the media of mass 
communication and the schools do, for better or for worse, 
mould society in its attitudes, values, and use of leisure time. 
From the point of view of the advancement of organized 
intelligence, it seems likely that the problem of leisure is more 
serious than that of work, even though the two are inter­
twined. 
Irresponsible and Consummatory Leisure 
The quality of leisure in a society is the final mark of the 
quality of its culture. The degree of authenticity of a culture is 
the degree of consummation which its leisure provides. Since 
consummatory values, however, cannot be measured apart from 
work, the tedium of work in industrial society remains as its 
* I pass over the touchy question of those who out of want seek work 
but do not find it. This is a different social question; yet it exacerbates 
the problem and makes even more difficult a satisfactory institutionaliza­
tion of leisure. 
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most pressing paradox. The reason for this paradox is found in 
the fact that tedium brutalizes man and thus denies to him the 
enjoyment of consummatory values. As a substitute he can 
enjoy at best sentimental values—dream-like diversions that are 
as far removed from work as the shadow from the tree. The 
sentimentalities of leisure are a function of the brutalities of 
work. Institutionally speaking, sentimentality may be regarded 
as the discordance between work and leisure. Work, of course, 
is not bad because it is fatiguing—almost everything but sleep 
is. The trouble arises when it fatigues without providing a 
sense of accomplishment and therefore without satisfaction. 
Nor is leisure good just because it is relaxing. Relaxation is a 
necessary release from the tedium of work, but apart from work 
it is more an expression of boredom than an intrinsic end. At 
its most consummatory, leisure is a supplement to work and 
completion of it. As Pieper, following Aristotle, expresses it, 
the notion of leisure "is the source of the distinction between 
the artes liberates and the artes serviles, the liberal arts and the 
servile work . . . [the two] are twin expressions, and form, 
one might say, the articulation of a joint, so that one is hardly 
intelligible without the other. . . ." * We have elaborated this 
view at length in discussing the liberal arts as liberalizing the 
practical arts. The question is, what are the current forms of 
mass leisure and do they serve to make work more intelligible? 
Discussing the character of leisure in America, Professor 
Wilensky writes: 
We must first grasp the fact that the mass media are the 
core of American leisure and that television has become 
* Of. tit., pp. 27-28. 
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the core of media exposure. The sheer arithmetic is strik­
ing. Nine in ten American homes average five to six 
hours daily with the TV set on. And it is not just turned 
on; it is generally being watched. Eight in ten Americans 
spend at least four hours a day viewing television, listen­
ing to radio, or both. Additional time goes to reading news­
papers and magazines.* 
Clearly, television has found a viewing audience that is de­
voted to it. The rapidity with which Americans insist upon 
having their broken sets repaired is a clue to the intensity of 
their interest in television.']' Leisure time spent in viewing 
television appears to be the dominant moulding force upon 
attitudes and sentiments of Americans, despite the many intan­
gibles involved. The analysts of the phenomena suggest that 
the programs generally cater to a low level, artistically and 
intellectually, and that the so-called high brow programs re­
ceive low viewing ratings. Television, it appears, is to be 
regarded first as entertainment, and only secondly or thirdly as 
informative and educational. Sociological studies bear out this 
conclusion, and the evidence points to the fact that there is a 
high degree of conformity such that the educated classes, too, 
become part of the mass, and are addicted to much the same 
* hoc. cit., American Sociological Review, XXIX, No. 2 (April, 
1964), 181. Wilensky takes his figures from G. A. Steiner, The People 
Look at Television (New York: Alfred H. Knopf, 1963). This volume 
should be consulted for a study in depth of American habits of viewing 
television, the kinds of programs viewed, the number of hours, and the 
kinds of viewers. It provides a thoroughly documented exposition of 
the magnitude of the problem, including the tastes and the depths of 
attachment to TV by the vast majority of the public from all ranks and 
classes. 
t Cf. Steiner, ibid, pp. 99-100. 
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programs as the less well educated.* There is no need to labor 
the question of whether the run of detective stories, soap 
operas, and Westerns, together with the interspersed advertis­
ings and announcements constitute consummatory values. 
They obviously do have consumers, more as the listless variety 
than as active participants. They sentimentalize and bowdler­
ize. How close they come to serving the "interest, convenience, 
and necessity" of the people—the standard set for radio and 
TV by law—may be regarded by some as debatable. No doubt, 
there are programs that do measure up to standard: the lively 
programs on educational TV, coverage of dramatic news devel­
opments, especially those of national and world-wide interest, 
special programs of historical subjects, as well as a significant 
number of other programs done with honesty and intelligence. 
Even so, the bulk of the programs can only be regarded as 
distractions from the vocation of man, which serve at best for 
entertainment and at worst as substitutes for ennui. 
The predicament reflects a malady at the core of industrial 
society, and we can, I think, locate its source. Leisure is not the 
cause of the sickness, but a symptom of it, even if it does 
aggravate the disease. The cause is to be sought in the "practi­
cal arts" themselves. In an industrial society these arts have 
become so disturbed that they serve ends out of proportion to 
the needs of an authentic culture. Not unreasonably, men 
react, often frantically, to enjoy the moment, entirely separated 
from that which has led them to seek momentary relief. The 
* Cf. Wilensky, loc. tit., pp. 178-80, 190, 191, 196. For example, 
"There is little doubt . . . uiat educated strata—even products of 
graduate and professional schools—are becoming full participants in 
mass culture; they spend a reduced fraction of time in exposure to 
quality print and film. This trend extends to professors, writers, artists, 
scientists—the keepers of high culture themselves—and the chief 
culprit, again, is TV (p. 190). 
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protest can take a great variety of forms, and entertainment is 
one of the most important. Entertainment, of course, is not 
therefore unjustifiable. It is an aspect of play and art, of 
creating and judging, of the intellect and the emotions, and 
can be a quality of almost anything human except piety and 
agony and gross human suffering. Even enjoyment as relaxa­
tion is easily and properly justified. But the conversion of 
enjoyment as relaxation into the principal end of life is a 
distortion that will not do: it is a trivialization of life, and as 
such drains its realities. 
Criticism of modern life is implicit in the form that mass 
leisure assumes, but it is found in other forms as well, some 
serious and some playful. Modern literature abounds in this 
criticism—that of Beckett, Bellow, Ionesco, Gold, Barth, Gel­
ber, and a host of others. Existentialist writers often make it 
explicit. Moreover, it may be argued that the arts in seizing 
upon formalism, the new geometricism and pop arts are half-ar­
ticulate, burlesqued criticisms of the trivialization of culture by 
modern industry. In addition, beatniks express their revolt by 
avoiding as much as possible not only the discipline imposed 
by work in industrial society but also the conformities de­
manded by mass leisure. Finally, refusal in general of philoso­
phers, with the possible exception of existentialists, to come to 
terms with the predicament is abdication of an intellectually 
responsible position in relation to the predicament. 
To resolve the predicament, nothing will satisfy short of a 
wholesale attack upon the specious aspects of industrial society 
for the purpose of converting that society into a genuine 
culture. I shall suggest three points of attack and then call 
attention to the task of philosophy in providing further guid­
ance for the development of a genuine culture. The three 
points are: first, a reconsideration of the standards of the 
practical arts; second, directions for transforming the arts and 
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the public forum; and finally, a heightened sense for the 
meaning of peace for the last third of the twentieth century. 
Defective Standards of the Arts 
The practical arts were never intended as an exercise in 
busywork. They were never intended, except by some nine­
teenth-century devotees of "the dismal science," to keep people 
out of mischief. And they were never intended, except by some 
twentieth-century economists who are wedded to a technique 
of avoiding some paradoxes of capitalism, to insist upon an 
ever-increasing rate of consumption in order to make the world 
safe for production. The problem of the practical arts is indeed 
made difficult in the twentieth-century in that, at least in 
America, we have carried over from the nineteenth-century an 
ideology that was grounded in job-shop enterprise and at­
tempted to apply it to oligopolistic, twentieth-century, big 
business. The error is threefold: it enthrones irrational choices; 
it covertly shifts power from the consumer to the producer; and 
it fails intelligently to employ modern technology as a signifi­
cant ingredient in the realization of consummatory values. The 
error traces to the fact that there is little semblance between a 
system in which, prior to the technological revolution as a 
result of the new science, intelligent choices of goods were 
made upon the basis of common-sense experience and a system, 
following that revolution, in which intelligent choices of goods 
could be made only by an appeal to technical standards. 
Hence, in the absence of technical knowledge, persons cannot 
possibly choose intelligently and are at the mercy of winds of 
«doctrine that they cannot understand. 
Little wonder is it then that we are confronted with the 
209 The New Leisure 
paradox of a society which, while it contains in the aggregate 
more knowledge than mankind has ever possessed, at the same 
time displays greater irrationality than ever before. From this 
paradox arises an indictment of the "practical arts." The ques­
tion is whether this indictment is a "true bill?" In primitive 
societies there is little doubt that rabbit-snaring and pottery-
making and growing maize, etc., are practical arts. They re­
main such even when they are overlaid with rituals that are 
supposed to expedite results; because, it seems, ritual was 
usually secondary except in the doubtful arts, such as those of 
healing. In contemporary society, ritual, in the form of ideol­
ogy and in that deriving from vested interests, especially when 
it takes advantage of ignorant people, aborts the arts of an 
affluent society. Men are "required" to produce goods or to 
produce them in a way which has questionable worth. Such 
goods may be luxuries not commensurate with the bother, or 
they may be manufactured with built-in obsolescences in order 
to guarantee the future need of production. Irresponsibility is a 
thoroughgoing character of the system. And the leisure which 
attends it is equally as irresponsible as the work which pro­
duces it. The result is a compounded loss of consummatory 
values involving both useless work and trivial enjoyments. To 
paraphrase Dewey, the means of the production are collective 
and communal but the ends are individualistic and divisive.* 
* Cf. Individualism, Old and New (New York: Minton, Balch, 
1930). Dewey's actual words are worth quoting. Addressing himself to 
the fact that the business mind is not unified, he asserts: "It is divided 
within itself and must remain so as long as the results of industry as 
the determining force in life are corporate and collective while its 
animating motives and compensations are so unmitigatedly private. A 
unified mind, even of the business type, can come into being only when 
conscious intent and consummation are in harmony with consequences 
actually effected. This statement expresses conditions so psychologically 
assured that it may be termed a law of mental integrity" (p. 58). 
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Transforming the Arts and the Public Forum 
The system of production and the means of choosing goods, 
along with the consequent inordinate amount of time spent on 
amusements and entertainments (despite or in the face of 
inner agonies), are seriously defective. There are, nevertheless, 
clearly contrary and authentically productive elements within 
the system, together with some genuinely consummatory val­
ues. The question is how to overcome the obfuscations and 
distractions that prevent the further development of these 
values? Except in emergencies, the forces that block legitimate 
values may not be capable of being overcome, and we may be 
reduced to admitting the prevalence of irrationality as an 
unalterable fact. Yet, a more searching look reveals some hope­
ful instrumentalities for making the productive arts more func­
tional. 
In order to redirect the arts, one may turn the spotlight on 
those genuinely creative movements that are capable of becom­
ing guideposts to even further civilizing processes. Chief 
among these may very well be the rational development of 
communities. One such exciting development is that of Reston, 
a planned new town, some 18 miles west of Washington, D.C., 
in a wooded Virginia hillside. The new town, composed of a 
number of villages and urban town center is intended to 
accommodate 75,000 persons. Scenery and artificial landscap­
ing are not to be sacrificed to an overemphasis upon conven­
iences of parking cars. The pedestrian is to be favored; and 
ambiance is to be made more human by eliminating "dead 
space" that separates houses in favor of "live space" that is 
usable for walking, picnicking, playing, congregating, etc. 
The community is intended to house rich and poor persons, 
those of different colors, and those capable of expressing a wide 
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range of interests. It is intended to combine work and leisure, 
especially communal leisure, where the town square, in easy 
walking distance, is to be a center of charm as well as one for 
the performing arts. Finally the industrial area is to be close at 
hand, and thus to minimize the problem of transportation and 
commuting.* The experiment f may fail, but similar experi­
ments in Europe, notably in Finland, have not. It would be 
absurd to suggest that Restons are the answer to contemporary 
problems, but it is not absurd to suggest their advantage over 
tract housing, and the ways in which they can alleviate rather 
than intensify present-day, social dislocations. And they can be 
especially instructive in providing us with a new sense of a 
proper relation of work and leisure, of the private to the public, 
the practical to the artistic, the realistic to the idealistic, and of 
the correction of many more of those tortuous dislocations that 
debilitate human excellence. 
The Restons, and other promising innovations, such as 
conservation and educational and health programs, slum clear­
ance, automation of industry, new experiments in the com­
munal arts that dignify athletics and the dance, speech and 
discussion, dissemination of knowledge, and whatever else as­
sists in making men at home in the world—these are the 
innovations that need to be spotlighted and discussed. This 
need cannot be satisfied unless there are new forums appropri­
ate to the modern task. The school, including the college and 
university, can be and are central to the task, for they are basic 
institutions of intelligence and of the advancement of the arts. 
* For a detailed discussion of the many facets of the project, see 
Wolf Von Eckardt's insightful discussion, "The Community: Could 
This Be Our Town," New Republic, CLI, No. 19 (Nov. 7, 1964), 
17-23. 
t Apparently it has failed. See Von Eckardt's later report, "Are 
We Being En-Gulfed?" New Republic, CLVII, No. 24 (Dec. 9, 1967), 
21-23. 
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But there are others as well: community forums that are suited 
to the task; for, as community centers, they provide the grass 
roots from which vigorous and fresh opinions can arise and be 
defended. Then there is the question of employing the most 
powerful medium of all for engaging in the process: TV. 
Whether this is possible is hard to say. England may have a 
better beginning in this regard than America. But as a new 
agora for public discussion and medium of dissemination of 
things required for the "interest, convenience and necessity" of 
the people, television could, if the people were to insist, be­
come the most significant public forum of all, aiding in the 
restoration of the sense of rationality for contemporary man. 
The quality of television of the future will no doubt prove to 
be the crucial test of the quality of leisure man will enjoy. 
Peacejare 
Finally, there is a mentality that must prevail if the arts are 
ever to arrive at anything like their full human potential: and 
that mentality demands peace. In a sense, this demand is 
redundant, for peace is the reign of the peaceful arts; it is what 
we previously called "peacefare." In outline, the requirement is 
simple; in detail it is one of the most tangled of all. The 
paradox is, of course, that nations "desire" peace most of all and 
they make as their first priority "the fight for peace." From our 
vantage point there are two comments called for, one pertain­
ing to the elimination of warfare and the other to the advance­
ment of the peaceful arts. The rest is the work of peoples who 
wish to convert from war to peace, from the death-wish to life, 
or from a spurious culture to a genuine one. Taking the 
genuine culture as our clue, our comments focus upon institu­
tional structures as relevant to war and peace. 
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There is only one sure way of eliminating war and that is to 
eliminate the institution of war. Once this is done, nations 
have no capacity for warfare and are therefore unable to make 
war, no matter what.* Once armies are dismembered and 
armaments destroyed, the mentality for warfare which remains 
is reduced to the power only of a wistful reminiscence. And 
even this power can be expected to die a quiet death without 
the need of mass psychotherapy or of any other therapy. The 
resulting impotence is the end of warfare. Moreover, if peace­
ful instruments capable of widespread destruction have a func­
tion in society, their employment for the distorted purpose of 
trying to make war could issue only into acts of sporadic 
madness; certainly not into a state of totally destructive war­
fare, such as is now capable of being waged. Madness of this 
sort is always possible, but its containment is of an entirely 
different order from that of the destructive power of atomic 
warfare, plus all its supporting forms.*}" 
If war is to be eliminated, peace must be enthroned. This has 
been the major theme of this essay. Peace is not just the 
absence of warfare; it is the practice of the human arts that are 
necessary, useful, and liberative. They are, in a word, moral. 
Warfare is immoral because it makes impossible "right relations 
among men"; it destroys the creative potential of men, includ­
ing much of human well-being that relies upon communica­
tion. Consequently, the loss that warfare makes inevitable is 
* Professor Robert Maclver first enlightened me on this point. See 
his Web of Government (New York: Macmillan, 1947). 
f There is a similar kind of problem in modern society in the struggle 
throughout the world for civil rights. I pass it over with, again, only the 
suggestion that it, too, is a matter of converting institutions of segrega­
tion (laws, poll taxes, ghettos, employment bureaus, etc.) into those 
of integration. In many ways the problem is more difficult than that 
of eliminating war, because of the intimacies involved in the relation 
of minorities to majorities. 
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compounded: the creative potential of men, as well as its 
dissemination and therefore such further realizations that dis­
semination would have stimulated. Behind the creative poten­
tial and its concomitants stand institutions of intelligence; 
without them a culture possesses little enlightenment. 
Conclusion 
Intelligence is inference, the drawing of proper conclusions; 
and it can be done only by individuals. How then can infer­
ence be a function of institutions, and how can there possibly 
be institutions of intelligence? One answer is that the agents of 
an institution are individuals. Another answer is that an insti­
tution may be so founded as to promote the activity of drawing 
conclusions by its agents. Taken together, the two answers 
have been implicit in the arts and sciences such as I have 
regarded them as being the bearers of intelligence in an au­
thentic culture. By making them more explicit, I hope now to 
clarify the course of the preceding discussion and to make the 
ties among the various topics more evident. To this end, I shall 
make my final comments on intelligence as it may be embodied 
first in the arts, and secondly in science and technology; then I 
shall briefly restate the conclusions by which these institutions 
of intelligence make their contributions to authentic culture. 
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Inference in the Arts 
The practical arts are functional. They serve to sustain life 
by making things and providing services. The life-functions 
they fulfill, we have said, include necessities, comforts, and 
elegances. These arts, then, are complexes of means to ends, 
which are capable of being rationalized. Their rationalization is 
illustrated in their employment of fire, the horse, the stirrup, 
iron, steam, the gasoline motor, the hydroelectric turbine, ad 
indefinitum. It turns out that these instrumentalities may be 
employed not only for co-operative work but also for co-opera­
tive enjoyments, whether for festivals or recreation or other 
such satisfactions. Regardless of the end to be served, intelli­
gence comes into play in the nice adjustment by which the 
instrumentalities serve their appropriate ends. Analysis of how 
the ends come about reveals that inferences are always in­
cluded in the process, even if only implicitly. Knowledge of the 
process discloses a knowledge that such and such will follow 
(or better, is likely to follow) upon the establishment of 
certain antecedent conditions. To know the art of welding is to 
know for example that the application of heat will cause 
certain kinds of metal to fuse. Inference consists in drawing 
just such conclusions. The more complex the art, the more 
complex are the inferences to be made, the last inference being 
dependent upon a series of preceding inferences. When reason­
ing of this sort is displayed in the conduct of an art, we usually 
call it prudence. And when the arts are capable of maintaining 
themselves and of serving functional ends, they are pre-emi­
nently prudential arts. 
Moreover, prudential arts, as we have noted, are capable of 
being passed on from generation to generation. Through ap­
prenticeship, the novice is usually capable of learning an art. 
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In part his activity consists of practice of manipulative skills, 
but in part it is also intellectual in that it is learning how to 
draw appropriate conclusions. The novice is required not 
merely to have dexterity, but also to learn to know what will 
happen if. . . . Or, should he possess a more experimental 
mentality, he will more ingeniously have an idea, what would 
happen if. . .  . In this case the inference is from one form of 
manipulation whose consequences are already known to an­
other which are not. In the first case, learning is by dissemina­
tion of knowledge; in the second, by experimentation. The 
processes are of course similar; but the one perpetuates some­
thing already known; the other, seen from the novice's point of 
view, is inventive, whether or not the invention has already be­
come a part of the accumulated knowledge of a society. When 
this kind of inventive thinking becomes an established pattern 
in a society, it then properly becomes an institution of intelli­
gence. If, however, they are very simple and easily discovered 
by almost anyone who has need of them, they may just as well 
be called common sense. Yet it is probably true that even com­
mon sense is more a function of the mores and culture of a 
society than of purely individual invention. Surely the common 
sense which is expected of an Eskimo or a Chuckchee or an 
Australian aborigine is very different from that expected of a 
Frenchman or American or an Englishman. The very notion of 
common sense as something to be shared predisposes it to be 
cultural rather than individual. 
Inference as Individual Act 
Yet the individual is always to be reckoned with whenever 
an inference is made. Inference is so bound up with first-hand 
experience that without that experience, it is inconceivable 
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that any conclusion would ever be drawn. In the life of the 
mind, inference surely arises from observation of one thing's 
happening after another, whether it is burning a finger on a 
hot coal, hearing a clap of thunder following a flash of light­
ning, crawling to reach and then thrusting a cookie or a marble 
in the mouth, etc. Sequence of events precedes the sequence of 
inferring, though we may rightly have more confidence in the 
truth of inference than in that of the events which precede 
inference. The reason of course is that the senses may—and 
often do—deceive. Illusions and misperceptions are too com­
mon for one long to doubt this. Of course, inferences may also 
deceive, but they deceive in a different way and are corrigible 
in a different way. Clouds mean rain, but not always. Some 
clouds bring rain and some don't. To find out which do and 
which don't, I need to discern new factors, probably not 
discernible by gross sense experience. So it may be that the less 
I rely upon sense experience the better capable I am of making 
good inferences. And so there comes to be discovered an order 
of reliability in inferences. 
The most ready of inferences I probably make by noting 
recurring sequences. The first red berry I chucked into my 
mouth tasted good, and the second and the third, etc. My 
inference, explicit or implicit, is that red berries taste good. I 
remember that this is so. Remembering itself then proves to be 
a kind of inference, an implicit one. If it is explicit, then it is 
not the sight of the red berry that prompts me to infer 'good 
taste' but the idea become symbol that so prompts me. Eventu­
ally, I come across a choke cherry. Then not only is my 
experience different, but, more importantly, the inference I 
make needs to be different. 
The process is much the same as that in the practice of the 
prudential arts. The chief difference of course is that the 
novice learns not just from first-hand experience, but also from 
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that of his teacher, and possibly from others, directly or indi­
rectly, who are privy to relevant experience. The teaching of 
an art is no doubt facilitated by the use of tools and of 
accumulated ideas. Tools and accumulated ideas are of course 
hallmarks of the existence of institutions. Tools especially are 
in fact the visible symbols of the existence of institutions of 
intelligence, and accumulated ideas are no less institutionally 
embodied. Some of these institutions are very complex, some 
fairly simple. Moreover, there is probably an order of impor­
tance of them in a given society at a given time, such at least 
that some are dominant and others subordinate in their effects 
upon how the members of a society act and think and feel. 
Inference may be characterized in two quite different ways: 
from the "given" to the "not given" or contrarily from the "not 
given" to the "given." The first is characteristic of the experi­
ence of berries and the expectation of good taste, where the 
taste is inferred from the sight of the berry. In a much more 
complicated form, it is also characteristic of the prudential or 
practical arts, where known and proven ways of doing things 
can be counted on to achieve certain results, even though 
surprises may be in store for its practitioners, just as surprises 
may be in store for the taster of red berries. The other kind of 
inference, that from the "not given" to the "given," marks a 
more radical kind of intelligence, namely, that displayed in 
science. 
Inference in Science 
Science possesses two characteristics that distinguish it from 
the practical arts. It relies upon hypotheses and it exploits 
experimentation. First, about hypotheses. In advanced science, 
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they are not really of trie sort "If red berry, then good taste." 
But rather, "If a string vibrates in certain proportions, then the 
octave or fifth or third, etc." Red berries happen; the vibrating 
proportions have to be looked for, and even that in a peculiar 
way, because the proportions are arithmetical; they are already 
'ideas' for which only later is the scientist able to provide them 
with a local habitation. In advanced science, ideas are invented 
to account for the things of sense, and they are very different 
from the things of sense—for example, as different as the atom 
or the ether or gravity or the cell or the gene. If such ideas are 
to be more than sheer inventions, then they rest upon some 
empirical foundation. That foundation, if discovered at all, 
may come only later and then possibly only tentatively. Mostly, 
ideas are the stuff of reason, partly by way of postulate, partly 
by way of inference from one or more propositions to another. 
The scientist much seeks after ways of interconnecting ideas 
such that they comprise a system. More than anything, it is a 
system of ideas that constitutes them as science. In fact, the 
aim of science is often taken to be an ideally pure system, such 
as may be found in mathematics or pure physics, or even pure 
economics. In the absence of a system of ideas, science would 
not be an institution of intelligence. Because of the system, 
science is constituted as a body of ideas that provides a com­
mon reference from which scientists may elaborate, prune, or 
alter the system in ways more elegant or more in keeping with 
nagging facts. 
Pure science does not fare well without an empirical sup­
port, and this for two reasons, one pertaining primarily to 
truth, the other to institutional relevance. The matter of truth 
is easily explained. Pure theory loses a dimension—precisely 
the dimension of truth. There can always be alternative the­
ories, whether in geometry, physics, biology, etc. As far as pure 
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theory is concerned, there is no good reason for adhering to one 
theory rather than another, as long as they are internally 
consistent. Only empirical considerations provide reasons for 
preferring one to another—namely that one theory better ex­
plains the persistent facts than another. The empirical question 
often arises by comparison of theories which may suggest a 
crucial experiment or series of experiments, which in turn may 
provide good reasons for adopting one and excluding the other. 
In this way, science is seen to be verificatory as well as 
hypothetical-deductive. 
Inference as Experiment and as Technology 
The verificatory phases of science result in experimental 
work and eventually in an institutional support. This result 
occurs because science in application, as experiment shows, is 
relevant to practical things, first, proximately, then produc­
tively. The proximate application is technology, important be­
cause it is two edged. On one side, it partakes of science in the 
dimension of truth. On the other, it partakes of life in the 
dimension of utility. When these two connections are estab­
lished, technology or engineering becomes the essence of the 
institution of science, and operates as an institution of intelli­
gence. On the utilitarian side, science gains support both from 
economics and politics; on the side of truth, it gains respect, 
however slowly, until only later it figures in the institutions of 
power as an element in culture to be preserved. We have 
already sufficiently noted how the marriage of truth and power 
contains institutional dangers capable of corrupting the whole 
enterprise. 
Science today is seen to be a massive, co-operative venture 
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It still depends upon individual inferences, but not on any one 
individual, or even on any particular group, unless we say, 
tautologically, that that group is the group of scientists. Even 
so, the place of the individual is both elevated and depressed 
by automation, that is, by the computer. This fact has unques­
tionably altered the practice of science very much by opening 
up new opportunities and by making more prominent a divi­
sion of labor in determining who does what. With the advent 
of the computer, science has become not less an activity involv­
ing inference. On the contrary, inference has become even 
more evidently established in science. And it has also become 
more evidently institutionalized. The big 6600 Computer is 
surely the visible symbol that the machine, first created by 
science, now has become a creator of science. 
Inference is the heart of the institution of intelligence, but 
its economics derive from the problems that generated it and 
that get transformed in the process. The solution of problems, 
or better, the conversion of problems, acts as the stimulus to the 
perpetuation of an institution of intelligence. But in a superla­
tive degree the institution of science is geared to the solution of 
problems, and the institution of science, more than any other, 
converts virtually every aspect of life in directions that bear the 
stamp of science upon it. Science, we have seen, for better or 
for worse leaves no part of life untouched whether war or 
peace, love or religion, or the whole industrial complex which 
is pre-eminent in utilitarian matters. Nor can educational insti­
tutions be exempt from its influence. Because of the centrality 
of science in contemporary society, the aims of education 
cannot be defined without taking science into account. A 
philosophy of education that does not cope with the primacy of 
science and its implications for the arts is unreal. 
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Education: Conserver, Liberator, Creator 
The purposes of education in our times cannot be realized 
apart from institutions of intelligence. According to the theory 
we have advanced, education requires a learning of the arts 
and sciences, together with a healthy skepticism of them. More 
finely conceived, the tasks of modern education are impossibly 
complex: training the young into the ways of its culture, 
opening up new vistas, aiding them to meet the unforeseeable, 
stimulating them to be radically inventive. The demands, we 
noted, are paradoxical, because of the tug between the aims of 
the conserving of practices on the one side and of breaking 
through encrusted ways on the other. Yet the two may really 
be paradoxical, rather than in contradiction. If so, the mediat­
ing element is inference, because education is irrevocably con­
cerned with articulate learning. When this learning is institu­
tionally organized, as it is in the school, it may at its best 
properly be regarded as an institution of intelligence. 
To advocate stages of education is risky, but inevitable. 
Emphases in them will surely vary with variations in culture, 
but no system of education can succeed which does not initiate 
the young into the sustaining arts of a society. I would caution 
once more that although we may recommend an order of the 
arts, we should bear in mind that at any stage they are complex 
and that we need constantly to respect the various facets of life 
and not starve essential impulses in an attempt to get along 
speedily with the learning of some particular skills. Since 
authentic educational practice leads a person more deeply into 
civic society, there is a constant in all such education, that is, 
the civic ideal. 
This we noted to be the case even in the earliest education 
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of the child in the arts of personal involvement—the first stage 
of the child coming to know himself in coping with personal 
needs of feeding and hygiene, making some stab at communi­
cation in expressing wants and demands, performing some 
simple services, and in becoming sensitive and responsive to his 
immediate environment. The multiplicity of his needs is surely 
a commonplace known to those who have the responsibility of 
child care. Preschool would emphasize a new dimension—a 
movement from the personal to the less personal and more 
threatening environment in having to cope with his peers. The 
suggestion was made that the essential mediating activity is 
found in the involvement with manipulation of things. This 
kind of involvement is surely to be regarded as developing both 
personal and interpersonal dimensions through a more intimate 
knowledge of the ways of things. We would emphasize here 
that this sort of activity implicates the child's rudimentary 
ability to form concepts and draw inferences. 
Although the idea of primary education was projected as 
initiation into a working knowledge of literacy and numeracy, 
these skills were not regarded as being contrary to, or even 
inhibitory of, the development of personal awareness and of 
interpersonal felicity. Literacy and numeracy were given prom­
inence with a view to inculcating early in the child the kinds 
of information, skills, and especially an outlook appropriate to 
the unwavering commitment of contemporary society to sci­
ence and technology. Without this outlook, no one can com­
fortably move about and effectively engage in civic affairs. 
Higher education was likewise conceived as a fulfilment of 
the civic ideal, but with one difference. Its objective was 
regarded less as being one of personal fulfillment (which is not 
therefore at all irrelevant) than one of making authentic con­
tributions to learning. We observed, however, the ambiguity of 
learning, which may turn either toward scholarship or toward 
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scientific advancement. Although the two are not easily recon­
ciled, there are ways of mediating between them, as between 
the humanistic and scientific ideals. 
Science can become less restricted and humanistic studies 
can be made more relevant with the advancement of the liberal 
arts of a society. The arts, containing the aesthetic, the reli­
gious, and the philosophic dimensions, engage the fullest 
powers and cater to the irrepressible demands of civic fulfill­
ment. Finally, to show how these arts need to be more com­
pletely reconciled with the practical arts, we outlined a concept 
of leisure, not as relaxation, but as complementing man's prac­
tical commitments with the more complete liberation of the 
human spirit. Thus leisure not only furthers the play of con­
certed intelligence but also celebrates both its accomplishments 
and its prospects for new institutional involvements. So con­
ceived, leisure becomes the conscience of society, the arts 
serving as its will. Together they constitute the examined 
culture which is worth having. The rest is unavoidable work, 
and relaxation, and love without wisdom. 
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(Continued from front flop) 
Finally, by taking into account the advantage 
of the genuine utilities inherent in science and 
technology as institutions of intelligence and by 
taking into account the possibility of liberating 
the intellect from the confines of pseudo-utilities 
inherent in old folkways, he assesses the pros­
pects for an authentic culture and a new leisure 
consonant with human greatness. 
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